Editor’s note: This is the final analysis in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. Part one on foreign and trade policies can be read here, part two on nuclear weapons policy here, part three on domestic economic policy here, part four on trade policy here and part five on social issues here.

With President Yoon Suk-yeol and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo impeached, the Democratic Party (DP) is set to retake the presidency, against positioning itself as the guardian of democratic norms.

Public expectations are high, but so is skepticism, given the fraught climate that led to the current political state of affairs.

In its first 100 days, the DP will confront a host of urgent challenges. It must restore stability to institutions battered by the Yoon administration’s downfall, ease domestic economic pressures and address festering social issues.

With control of the presidency and its 170-seat majority in the National Assembly, the DP can push through legislation but will need to be careful of overreach that alienates an already anxious public. 

Whether it can convert its electoral mandate into meaningful progress — or if it will be stymied by structural obstacles — will define South Korea’s trajectory for years to come.

Democratic Party lawmakers hold signs calling for the People Power Party to be disbanded, Dec. 20, 2024 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

POLITICAL STABILIZATION

The impeachment saga exposed serious vulnerabilities in South Korean governance, highlighted by bitter partisan battles and an executive branch tarnished by martial law proclamations. In the first days of its new presidency, the DP will likely move quickly to enact targeted reforms aimed at shoring up institutional credibility.

At the same time, the DP’s portrayal of itself as savior — framed against a People Power Party (PPP) it accuses of being complicit in Yoon’s martial law declaration — threatens to deepen political rifts.

The DP will likely seek to maintain its moral appeal without appearing vindictive or heavy-handed, especially if moderates begin to feel discomfort with the DP’s dominance in both the executive and legislative branches. While the DP will be able to rally its base by achieving immediate legislative victories, winning over undecided voters will require transparency and inclusivity.

Further, even with its majority, the DP cannot singlehandedly amend the Constitution or reorganize entire institutions without PPP cooperation. For instance, clarifying investigative jurisdictions between prosecutors, the police and the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) — will face resistance from entrenched interests.

Thus, a DP administration will likely prioritize visible and immediate actions to restore public confidence in governance. Beyond clarifying investigative jurisdictions, it may also champion transparency measures, such as mandating disclosure of executive decision-making processes.

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung attends a party task force meeting to discuss revitalizing the South Korean stock market at the Korea Exchange, Nov. 28, 2024 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

South Korea’s economy is reeling from a depreciating currency, the looming threat of trade protectionism and lack of investor confidence. The DP’s first major move will likely be a supplementary budget designed to inject stimulus into critical sectors and offer immediate relief to struggling families.

While this approach may swell the national debt and undermine long-term stability, the DP may choose to defer bigger debates about fiscal discipline until after the immediate crisis subsides. Its strategy will likely hinge on bolstering social welfare measures — direct subsidies for low-income households, expanded unemployment benefits and targeted support for small businesses.

These moves can build goodwill and address urgent needs, but a perception of recklessness with public finances could haunt the party if inflation pressures take an upward swing.

On the trade front, the administration must adapt quickly to shifting geopolitical dynamics. U.S.-China tensions could worsen if Donald Trump keeps his pledge to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese goods, which may have a significant impact on South Korea’s export-driven economy.

The DP wants to maintain access to both markets while safeguarding key industries such as semiconductors. Thus, a DP administration will likely deepen cooperation with the U.S. on advanced technology and supply chain security while keeping lines of communication open with China to protect vital trade flows.

An elderly South Korean, June 26, 2024 | Image: Korea Pro

SOCIAL WELFARE

Alongside its economic agenda, the DP plans to emphasize social reforms that address structural inequities and demographic decline.

The country’s chronic low birthrate has accelerated labor shortages, while an aging population adds stress to health care systems and social services. Widening these safety nets may prove popular in the short term, but costs will mount.

Health care stands out as a top concern. Rural areas lack enough medical professionals, and specialties such as emergency medicine and pediatrics are perennially understaffed. The DP’s vow to fix these gaps will resonate with rural voters, but mandating doctor relocations could stir fierce pushback.

Rather than sweeping mandates, the DP is more likely to offer incentives like student loan forgiveness, housing subsidies or higher reimbursement rates to coax doctors into underserved regions.

In tackling demographic decline, the DP plans to expand family subsidies, paternity leave and child allowances. The party may also support more generous housing loans or rental support for young couples. With eldercare also a growing concern, the DP will seek to support seniors via upgraded long-term care insurance or tax breaks for employers hiring older workers.

However, it remains to be seen whether these measures will meaningfully boost birth rates or provide economic stability to the country’s senior citizens.

South Korean police officers, July 25, 2024 | Image: Korea Pro

GOVERNANCE REFORMS

Yoon’s impeachment exposed how various law enforcement agencies — prosecutors, the CIO, police and military investigators — all jockey to claim jurisdiction over high-profile cases. And Yoon’s legal defense team has been able to point to unclear jurisdictional authority to defy multiple summonses for questioning.

The DP will likely seek to streamline these powers and reassure the public that accountability will not hinge on turf wars. However, doing so might force the party to revisit the root cause of the jurisdictional confusion — the Moon Jae-in administration’s prosecutorial reform efforts, which sought to curb the historically dominant role of prosecutors in South Korea’s justice system.

One early sign of reform could be legislative action clarifying investigative boundaries, such as restricting the CIO to high-level corruption cases while limiting prosecutors to national security or organized crime. But passing such measures will be contentious, as the PPP will likely describe them as attempts to weaken prosecutors seen as antagonistic to the DP.

Ultimately, resetting institutional integrity will take longer than 100 days. The DP will likely aim for visible fixes to demonstrate momentum, even if far-reaching structural overhaul remains out of reach without PPP cooperation.

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung meets with U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg, Dec. 23, 2024 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

FOREIGN POLICY

Back-to-back impeachments will have undermined confidence among allies, particularly the U.S., which relies on South Korea for regional stability. Rebuilding trust is essential, and the DP will quickly reaffirm the ROK’s alliance with Washington.

However, it remains to be seen how a DP administration will manage Trump’s inevitable demand for Seoul to shoulder a significantly larger portion of joint defense costs, especially as it may fuel domestic resentment about propping up U.S. forces.

North Korea remains a wildcard. The DP may seek to reestablish communications, including by offering limited humanitarian aid. However, Pyongyang’s decision to scrap reunification as part of its policy likely means that the next DP administration may not enjoy the same benefits that Moon Jae-in had during his presidency. 

If North Korea continues to test missiles or float trash balloons toward the South, the new DP administration will need to balance a firm response with a willingness to keep negotiation doors open.

China is the largest trading partner, and the DP will tread carefully between Beijing and Washington. Thus, while a DP administration will comply with U.S. export controls on advanced technologies, it will also try to preserve access to valuable Chinese markets, especially in semiconductors and consumer goods.

But how a DP administration will seek to engage Japan is a mystery. As an opposition party, the DP was able to criticize the Yoon administration’s approach, ranging from wartime labor issues and the Fukushima nuclear power plant to trilateral military exercises.

However, a new DP administration will have to contend with an assertive China and an increasingly hostile North Korea backed by Russia. Moreover, both the U.S. and the EU have grown more comfortable with adopting trade protectionism. Whether the DP will maintain an antagonistic stance toward Tokyo in spite of a drastically transformed geopolitical landscape remains to be seen.

Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung meets with People Power Party floor leader Kwon Seong-dong, Dec. 18, 2024 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

REALITIES AND OUTLOOK

Even with commanding parliamentary numbers, the DP faces structural constraints that limit how much it can accomplish in a short window. The PPP retains enough seats to block constitutional amendments and any major rebalancing of power.

Moreover, heightened public expectations may prove to be a double-edged sword if the DP’s promises — economic rescue, health care fixes and governance reforms — prove slow to materialize.

The DP walks a fine line between decisive action and appearing vindictive. While its labeling of the PPP as enablers of martial law may rally the base, too much scorched-earth rhetoric risks alienating centrists and foreign investors who crave stability over more political strife.

Meanwhile, global market fluctuations and supply chain disruptions remain outside the DP’s control. If inflation worsens, international tensions escalate or foreign central banks’ monetary policies have unintended effects on South Korea’s economy, blame will fall on the new administration just as it did on Yoon.

The stakes are high. If the DP can manage to govern effectively without descending into zero-sum antagonism against the PPP, it could redefine South Korea’s path for the better. If it fails, the nation’s crisis of confidence will only deepen, leaving the public to wonder whether any party can restore faith in a system pushed to the brink.

Edited by Bryan Betts