Last week, the world witnessed the most serious threat yet to Vladimir Putin’s grip on power as the Wagner Group marched on Moscow. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the world has yet to see the final act play out, and the political tremors will likely reverberate in Seoul.

Should Russia’s leadership crisis deepen, repercussions will present a mixed bag of challenges and opportunities for South Korea. The potential instability in Russia could necessitate a recalibration of how the Yoon Suk-yeol administration approaches the war in Ukraine.

But in the medium to long term, the potential ramifications become even more complex for Seoul. The state of North Korea-Russia relations would be a significant concern, and South Korea would need to navigate the prospects of rejuvenating economic cooperation with regional entities in the Russian Far East.

MILITARY AID TO UKRAINE?

The ROK has so far contributed to Ukraine’s efforts on various non-military fronts. However, recent reports have also alleged that South Korea is supplying Ukraine with ammunition through U.S. channels.

The Yoon administration finds itself navigating a precarious path, striving to balance Washington’s requests for the provision of lethal aid to Kyiv against Moscow’s threat of retribution for such assistance. This diplomatic tightrope walk poses a significant challenge for Seoul.

Going forward, the Yoon administration’s approach to the question of lethal support to Kyiv will likely hinge on the unfolding effects of the Wagner rebellion on the conflict itself.

The Wagner uprising, arguably driven in part by popular discontent among Russians with the war’s progression, could significantly impact the trajectory of the conflict. Should the fallout from the Wagner mutiny critically impair Moscow’s ability to sustain its military engagement in Ukraine, this could potentially alleviate the pressure on Seoul to provide lethal aid.

However, if instability in Russia exacerbates the Ukrainian conflict, leading to an increase in casualties, Yoon may confront increasing pressure to augment Seoul’s support for Kyiv. This is especially pertinent given the unprecedented degree of alignment the Yoon administration has fostered between Seoul and NATO.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the G7 Summit, May 21, 2023 | Image: ROK Presidential Office

INTER-KOREAN CONCERNS

Any potential power struggle in Moscow and its subsequent impact on the relationship between Russia and the DPRK will undoubtedly be significant for Seoul.

North Korea’s immediate and unambiguous response to the unrest in Russia was to support the Kremlin and any actions it may take against Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion. This stance mirrors North Korea’s ongoing overt support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

The noteworthy aspect of North Korea’s support for the Kremlin is the continued allegiance to the Russian state even while the Wagner Group — a private military company that has allowed Moscow plausible deniability — allegedly receives North Korean weapons for use in Ukraine. Since late 2022, Wagner’s involvement has helped maintain plausible deniability for both parties involved in weapon supplies, thereby enhancing DPRK-Russia relations.

North Korea’s apparent preference for the survival of Putin’s regime illuminates the value that the DPRK places on Russia as a partner against the West, even at the potential risk of unsettling the dynamics between the North Korean regime and Wagner. This posture becomes all the more significant considering the possible dependence of the North Korea-Russia relationship on the internal state of affairs within the Russian Federation.

Long-term political instability in Russia could result in the Kremlin de-emphasizing its ties with the DPRK, much like the post-Soviet political turmoil of the 1990s, which led to an erosion of trust between Russia and North Korea. The DPRK likely hopes to circumvent a similar situation by voicing its support for the Kremlin and positioning itself as a reliable ally to ensure Russia’s backing in North Korea’s ongoing standoff with the West.

Maintaining the upward momentum in North Korea-Russia relations since Feb. 2022 could also impact South Korea’s strategic calculations. The potential for strengthened ties between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin might cause South Korean policymakers to reconsider the extent of their willingness to antagonize Russia, particularly if Putin manages to withstand the present challenge to his power.

Notably, some in South Korea’s foreign policy circles have voiced concerns regarding the potential limitations to Seoul’s diplomatic maneuverability on North Korea if the ROK aligns overtly against Russia.

Conversely, Moscow’s role in inter-Korean relations may diminish in Seoul’s policy considerations if the Kremlin downplays its attention to Pyongyang.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony commemorating the 80th anniversary of breaking the Siege of Leningrad, Jan. 18, 2023 | Image: Russian Presidential Executive Office 

THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

A substantial weakening of Putin’s regime could stimulate increased regional factionalism within the geographically vast Russian Federation, potentially opening avenues for renewed economic cooperation between the ROK and entities in the Russian Far East.

If the Kremlin’s ability to govern its far-flung regions diminishes, it could evoke former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s exhortation to regional leaders during the upheaval of the early 1990s: “Grab all the sovereignty you can swallow.”

Fearing such a drift, Putin took steps to prevent it early in his presidency, such as requiring the Kremlin’s approval for elected regional governors and forming the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic in 2012. The latter has seen extensive collaboration with the ROK until recently.

The Kremlin had long seen South Korea as an alternative investment source to balance China’s economic dominance before it classified the ROK as an “unfriendly country.” With continuing international sanctions against Russia potentially driving increased Chinese investment in the Russian Far East, regional leaders inclined to distance themselves from Moscow may seek to reinvigorate economic ties with South Korea.

Economic cooperation with Russia could be advantageous for South Korea, even in the post-Feb. 2022 era, as Jeh Sung-hoon, a Russian language professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, contends. However, the success of any economic overtures from Russian entities to the ROK would be bound by the confines of sanctions.

This raises a question about Seoul’s willingness to consider economic collaboration with Russian entities that have distanced themselves from the Kremlin as a viable alternative, thereby introducing an intriguing aspect to the evolving economic discourse.

GUESSING GAME

South Korea cannot discount the potential for sustained instability in Russia, particularly if the cracks in Putin’s authoritative rule widen. The most pressing issue for the ROK will be navigating the complex question of providing military assistance to Ukraine.

Looking to the future, the role of Russia in inter-Korean relations and the prospect of economic cooperation between South Korea and the Russian Far East will likely emerge as critical focal points.

However, how South Korea approaches Moscow and the Russian Far East will depend on who controls the Kremlin.

Edited by John Lee