As Europe grapples with conflict on its eastern borders, South Korea’s arms industry has stepped up, challenging the established European defense industries.

However, this surge in South Korea’s arms exports is causing a stir in the European defense market. This development has elicited mixed reactions: while some industry players in Europe see room for a new entrant, others are concerned about the potential impact on their businesses, highlighting broader systemic issues within the continent’s defense sector.

Greta Monika Tuckute, Lithuania’s vice minister of defense, highlighted South Korea’s appeal at the Seoul Defense Talk on Oct. 18. She pointed out South Korea’s ability to innovate and offer high-quality, cost-effective military equipment.

“I don’t see why a country like Lithuania should limit itself to European industries when it comes to arming itself,” Tuckute stated, reflecting a growing trend among European nations to explore diverse defense partnerships.

The conflict in Ukraine has been a turning point for South Korea’s defense industry. Aiming to rank as the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027, Seoul has made significant strides, most notably securing a $13 billion contract with Poland. This deal marks South Korea’s robust entry into the European market, drawing interest from Czechia, Romania and Estonia.

Beyond exporting, South Korean firms are establishing a direct presence in Europe. This year, the Hanwha group solidified its commitment to the European market by setting up “Hanwha Aerospace Europe” in Poland, highlighting South Korea’s serious intentions in the region’s defense landscape.

FILLING THE GAPS

South Korea’s strategy to compete in the European defense sector is not without its complexities. Germany and France, two leading European arms markets, show differing reactions. The split is notable between the governmental stance and the perspectives of manufacturers.

“South Korea is not a threat to France or Europe,” Marjorie Vanbaelinghem, the director of the Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School, the strategic research institute at the Military Academy in Paris, told Korea Pro. “The market, especially now that the war in Ukraine is revitalizing orders, is big enough for Europe and South Korea simultaneously.”

She explained that the current trend of governments diversifying their defense sources means that, in her view, South Korea represents an alternative, rather than a replacement, in the global defense market.

The position of France, a key player in the defense sector, is noteworthy. “The South Korean defense industry fills the gaps left by Europe,” Sung Il, South Korea’s deputy minister of defense, told Korea Pro. He emphasized the complementary nature of this relationship, stressing partnership over competition.

However, Vanbaelinghem also raises concerns about South Korea’s rapid expansion in this sector. She warns of potential drawbacks for Seoul, highlighting the substantial state investment required to sustain an ambitious export-driven defense industry. 

“To remain competitive over the long term, you need to fund research and development at a high level, which can have a significant impact on the country’s budget over time,” she told Korea Pro.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol attends the opening ceremony for the Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition 2023, Oct. 17, 2023 | Image: ROK Presidential Office

LACK OF ANTICIPATION

The political implications of South Korea’s burgeoning arms exports are significant, Vanbaelinghem told Korea Pro. She explained that armaments are inherently tied to international relations.

South Korea’s alignment with NATO, she notes, has opened doors in some markets while potentially limiting opportunities in others, especially in countries of the “global south” that may be hesitant to align with NATO standards. Vanbaelinghem suggests that South Korea must carefully consider its position in the international arms trade landscape.

However, the situation for French defense companies presents a more complex scenario. “There was clearly a lack of anticipation on the part of both the government and industry, Kevin Martin, a researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research, told Korea Pro, suggesting complacency within the French government and its defense industry.

Martin calls attention to France’s need to formulate a strategic response. “South Korea’s export policy is very aggressive, with a highly varied catalog, from tracked armored vehicles to aircraft, not forgetting the navy,” he said.

Further, South Korea’s non-NATO status gives it a unique advantage in markets like the Middle East, where countries may seek to avoid overt alignment with NATO powers. This aspect reshapes traditional market dynamics, where France and the U.S. previously held more robust positions.

As France grapples with this new reality, Germany, another key player in the European arms industry, faces its own set of challenges with South Korea’s ascent. However, the nature of the challenge differs, as Germany’s defense market dynamics and relationships vary from those of France.

DIFFERENT MARKETS

Germany’s relationship with South Korea in defense matters dates back to the 1990s. This history includes instances such as Berlin’s support in mine-clearing operations and the ROK Navy’s procurement of submarines based on Germany’s Type-209 design. This longstanding cooperation sets the context for Germany’s current stance toward South Korea’s evolving defense industry.

During a brief visit to Seoul in May, Olaf Scholz emphasized the need for enhanced defense collaboration between the two nations. This was soon followed by Berlin’s decision to relax arms export regulations to Seoul, signaling a potential shift in German defense diplomacy.

Kevin Martin, from the Foundation for Strategic Research, sees South Korea’s rise in the arms industry not as a direct threat to Germany but as a different market focus. While South Korean firms like Hanwha engage in sectors where they compete with German companies like Rheinmetall, the overall market strategies of the two countries diverge.

Martin points out that Germany has “closed itself off to customers that South Korea has not hesitated to approach.” A notable example is Poland, with which Germany hesitated to engage deeply due to political concerns and reluctance to share technology, limiting its market presence in ways South Korea did not.

“Political differences between Germany and Poland, in particular the uncertainty of Polish politics in the coming years, blocked the negotiations for German tanks.”

EUROPEAN COOPERATION

The entrance of South Korea into the global arms market poses a significant coordination challenge for the European defense industry. Divergent interests across European countries have led to fragmentation, as highlighted in a recent report by the European Parliament. This fragmentation has manifested in slow and uncoordinated production processes across the continent.

At the heart of this issue are joint development projects, which have been notably sluggish. The Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) project, intended to replace the Leclerc and Leopard tanks and initiated in 2012, exemplifies this stagnation, having made little progress over the years. Differing national interests and intra-industry competition have hindered collaboration between leading European defense players like Berlin and Paris.

“Europe has abandoned certain sectors, such as armored vehicles, in the belief that land warfare will not return to its soil any time soon. South Korea is now making up for this lack of anticipation,” Martin told Korea Pro. In response, Europe has recently reignited efforts on the MGCS project, albeit as a delayed reaction.

The dynamic between European nations and South Korea in the defense sector is complex. France and Germany, while being traditional leaders in European defense, are also strategic partners with South Korea in defense and broader Indo-Pacific security issues. The rise of the South Korean arms industry necessitates a new paradigm for these European nations — one where they must navigate the dual roles of partner and competitor with South Korea.

Edited by John Lee