Shortly after North Korea deployed troops to Russia, South Korea announced it was considering supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine, a move that would depart from its previous stance of offering only non-lethal aid.

DPRK troops’ potential to gain combat experience could help President Yoon Suk-yeol justify providing military assistance to Ukraine if he chooses to do so, but South Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party (DP) has strongly resisted this potential move on the grounds that it could harm ROK security.

Despite such objections, Korea Pro analysis suggests that current South Korean laws requiring consideration of how arms exports impact “international peace” give the president wide discretion to decide whether to send weapons to conflict zones.

And while the DP seeks legal reforms to change this, experts say efforts to mandate additional parliamentary oversight could have a negative impact on the ROK defense industry, cautioning that Seoul will need to carefully handle domestic opposition to protect both its economic and security interests.

Main opposition Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung visits the ROK Army’s 17th Division, Oct. 31, 2024 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea

PUBLIC SENTIMENT AND LEGAL BARRIERS

The DP’s opposition to weapons provision rests on two main arguments: public sentiment and legal concerns. The party argues that sending weapons to Ukraine would jeopardize South Korea’s security by damaging relations with Russia and risking excessive involvement in a foreign conflict.

A Gallup Korea survey from Oct. 24 showed over 80% of South Koreans oppose providing lethal aid to Ukraine.

However, South Korea’s single-term presidency system, combined with Yoon’s seeming disregard for his party’s future electoral prospects, means public opinion alone is unlikely to sway his decision.

Consequently, the opposition bloc has intensified its efforts to challenge the legal framework governing defense exports, proposing amendments to enhance parliamentary oversight and restrict executive discretion.

Relevant laws covering the provision of weapons to foreign countries do not explicitly prohibit weapons exports to conflict zones, although they advise ministers and other heads of relevant branches to consider how such moves could impact international peace. In practical terms, this gives the South Korean president the flexibility to proceed with weapons exports if he or she deems the strategic benefits to outweigh political costs.

Hence, the opposition is pushing for changes to three key laws to limit the executive’s authority to send military supplies abroad without parliamentary consent.

FOREIGN TRADE ACT

The Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법) states that ministerial approval is required for certain strategic items exports when they could affect international peace and security.

Specifically, Article 19(6) requires the industry minister or relevant agency heads to assess whether exports are for “peaceful purposes” and won’t undermine “international peace, security maintenance and national security.”

The DP argues that providing lethal aid to Ukraine inherently contradicts the “peaceful purposes” clause, asserting that the move would harm ROK-Russia relations and drive Moscow closer to Pyongyang, thus posing a risk to South Korea’s national security.

However, the law’s language weakens this argument. It states ministers “may” prohibit exports, not “must.” Additionally, items already approved by the defense acquisition chief are exempt from further ministerial review. The defense acquisition law similarly uses discretionary language, stating its chief “may” restrict exports that could harm peace or cause diplomatic friction.

This wording allows the Yoon administration considerable flexibility. It could argue that arming Ukraine would not violate the Foreign Trade Act’s “peaceful purposes” clause because arming Ukraine might help to end the war sooner and potentially deter further North Korea-Russia military cooperation.

In light of these loopholes, minor opposition Reform Korea Party (RKP) lawmaker Kim Jun-hyeong, with DP support, proposed an amendment in September to remove the law’s discretionary language. The proposed revision would require mandatory prohibition of strategic exports during wartime, aiming to close any gaps that could allow lethal aid to conflict zones.

South Korea’s K9 self-propelled howitzers during a training exercise, July 3, 2007 | Image: ROK Armed Forces via Flickr

THE MILITARY SUPPLIES AND DEFENSE ACQUISITION ACTS

The DP is also pushing for amendments to the Act on Management of Military Supplies (군수품관리법) and the Defense Acquisition and Program Act (방위사업법) to ensure parliamentary oversight on weapons exports.

The Military Supplies Management Act allows the defense minister to transfer supplies to foreign governments without requiring parliamentary consent, provided these exports do not interfere with South Korea’s own military needs. Similarly, the Defense Acquisition and Program Act grants the Defense Acquisition Program Administration chief discretionary authority over defense exports, without explicit restrictions on transfers to conflict zones.

However, the opposition argues that sending military supplies to Ukraine, even indirectly through third-party countries like Poland or the U.S., “violates” these laws, contending that South Korea must maintain sufficient artillery supplies given the technical state of war with North Korea.

This interpretation likely explains the Yoon administration’s swift denial of recent reports suggesting it is considering providing 155-millimeter artillery shells directly to Kyiv.

In response, DP lawmaker Han Jung-ae introduced a bill requiring parliamentary approval for all military exports to countries involved in international conflicts. DP lawmaker and former general Kim Byung-joo also proposed a bill mandating that “all” military supply transfers be reported to parliament during budget sessions, arguing that weapons are state assets and thus require parliamentary oversight.

To address similar concerns under the Defense Acquisition and Program Act, the opposition has called for further restrictions. DP lawmaker Kim Byung-joo’s amendment would align weapons export regulations with Article 60 of the ROK Constitution, which mandates parliamentary approval for treaties concerning national security.

Similarly, RKP lawmaker Kim Jun-hyeong also proposed mandatory export restrictions for countries in conflict, aiming to close perceived legal gaps in the act.

South Korea’s K9 self-propelled howitzers during a training exercise, May 12, 2016 | Image: 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cav Div via Flickr (CC BY-ND 2.0)

BALANCING SECURITY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS

The Yoon administration and the ruling People Power Party are expected to resist these amendments, arguing that mandating parliamentary oversight would hinder South Korea’s defense industry by adding bureaucratic hurdles and creating uncertainty for international clients.

They will likely highlight the economic advantages defense exports bring to South Korea and criticize the DP for endangering trade gains. Further, they may argue that parliamentary oversight could stifle the defense industry’s growth, as mandating the South Korean government to track the end use of weapons exports is impractical.

Similarly, experts caution that excessive restrictions on weapons exports could harm South Korea’s defense industry, emphasizing the need to balance security and economic interests.

“Exports should be supported rather than blocked for countries that aren’t hostile nations or problematic states,” Yang Uk, a military analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, told Korea Pro. 

“If regulations are structured to strangle exports, it will pour cold water on the defense industry,” he said. “The issue isn’t having regulations, but rather what specific content those regulations contain. If there’s a clause about National Assembly control in the amendment, it absolutely should not pass,” Yang said.

Experts also note that categorizing arms as either “offensive” or “defensive” will help the Yoon administration evade potential legal or political hurdles, as it would distance Seoul from the manner in which Ukraine might use those weapons. A high-level presidential official, likely in line with this strategy, referred to the term “lethal weapons” as “emotionally-charged,” signaling that Seoul will move away from the term going forward.

Kim Yeol-su, head of security strategy at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, emphasized that South Korea’s approach to weapons provision “needs to be developed step-by-step in coordination with the international community.”

He added that Yoon should avoid premature announcements on lethal aid, recommending instead that the administration adopt a more nuanced position to limit domestic opposition.

STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY

The DP’s proposed amendments, despite the party’s parliamentary majority, face an uphill battle against Yoon’s likely veto. 

Given this dynamic, while Yoon retains the authority to provide weapons to Ukraine, he will likely proceed cautiously in light of domestic opposition, legal challenges and potential shifts in U.S. policy following the upcoming presidential election.

Regardless of the final decision, Yoon’s approach will not only shape South Korea’s stance on the Ukraine conflict and its burgeoning partnership with European countries, but it may also set a precedent for the country’s future role in global security affairs.

Edited by John Lee