President Yoon Suk-yeol’s martial law declaration on the evening of Dec. 3 sent shockwaves reverberating around the world. For many international observers, it was seen as part of a broader trend of right-wing leaders instigating democratic reversals.

But in South Korea, it was a blast from the past. The words “martial law” were thought to be consigned to history textbooks. Older South Koreans recalled the curfews and campus protests of their youth.

Younger generations, educated about past abuses under military rule, reacted with alarm and disbelief, remembering lessons about tortured students, imprisoned opposition leaders and deadly crackdowns on democracy protests.

As the events of Dec. 3 unfolded and carried over into the early hours of the following morning, several similarities emerged between Yoon’s declaration and those from South Korea’s authoritarian past. 

However, there was one key difference: Yoon’s martial law was rescinded within a few hours.

BACKGROUND OF MARTIAL LAW DECLARATIONS

Martial law has been a recurring tool in South Korea’s authoritarian history, used by military leaders to suppress dissent and consolidate power. Park Chung-hee declared martial law in 1961 to facilitate his military coup, citing a slumping economy and ineffective governance following even wider protests and massacres by police during the April Revolution of 1960.

Park’s successor, Chun Doo-hwan, expanded martial law in May 1980 to crush democratic protests after Park’s assassination in 1979 in his bid to secure power again amid widescale outcry demanding a new democratic constitution.

Both Park and Chun justified these measures as necessary to restore order during times of crisis. They implemented sweeping restrictions: banning political activity, censoring the media, closing universities and imposing curfews. These actions, while framed as measures to protect the nation, were ultimately self-serving attempts to entrench power.

However, these were remarkable times in a country that had yet to experience true democratic governance.

Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration stands in stark contrast. Yoon’s martial law declaration in which he labeled opposition parties as “anti-state forces” for impeaching administration officials and threatening budget cuts, came after nearly four decades of peaceful transfers of power in Korea.

Moreover, while there were protests calling for Yoon’s impeachment prior to his martial law declaration, they were small in scale and posed no threat to societal stability.

Unlike 1961 or 1980, the circumstances of 2024 suggested no real need for martial law. This key difference, alongside South Korea’s evolved democratic norms, helps explain why Yoon’s attempted self-coup was so short-lived.

Then-Major-General Park Chung-hee (center) leads a coup d’état to take over control of the South Korean government, May 16, 1960 | Image: Wikimedia Commons

MARTIAL LAW DECREE AND ATTEMPTS TO SECURE POWER

The similarities between Yoon’s martial law decree and those issued by Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan are striking, however there are also some key differences to note. 

Yoon’s decree banned political activity and shuttered the National Assembly. By contrast, Park and Chun’s decrees restricted political activity but stopped short of closing the Assembly. This prompted one Korean media outlet to note that Yoon had gone further than previous military governments.

Other observers argued that Yoon’s actions were unlawful, as South Korean law gives the National Assembly the authority to overturn martial law. By attempting to shut down the Assembly, Yoon tried to deprive lawmakers of their constitutionally mandated authority.

Other elements of Yoon’s decree also mirrored those of past regimes, including censorship of the media, bans on strikes and work stoppages and punishment for denouncing the government. Ironically, these orders were often accompanied by promises to allow citizens to carry on with their daily lives.

However, there were notable differences. Both Park and Chun ordered universities to close, recognizing that college students were among their fiercest critics. Yoon, in contrast, avoided disrupting schools. The Ministry of Education was keen to note that schools would not be impacted by Yoon’s martial law declaration.

Yoon also refrained from imposing curfews, a hallmark of past martial law declarations. 

Had Yoon imposed such measures and his martial law made it past the first night, they would have helped him to maintain order against inevitable protests. However, South Korea’s democracy, which has evolved over the past four decades, likely made it challenging for Yoon to issue such orders. 

A day after Chun Doo-hwan declared martial law on May 17, 1980, martial law forces entered Gwangju to suppress the Gwangju Democratization Movement, May 18, 1980 | Image: KTV Archives

THE AMERICAN FACTOR

The role of the United States, or lack thereof, in the events of Dec. 3 marks a striking difference between Yoon’s martial law and those of his predecessors.

During the military dictatorship years, South Korea’s military operated under U.S. operational control in both peace and wartime. Declarations of martial law demanded immediate American responses.

For instance, when Park Chung-hee launched his 1961 coup, the U.S. Forces Korea commander ordered troops to “support the duly recognized Government of the ROK” rather than Park. Although Washington eventually backed Park, the initial American reaction threw the coup’s success into doubt.

When Park declared martial law in 1972, the U.S. did not offer any substantive protest. Months after the 1972 declaration, then-U.S. President Richard Nixon told Park’s prime minister and nephew-in-law, Kim Jong-pil, that he wouldn’t lecture the ROK on its “internal affairs.”

In other words, the U.S. endorsed South Korea’s past coups and martial law declarations as it theoretically had the power to pressure Seoul to return to the status quo.

In 2024, however, the role of the U.S. was significantly diminished. Naturally, many were curious about how Washington would respond, and there have been some valid criticisms of both the official U.S. response and the responses of the Korean watcher community in Washington D.C.

However, no one expected or desired any American interference. The Dec. 3 incident was a domestic political issue that was handled swiftly and decisively by Koreans without external interference. 

Then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan toasts then-South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a reception at the Blue House, Nov. 13, 1983 | Image: National Archives Catalog

DELIVERING JUSTICE

Prosecutors announced Sunday that Yoon has been officially named a suspect in a treason investigation related to his short-lived martial law declaration on Dec. 3.

Former defense minister Kim Yong-hyun was arrested on the same charge earlier that day, and interior minister Lee Sang-min announced his resignation a day after the opposition Democratic Party passed a motion to impeach him at the National Assembly.

These three figures — Yoon, Kim and Lee — have been referred to as the “Chungam High School Faction,” an informal group tied to Yoon through their shared background studying at the same high school. And it has been rumored that Kim and Lee heavily influenced Yoon’s decision to implement martial law, drawing comparisons to Hanahoe, the secretive military clique that enabled Chun Doo-hwan to seize power.

While Chun and his allies faced harsh sentences after South Korea’s democratization — Chun received the death penalty, later commuted, and Roh Tae-woo was sentenced to 22 years in prison, also commuted — Yoon’s reckoning may be less severe.

Nevertheless, the swift legal and institutional response sends a clear message: South Korea will not tolerate a return to military rule or power concentration in the hands of a few.

Edited by John Lee