South Korea and the Philippines have strengthened their military ties in recent months, with ROK defense contractors poised to benefit from the Philippines’ military modernization plans. However, this deepening cooperation faces potential risks, including the possibility of increased Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and the impact of South Korea’s parliamentary elections on President Yoon Suk-yeol’s foreign policy agenda.

In March, the ROK Air Force’s Black Eagles aerobatics display team performed at Clark Air Base in Luzon to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two nations. 

Additionally, Philippine Navy spokesperson Commander John Percie Alco announced that the service had begun training the future crews of two corvettes being built by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) at its Ulsan shipyard.

The Philippine crewmembers will deploy to South Korea next year to train with the “original equipment manufacturers” before HHI delivers the first corvette in the second half of 2025.

DEEPENING TIES

These events underscore South Korea’s significant role as an equipment supplier for the Philippines’ ongoing military modernization plans. HHI built two Jose-Rizal class frigates, the Philippine Navy’s most modern warships, with their design serving as the basis for the corvettes under construction.

The Philippine Air Force also operates the FA-50PH, an armed version of the T-50B trainer jets used by the Black Eagles, as its most advanced aircraft.

Additionally, South Korean defense contractors stand to gain from Manila’s other modernization plans. For instance, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. approved revisions to the Philippine military’s modernization plan in January, estimated to cost more than $35 billion over the next decade.

The Marcos administration also adopted the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept to counter China’s escalating aggression in the South China Sea. The strategy is to develop Manila’s ability to project comprehensive power in its exclusive economic zone — “not only in the West Philippine Sea and South China Sea but also in the entirety of its territorial jurisdiction.”

Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), told Korea Pro that the Philippines’ purchases of Korean military hardware will “highly likely” continue.

Hanwha Ocean, a Korean defense firm, is pitching its Jangbogo-III PN attack submarine design for the Philippine Navy’s nascent submarine program. The Philippine Air Force has also expressed interest in evaluating the KF-21 Boramae for its Multi-Role Fighter program alongside American Lockheed Martin F-16s and Swedish Saab Gripen fighters, pending the KF-21’s development progress.

The KF-21’s progress has been troubled. In addition to an Indonesian engineer’s alleged attempt to steal classified information related to the jet, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration — South Korea’s state arms procurement agency — signed a contract in March to begin the production of 20 KF-21 fighter jets this year, half of what was initially planned.

If the Philippine Air Force seriously considers the KF-21 fighter jet for its Multi-Role Fighter program, it would significantly boost Korea Aerospace Industries, the fighter jet’s manufacturer.

BRP Jose Rizal FF150, a Philippine guided missile frigate that was designed and built by Hyundai Heavy Industries, showcases its capabilities, Oct. 27, 2023 | Image: Philippine Navy via Facebook

VERY SERIOUS RISKS

However, despite the potential for further defense cooperation between Seoul and Manila, the relationship is based on commerce rather than on forming a deeper partnership.

Gregory Poling, head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ South East Asia program, believes that to remedy this, the relationship should be supplemented by more training and capacity-building support from the South Korean military.

Poling identifies the lack of a status of forces agreement or visiting forces agreement as the main obstacle to such training exchanges, as they would provide the legal basis for deploying ROK troops to the Philippines for joint training.

Although Philippine military chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. has publicly supported the creation of a visiting forces agreement in his previous posting as the head of the Philippine Army, Poling notes that there has been “no indication” of both nations moving toward reaching such an agreement.

While Marcos Jr. has pursued closer defense ties with the U.S. and Japan, South Korea is likely hesitant to push its relations with the Philippines beyond commercial transactions to avoid upsetting China.

Kurlantzick said that ROK Navy ships would face “very serious” risk from aggressive Chinese actions that could lead to a “miscalculation” if they venture into the South China Sea.

Kurlantzick also expects the recent rhetoric from Beijing, accusing Seoul of “following others to hype up the matter” in response to the South Korean foreign ministry’s “grave concern” over the Chinese Coast Guard’s use of water cannons that injured Filipino sailors on March 23, to intensify.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin answers reporters’ questions during a press briefing, March 12, 2024 | Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China

ELECTION IMPLICATIONS

The April 10 South Korean parliamentary elections resulted in a significant setback for Yoon. The ruling People Power Party secured only 108 seats in the 300-seat National Assembly, while the opposition bloc, led by the Democratic Party (DP), won 192 seats. 

Although the president holds primary authority over foreign policy, the election outcome may lead Yoon to consider parliamentary opposition more carefully when making decisions.

DP leader Lee Jae-myung, a likely 2027 presidential candidate, has openly criticized Yoon’s foreign policy for abandoning former President Moon Jae-in’s approach of attempting to balance South Korea’s ties with the U.S. and China.

A change in leadership, particularly if Lee Jae-myung becomes president, could lead to a shift in South Korea’s approach to military cooperation with the Philippines.

Such a drastic shift will negatively impact South Korea’s credibility among its Southeast Asian partners and hinder Seoul’s ability to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations compared to other regional powers, such as Japan and Australia, weakening its position in the region.

Edited by John Lee