South Korea’s inaugural Indo-Pacific Strategy lists Southeast Asia as a regional priority for Seoul, but experts fear a lack of specifics in the new policy could spread the ROK’s priorities too thin and force it to lose traction in an increasingly competitive region. 

The strategy stresses that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region remains central to Seoul’s foreign policy, serving as its second-largest trading partner and investment destination and the top travel destination and largest official development assistance (ODA) partner from South Korea’s side.

“The solidarity established through years of political and economic cooperation, as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges, will serve as a strong foundation from which the ROK and ASEAN can deepen their collaboration towards their common objectives in the Indo-Pacific,” the brief says.

ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol attended the ASEAN summit in November, where he pledged to ensure a “free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” by working with other countries and regions, including ASEAN and East Timor. Seoul also proposed a new Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) as the foundation for stronger relations.

A few weeks later, South Korea and Vietnam upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” signaling the former’s attempt to prioritize Southeast Asia.

Despite these grand ambitions, however, the new Indo-Pacific Strategy is “basically just a continuation” of former president Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy (NSP) covering Southeast Asia and India, Jeffrey Robertson, an associate professor of diplomatic studies at Seoul’s Yonsei University, told Korea Pro.

Introduced in 2017 and expanded as the New Southern Policy Plus in 2020 to tackle emerging pandemic-era challenges, the NSP promoted mutually beneficial and sustainable trade and investment, cultural exchanges and infrastructure development and cooperation in security, health, education, and digital industries.

Moon Jae-in addresses the 22nd ASEAN-ROK Summit, Oct. 26, 2021 | Image: Moon Jae-in Administration Blue House Facebook

By comparison, Yoon’s policy seeks to expand security cooperation for the region and help secure “free and safe sea lines of communication,” including increased naval ship transfers, military logistics support and cooperation on maritime terrorism and law enforcement.

The strategy calls for closer cooperation with ASEAN and other regional forums on the economy, finance and food to ensure a “robust financial safety net” and pledges to increase ODA in areas such as digital education, climate change, smart cities and transportation.

Southeast Asia welcomed Moon’s increased emphasis on the region at the time and is likely to favor policy continuity despite Yoon’s decision to scrap the NSP, according to Hoo Chiew-Ping, a senior lecturer in strategic studies and international relations at the National University of Malaysia (UKM).

“The New Southern Policy is actually one of the successful legacies from the previous government, so it makes sense for the current administration to carry it forward,” she said.

Hoo added that South Korean officials have indicated the new policies are likely to remain much the same but added that the structure has yet to be clarified, particularly for KASI.

President Yoon Suk-yeol and Vietnamese former president Nguyen Xuan Phuc raise a toast to ROK-Vietnam relations, Dec. 6, 2022 | Image: ROK President Office

BALANCING REGIONAL POWERS

Experts warn that the strategy’s lack of clarity on Southeast Asia could see Seoul fall behind other players in an increasingly competitive region, despite its current strong position.

Unlike the region-specific NSP, Yoon’s approach takes a broader view of the Indo-Pacific and tries to incorporate countries such as the U.S., China and East African nations. 

“Trying to please everyone means that you’re not going to please anyone and that perhaps will be the case for Southeast Asia,” Yonsei University’s Robertson said.

A Korea Pro analysis last June, well before the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s release, raised similar concerns that the broader Indo-Pacific focus would distract from Seoul’s Southeast Asia relations.

The shift from Southeast Asia was evident at November’s ASEAN summit when Yoon’s most high-profile engagement was a trilateral summit with U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

The ROK’s lack of clear stance is also reflected in its vacillation between the U.S. and China as competition grows between the countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

China remains a complex subject for South Korea and Southeast Asia, as both rely heavily on Beijing for economic activity while sometimes finding themselves at odds with its regional politics.

The strategy emphasizes Seoul’s alliance with Washington based on “universal values.” But Seoul’s careful avoidance of criticizing Beijing’s human rights record or growing assertiveness in the region speaks to its complex relationship with its much larger neighbor. 

Robertson said that as a U.S. ally, South Korea might not be best placed to work with Southeast Asia to facilitate a regional balance regarding China. But it could make use of ASEAN’s neutrality to advance its goals.

“South Korea wants to use ASEAN’s centrality and position as a neutral player to paint itself in a better light with China,” he said. “To paint itself not as an alliance partner for the U.S., but as working with ASEAN to ameliorate any tensions between the two major players.”

Hoo concurs, saying, “It’s only by forging a closer and stronger partnership with ASEAN countries that South Korea would have some breathing room or space to navigate these types of geopolitical uncertainties.”

U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping hold talks in Indonesia, Nov. 14, 2022 | Image: POTUS Twitter

FALLING SHORT ON ‘VALUES-BASED’ LEADERSHIP

The new strategy emphasizes its foundations in democracy and the rule of law in line with the three pillars of the U.N.: peace and security, human rights and development.

To this end, it pledges to “actively promote and strengthen a regional order that is shaped not by force or coercion, but by rules and universal values” and expresses Seoul’s opposition to “unilateral change of status quo by force.”

However, this raises questions about how strong a leadership role the ROK wants to play in ensuring these values in Southeast Asia, where some leaders often restrict fundamental freedoms to maintain power. 

“We question what kind of values-based diplomacy South Korea is trying to pursue and whether it is in line with what Southeast Asian countries are interested in,” UKM’s Hoo said, citing Myanmar as an example.

Under Moon, South Korea suspended defense exchanges with Myanmar’s military after it seized power in a coup in Feb. 2021. Two years later, the junta government retains control despite ASEAN’s attempts to make it adhere to a much-criticized agreement to restore democracy.

“What South Korea can do right now would be something like asserting a rules-based international order to support ASEAN’s solution to the crisis,” Hoo said. “But other than that … there is a constraint as to what extent to start asserting pressure over the Myanmar military regime.”

Robertson says that South Korea can do much more to address this situation but does not believe it will, as Seoul wants to position itself as a regional leader to get more from other countries, it is not willing to commit and show actual leadership in resolving regional issues.

“South Korea has a position where it seeks to gain the benefit from what is outside Korea, but not necessarily get embroiled into the challenges of what is outside the Korean region,” he said.

Comparing the situation to Ukraine, where the ROK has offered to help with reconstruction but is not entering the conflict, he said, “South Korea will be more than willing to help reconstruct because there’s money there, but it won’t be willing to necessarily lead efforts to bring a close to the current situation.”

Although the Yoon administration’s stated goal of expanding its scope to include other regional countries and blocs in its Indo-Pacific strategy might be justifiable in a shifting global political landscape, Yoon’s focus on larger picture narratives, such as South Korea’s participation in the G7 and closer alignment with Washington and Tokyo, does not bode well for ASEAN. 

Unless carefully managed, Seoul might find itself undermining its interests in Southeast Asia and failing to emerge as a regional leader.

Edited by John Lee