Beijing’s increasingly antagonistic “wolf warrior” rhetoric toward the Yoon administration signals a critical shift in the dynamics of ROK-China relations.

President Yoon Suk-yeol’s remarks ahead of his trip to Washington in April, where he opposed any attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force, elicited a furious response from China.

South Korean media quoted a “Chinese source in Beijing,” stating, “China sees this as a sign that South Korea has become more aligned with the U.S., and it will probably wait to see the outcome of the upcoming South Korea-U.S. summit before making a concrete response.”

China’s state-run media outlet Global Times launched a critique of Yoon in late April, accusing him of bowing to Japan to win favor with Washington. The outlet labeled Yoon the “least independent-minded” South Korean president thus far.

When the South Korean Embassy in Beijing expressed its objection to these sentiments, the Global Times issued a stark warning: Seoul risked a “collapse of the situation in Northeast Asia,” a scenario it described as “unbearable” for South Korea.

There are other signs that China is adopting a more confrontational posture, with the ROK foreign ministry confirming that Korean businesspeople in China shared rumors on social media that Beijing might deploy tactics akin to those utilized during the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) dispute from 2016 to 2017.

An editorial cartoon in China Daily, a state-run English-language daily newspaper, recently included the ROK in its criticism of the U.S. and its allies.

Recently, a Chinese academic wrote in Global Times: “The atmosphere…is a result of Seoul’s attempts to return to the diplomatic attitude of the Cold War and its frequent suspected interference in China’s internal affairs [i.e., Taiwan].” He warned that Seoul’s current path is not conducive to developing relations and will “affect regional peace and stability.”

Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chinese leader Xi Jinping shaking hands ahead of the bilateral summit during the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Osaka, Dec. 19, 2019 | Image: Korean Culture and Information Service

CONCRETE RESPONSES

Beijing’s “concrete response” to Seoul’s latest overtures seems imminent. At a minimum, Beijing will refuse to make the relationship better.

Previous conservative presidents had good relations with Beijing. Park even attended a massive 2015 military parade in Beijing, standing second only to Putin in proximity to Xi Jinping. Her successor, progressive Moon Jae-in, traveled twice to Beijing, adding up to three Korean presidential visits since Xi Jinping last set foot in Seoul in 2014.

It will send a clear message if Xi continues not to visit Seoul. It casts the current Yoon administration and the conservative movement as incapable of fostering a cooperative relationship — potentially becoming an issue in the next election as it has in other democracies.

Progress on other fronts, such as cooperation on North Korea or easing restrictions on Korean entertainment content, would also halt. However, sectors like semiconductors, where Beijing is keen to join forces with Korean companies to counter Washington, would be the exception to this lack of progress.

If it chooses to escalate the situation, the scale of Beijing’s response could parallel its reaction to South Korea’s THAAD installation in 2017. The deputy editor of the Global Times previously warned Australia in 2017 by referring to South Korea’s experience as “a good example of how the Chinese public could make an impact on another country’s economy and trade.”

This phrase, “the Chinese public,” implies the implementation of undeclared sanctions under the guise of popular boycotts, making them more challenging for Seoul to counteract, including at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Such measures would aim to inflict damage on the Korean economy while minimizing their impact on Beijing’s strategic goals. Unlike the targeting of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, industries like beauty products might come under fire.

Beijing can also employ its gray zone tactics. Such strategies would mean an increased presence of Chinese fishing vessels doubling as maritime militias in South Korean waters, more frequent naval confrontations and heightened pressure on Korea’s air defense identification zone (KADIZ).

An even more ominous possibility is China’s use of hostage diplomacy. There have been several instances of this recently; Canadian citizens were detained following the arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou in Canada for extradition to the U.S. They were released only upon her release.

Similar episodes involved Japan, Australia and others. Disturbingly, there is a possibility that South Korean soccer player Son Jun-ho, recently detained in China on bribery allegations, may already have been caught up in such tactics.

Perhaps the most alarming prospect is Beijing’s potential decision to “unleash” North Korea. A recent article in Xinhua, China’s official state news agency, urged South Korea to “quickly rein in at the edge of the cliff” and not forget that their “compatriots in the North haven’t had any contact through the inter-Korean hotline for a long time.”

North Korean provocations have had deadly consequences in the past; the most disastrous recent incident led to the loss of 46 sailors to a North Korean torpedo attack in 2010. This threat highlights the grave risks associated with Beijing’s response to Seoul’s political direction.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol speaking during the bilateral summit on the sidelines of the Group of 20 (G20) Bali summit, Nov. 15. 2022 | Image: ROK Presidential Office, edited by Korea Pro

DIRECT AND CONTROL

In whatever action Beijing takes, its intent will not be simply to punish but rather to direct South Korea’s actions toward policies that favor China. Beijing divides the world into friends and enemies, with waverers in between. It initially categorized Yoon as one of the waverers, given that South Korea’s prior conservative presidents, like Park Geun-hye, were keen to improve cooperation with China even while maintaining the country’s security alliance with the U.S.

Yoon himself initially signaled a desire for a cooperative relationship. However, Yoon’s alignment with the U.S. and Japan, particularly over the issue of Taiwan, has now likely led Beijing to consider him more of an enemy.

Beijing perceives the situation as it always does in such cases: blaming malign U.S. influences operating through some bad local elements. 

Chinese commentators have zeroed in on a small circle of American-educated officials as the troublemakers. They are key figures in Yoon’s administration: deputy national security adviser Kim Tae-hyo, Korea’s Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho, foreign minister Park Jin and former national security adviser Kim Sung-han.

Chinese commentators perceive these individuals as having been “Americanized,” hence their alleged antagonism toward China and admiration for Japan. While it’s impossible to know for sure, decision-makers in Beijing likely see it much the same way.

Just as the explanation is the same, so is the solution: try to isolate these apparently hostile elements and unite their friends against them. This strategy will persist until Korea’s conservatives understand that cooperation can only be achieved on Beijing’s terms.

In the meantime, Korean progressives are likely to convince voters of their willingness and ability to abide by Beijing’s rules, thus fostering cooperation. Korea’s influential corporate sector will also be induced to emphasize the importance of “cooperation.”

The effectiveness of Beijing’s strategy ultimately hinges on South Korea’s national resolve. Although Yoon didn’t begin his term as a China hawk, he will likely double down. Yoon’s team views the key problem as Beijing’s lack of respect for Seoul, and they believe that cultivating stronger ties with Washington and Tokyo can provide leverage.

However, they might be underestimating what a Chinese scholar Gong Keyu at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, referred to as “China’s sense of superiority and condescending attitude toward the Peninsula.” Giving voice to this sentiment, Chinese celebrity commentator Hu Xijin stated, “I believe that South Korea as a whole cannot be an enemy of China. It does not have the strength or courage.”

The probability of Beijing backing down before the next South Korean election is virtually nonexistent.

The crucial question is how the South Korean public will react to China’s inevitable retaliatory measures. As more than 80% of South Koreans have expressed negative or very negative views of China, it is not implausible that they might rally behind Yoon, which would signal to the political left that it must be more circumspect toward Beijing if it wants to win elections.

Over time, such an outcome could even prompt Beijing to reassess its tactics if it perceives South Korea is increasingly slipping away. 

However, considering Yoon’s low approval ratings, it appears more plausible that Beijing will have its belief reaffirmed: it possesses the necessary tools to manage South Korea and occasional troublemakers like Yoon.

Edited by John Lee