South Korea is not a nation of immigrants. And would-be emigrants who wish to work and live outside their home countries hardly rush to settle in Korea.

This week, Statistics Korea announced that the number of immigrants, including naturalized citizens, residing in the country fell by 2% in 2022 from the previous year. Korea’s population is approximately 52 million and immigrants make up less than 2.6% of it, accounting for about 1.35 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic has proved to be a setback for increasing the country’s immigrant population. In 2021, the migration rate, including Koreans, fell to an overall negative level for the first time since 2006. The migration rate for foreigners was also down for the second consecutive year, with only the 10-29 age bracket showing a net increase.

A reason for the overall decrease was Chinese nationals’ high rate of outgoing migration. Although improved from 2020, 22,000 more Chinese migrants left Korea (117,000) in 2021 than entered (95,000). Thailand, another critical source of migrants, also saw a negative migration rate, while Vietnam flatlined, with 17,000 leaving and entering.

Before the pandemic, these three countries were the top three nationalities of newcomers to South Korea. 

THE GRASS IS NOT GREENER

According to the most recent government statistics, most foreign residents in Korea work in the mining and manufacturing sector (43.2%), followed by wholesale, retail, lodging and restaurants (19.2%). The industries that grew in 2021 compared to the previous year were construction and agriculture (19.4%) and forestry and fisheries (7.2%).

Many migrant workers in these industries are engaged in low-skilled, low-wage occupations that young Koreans tend to avoid. The most significant issues these workers face relate to working conditions and discrimination.

Employers do not guarantee safe dormitories for their workers. Temporary structures, like shipping containers, that lack proper heating and cooling systems are still considered legal dwellings for their accommodation. Migrant workers are also not legally allowed to change workplaces, which subordinates them to their employers.

Other concerns include wage theft, withholding and minimal protection for illness and accidents.

Marriage migrants, the majority of whom are women, often face communication barriers due to a lack of language skills, domestic conflicts over cultural differences and sometimes violence from patriarchal domination. The discrimination they face is intersectional, along the lines of gender, class and their status as foreigners.

Finally, there are also overseas Koreans who have been encouraged by the Korean government to migrate at various times. Concentrated in southwest Seoul’s Guro, Garibong and Daerim neighborhoods, the Joseonjok — ethnic Korean Chinese nationals — are one of the largest of these communities.

The first wave arrived in 1992, following the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and South Korea. The Joseonjok migrated to northeast China’s Jilin province during the Japanese occupation of Korea and many likely believed that returning to their ancestral homeland (and a richer country) would bring them a brighter financial future.

However, the Joseonjok have been frustrated by underpaid work and unstable jobs, as South Koreans often treat them as “not Korean enough.” The Joseonjok often fall victim to negative stereotypes related to drugs, alcohol and violent crime, thanks partly to media portrayals.

Departures at Incheon Airport, Oct. 2013 | Image: Kristofer Palmvik via Flickr

HOSTILE NATIVES

Support mechanisms and networks are critical for new migrants, facilitating their access to public services, healthcare, housing, banking and the justice system, as well as workshops and language classes. While agencies providing these types of support exist, they primarily exist in migrant enclaves across Seoul and Gyeonggi Province.

Migrants also seek a sense of community, belonging and settlement assistance at places of religious worship. But hateful protests in Daegu against the construction of a mosque near Kyungpook National University, following a backlash against the enrollment of Afghan refugee students in local schools earlier this year in nearby Ulsan, demonstrate that many immigrants are not welcome to practice their beliefs in South Korea.

This past July, the Ministry of Justice released a work plan that it will follow under the new government. It emphasized strengthening the “rule of law” for national growth and prosperity. Other than highlighting the October launch of region-specific visas for high-skilled foreigners to live and work in designated depopulated regions, it declared that the ministry will “establish immigration order through illegal immigrant management and strengthened border control.”

Follow-through on this latter point resulted in the exit of 10,000 irregular migrants from Korea in the final quarter of 2022.  Effective border security is essential, but it will not solve many of the structural issues Korea faces regarding immigration.

REMEDIAL STEPS

To its credit, Seoul pledged to strengthen human rights protections for foreign seasonal workers. 

Promised measures include the dispatch of “language and communication helpers,” a new three-step index to assess whether workers have had their rights violated and the revamp of an “early adaptation program” run by local governments to better meet the needs of workers arriving in Korea for the first time.

The government also announced that it would establish a state-run agency to attract foreign workers to root out corruption involving third-party brokers. At the end of November, the Ministry of Justice officially launched a new “Policy Reform Division” responsible for steering system-wide immigration reform.

However, Korean society’s resistance to immigrants and attempts to reform its immigration policy run deep. Even after a migrant farm worker froze to death last year after sleeping in a poorly heated, squalid shelter at a farm where she worked, government officials chose not to ban using shipping containers as shelters due to strong opposition from Korean farmers.

It remains to be seen to what extent reforms will be realized. Right now, the Policy Reform Division is still focused on soliciting opinions from stakeholders and conducting its case-based analyses.

Edited by John Lee