North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently led the apparent launch of two short-range ballistic missiles matching the profile of either the KN-23 and KN-24 series from a mobile launcher. Pyongyang claimed the successful launch will “drastically improve the strike capability of the front units” and that it will “strengthen the effectiveness of tactical operation and variability of fire missions for the DPRK.”
The description of the test implies the employment of a nuclear warhead in this system. If such a system is operational, it will mean a mobile nuclear missile launch capability will be delegated to tactical units inside the DPRK. This increases the chances of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation as well as by deliberate planning.
In light of the probability that North Korea will deploy tactical missiles with nuclear warheads, it must be assumed that all North Korean missile units are nuclear-capable. To respond to such a threat, the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to establish a system that can respond immediately to an attack; for this, the alliance will need a nuclear Pershing-type tactical missile.
This will inevitably lead to a more dangerous peninsula in the short term, but this is the best way to push forward the prospect of serious arms reduction negotiations with North Korea. It is only when people stand at the precipice of total annihilation that people take seriously the situation in which they have put themselves.
South Korean President-elect Yoon visits United States Forces Korea Commander Paul LaCamera and other USFK personnel, April 2022 | Image: Yoon transition committee team
In Jan. 2022, during the Eighth Party Congress, Kim unveiled a laundry list of new weapons and capabilities he wanted to possess, including stronger, more capable nuclear warheads, solid-fuel intercontinental missiles (ICBMs), nuclear-capable missiles that could fly some 9,300 miles, nuclear submarines and a host of other new hardware.
The new and evolving North Korean capabilities are a serious concern for the South and its allies. Seoul’s primary countermeasures if North Korea’s new nuclear and missile technology were to be used against it is the Korean Three-Axis, or K3. The K3 consists of the Kill-Chain, Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). (The outgoing Moon administration opted to change the names of the K3 processes, but these may not stick under incoming president Yoon Suk-yeol.)
A tactical capability from North Korean units implies that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) will have the ability to conduct a surprise attack with its mobile launch vehicles that carries very little risk of preemptive interruption by the South. This could allow the KPA to overwhelm alliance defense systems.
What is more concerning is that these capabilities could tempt North Korean planners to authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons by these units. Since the natural targets for these types of weapons would be South Korean missile or rocket units, the KMPR strategy will not function unless countermeasures are started immediately. As mentioned, preemption is easier said than done and air defense will not be able to stop all the North Korean missiles. The conclusion, then, is that the K3 will not work against tactical nuclear missiles fired from North Korea.
The South Korean military conducts a missile exercise in Sept. 2017 | Image: Ministry of National Defense
Defense planners under the new Yoon administration may opt for laser weapons to better defend the country. The number of North Korean missiles and artillery is a formidable threat to say the least. A laser defense system that can shoot down these threats is now in the realm of possibility. South Korea needs to accelerate its current research in this space and deploy these types of defensive capabilities as soon as possible.
The ROK relies on extended deterrence provided by the U.S., which is embodied in the strong presence of U.S. military forces in Korea. Despite these assurances, North Korean developments and the ever-changing political environment in Washington are a concern for Seoul.
Polls have found that nearly 70% of the Korean people want to have their own nuclear deterrent. This is probably because a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy is the only proven defense strategy against a nuclear-armed adversary. The political oscillations on nuclear weapons policy that have plagued the U.S. in recent years could be perceived as a weakness by leaders like Kim Jong Un.
RETURN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
Another option that Seoul policymakers have discussed is nuclear sharing or redeployment of U.S. nuclear assets to the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear sharing refers to U.S. nuclear weapons being deployed by Korean assets. In other words, a Korean aircraft piloted by a Korean would drop a U.S. nuclear bomb.
Although there will be consultation and combined training to support this arrangement, the final decision to deploy a U.S. nuclear weapon would always rest with the U.S. president. The cost affiliated with the required modifications to Korean aircraft and related training would require an in-depth review as to whether the benefits are worth the cost.
A redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons has limitations as well. First, there are no cruise missiles or ballistic missiles in the U.S. inventory that are armed with nuclear warheads. The only weapon is the B61-12 bomb that is delivered by an aircraft. To base U.S. aircraft with nuclear weapon delivery capability on Korean soil might be less effective than having these assets in off-peninsula bases farther from North Korean missile attacks. Even if a decision is made to redeploy U.S. nuclear assets to Korea, a significant problem would be where to put them.
The MAD strategy relies on an immediate nuclear response or the adversary believing such a response exists. The main challenge for the ROK-U.S. alliance is that North Korea might believe that it could successfully exploit a situation where North Korea could use a nuclear device and avoid a U.S. response. There must be no such doubt.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un recently led the apparent launch of two short-range ballistic missiles matching the profile of either the KN-23 and KN-24 series from a mobile launcher. Pyongyang claimed the successful launch will “drastically improve the strike capability of the front units” and that it will “strengthen the effectiveness of tactical operation and variability of fire missions for the DPRK.”
The description of the test implies the employment of a nuclear warhead in this system. If such a system is operational, it will mean a mobile nuclear missile launch capability will be delegated to tactical units inside the DPRK. This increases the chances of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation as well as by deliberate planning.
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Retired Lieutenant General In-Bum Chun entered the Korea Military Academy in 1977. Chun was commissioned an infantry officer in 1981 as class 37. Chun became the youngest officer in the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army history to be an aide to a three-star general with a rank of lieutenant. Chun commanded a combat division and the Korean Special Forces. Chun retired from active duty as of July of 2016, and continues to contribute to the improvement of ROK military capabilities and animal welfare.