It would be easy to assume that South Korea’s relationships with China and North Korea are inextricably linked, not least because Beijing is Pyongyang’s biggest backer. And South Koreans are in broad agreement that China and the DPRK pose significant security challenges.

But public opinion breaks down quite differently. South Koreans across the political spectrum feel mostly negatively about China, but there are fundamental divides between the left and right about how to handle North Korea. 

This political rift goes back to the Korean War, reflecting uncertainty in the ROK about the DPRK’s place within Korean identity. And by understanding how this shapes South Koreans’ divergent views toward China and North Korea, alliance managers can better calibrate expectations and coordinate their policies.

BIPARTISAN CHINA POLICY

Recent political discourse about China might give the impression that there has been rising polarization in recent years. While he was running for president, President Yoon Suk-yeol repeatedly vowed to take a tougher stance on China and criticized his predecessor’s policies as “pro-China.” 

Conservatives have accused Moon Jae-in and other progressives of submitting to Beijing since the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system controversy in 2016 and 2017. Shortly before Moon was elected president, the now-defunct Liberty Korea Party, the People Power Party’s (PPP) predecessor, argued that the Democratic Party was taking a “pathetic” and “reckless” stance by arguing that the missile defense system should be stopped for fear of Chinese retaliation.

Yet beyond the rhetoric, conservatives and progressives broadly agree that they must resist Chinese bullying and that South Korea should — without provoking China — strengthen its alliance with the U.S. 

Polls show that South Korean views of China have deteriorated sharply since 2017, to the extent that many South Koreans now view China less favorably than Japan. This shift occurred across the political spectrum, even as conservatives remain slightly more distrustful of China than progressives.

Despite criticism from the right, the Moon administration condemned Beijing’s unofficial sanctions campaign and ultimately supported THAAD deployment. And although Yoon has portrayed his pursuit of a closer relationship with the U.S. as a change from the past, his efforts build on steps Moon took to strengthen the alliance throughout 2020 and 2021.

That South Korea’s two main political camps have broadly similar China policies is, to some extent, unsurprising. One of the most widely accepted theories in international relations is that foreign threats produce domestic unity.

Panmunjom at the inter-Korean demilitarized zone | Image: NK News (Sept. 2015)

DIVISIVE NORTH KOREA POLICY

However, North Korea is a different matter. Although most South Koreans see North Korea as a significant security threat, the left and right disagree over how their government should handle the inter-Korean relationship. 

For example, after North Korea’s first nuclear weapons test in Oct. 2006, then-President Roh Moo-hyun, a progressive stalwart, doubled down on inter-Korean engagement and humanitarian aid policies. On the other hand, Roh’s conservative successor, Lee Myung-bak, made economic assistance conditional on progress toward denuclearization and publicly criticized Pyongyang’s human rights record.

A decade later, Moon revived inter-Korean rapprochement during his presidency, including three summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018 in an attempt to assure Pyongyang of Seoul’s peaceful intentions. The two Koreas also took a number of additional steps toward detente such as family reunions and an inter-Korean military agreement. 

Like Lee Myung-bak, however, Yoon reversed course once again and abandoned proactive engagement. The onus is once again on Pyongyang to make concessions. Yoon has also promised economic assistance for denuclearization and condemned Pyongyang’s human rights violations. 

Yoon has gone further, pushing for “joint planning and execution” of nuclear assets with the U.S. and appearing to suggest South Korea could even develop its own nuclear weapons program if conditions become “more serious.” He’s the first president to publicly suggest this course of action. 

FORMATIVE RIFT

The discrepancy between Seoul’s policies toward Beijing and Pyongyang is in North Korea’s ambiguous position within South Korean national identity. Essentially, a country is less likely to unite against a foreign threat when a “formative rift” in its history divides political groups over national identity issues and causes them to perceive the danger differently. 

Political science professors Murat Somer and Jennifer McCoy explain that formative rifts are “long-standing and deep-cutting divisions that either emerged or could not be resolved during the formation of nation-states, or, sometimes, during fundamental re-formations of states” such as after civil wars or transitions from communism to capitalism.

The rift on the peninsula dates back to the Korean War. Since then, South Korean conservatives have primarily seen the DPRK as an enemy state to be defeated. In contrast, progressives have viewed North Koreans as estranged kin they ought to reconcile with, albeit a security challenge. 

These differing perspectives on national identity lead to differing perceptions of threats from Pyongyang, resulting in South Korean progressives being more disposed to engagement and compromise. This discrepancy is evident in many ROK progressives’ initial reluctance to support THAAD deployment, as it stemmed partly from the notion that doing so would be needlessly provocative to North Korea.

In contrast, South Koreans do not have a comparable formative rift over China. During the Cold War, conservatives were concerned that progressives were communists and possibly pro-Beijing, but views on China did not raise fundamental issues of national identity. 

Moreover, starting in the 1990s, successive conservative and progressive administrations had similar China policies based on a desire for robust economic cooperation balanced with security cooperation with the U.S. For example, Park Geun-hye, despite being a conservative and the daughter of the anti-communist dictator Park Chung-hee, pursued largely China-friendly policies during the 2010s.

This lack of a formative rift over China made it easier for Beijing’s pressure campaign on THAAD to serve as a unifying threat, thus producing domestic cohesion. 

Unless Pyongyang forces South Koreans to perceive it as a significant threat, such as by conducting a seventh nuclear weapons test, President Yoon Suk-yeol will have much broader support for his approach to China than North Korea. Historically rooted identity issues have erected lasting divisions that might be too challenging for any president to overcome otherwise.

Edited by John Lee