{"id":2208549,"date":"2025-02-28T15:48:35","date_gmt":"2025-02-28T06:48:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2208549"},"modified":"2025-02-28T17:43:46","modified_gmt":"2025-02-28T08:43:46","slug":"power-without-trust-potential-pitfalls-of-lee-jae-myungs-likely-presidency","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2025\/02\/power-without-trust-potential-pitfalls-of-lee-jae-myungs-likely-presidency\/","title":{"rendered":"Power without trust: Potential pitfalls of Lee Jae-myung\u2019s likely presidency"},"content":{"rendered":"
What happens when a president is both powerful and deeply distrusted? South Korea may soon find out.<\/span><\/p>\n With the Constitutional Court <\/span>set to rule<\/span><\/a> on President Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s impeachment, Democratic Party (DP) leader Lee Jae-myung is anticipated to win if a presidential snap election happens in May, which will likely fall before the Supreme Court rules on Lee\u2019s election law violation <\/span>conviction<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n If Lee becomes South Korea\u2019s next president, he will have one of the freest hands of any leader in modern Korean history: The DP currently commands 170 seats in the National Assembly, which would give Lee a legislative advantage that Yoon never enjoyed.<\/span><\/p>\n Unlike Yoon, whose presidency was crippled from the outset by an opposition-controlled legislature, Lee will be in a position to govern decisively, pushing through <\/span>economic reforms<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>social welfare programs<\/span><\/a> and judicial restructuring with little opposition.<\/span><\/p>\n However, Lee will not be seen as a legitimate leader by much of the country. To conservatives, his rise to power will not be the result of a fair and open democratic process, but the outcome of legal maneuvering, partisan impeachment and <\/span>judicial delays<\/span><\/a> in his own legal cases.<\/span><\/p>\n They will argue, as they already have for the past three years, that he did not win the presidency to lead South Korea, but to <\/span>shield himself<\/span><\/a> from prosecution. This belief is not confined to political elites; it is widespread among conservative voters, many of whom see his candidacy as a strategy to evade justice rather than a mandate to govern.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Lee\u2019s election would deepen the fractures in South Korea\u2019s political system rather than stabilize the country after Yoon\u2019s likely removal from office. His presidency will begin not with broad public support, but with mass conservative backlash. He will take office not as a unifying figure, but as a leader who will be viewed by half the country as a symbol of systemic manipulation.<\/span><\/p>\n In this sense, his presidency will not be defined by policy alone \u2014 it will be shaped by the fundamental question of whether South Korea\u2019s democracy still functions as intended, or whether the presidency is little more than a weapon for the country\u2019s cycle of political revenge.<\/span><\/p>\n Democratic Party Floor Leader Park Chan-dae addresses the National Assembly, Jan. 4, 2025 | Image: Democratic Party of Korea<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n A POWERFUL PRESIDENT<\/b><\/p>\n For all the <\/span>controversy<\/span><\/a> surrounding Lee, there is little doubt that he will wield considerable domestic power. The DP holds 170 out of 300 National Assembly seats, ensuring that Lee will have the votes to pass laws without obstruction.<\/span><\/p>\n If the party expands its majority in the April 2028 parliamentary elections, he could find himself in a position even stronger than Moon Jae-in, whose presidency benefited from legislative dominance with <\/span>180 seats<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Unlike Yoon, who struggled to push through his agenda, Lee will not have to rely on executive orders or backroom negotiations with hostile lawmakers. His administration will be able to enact sweeping policy changes on everything from economic stimulus measures to labor laws, real estate regulations and even judicial reforms designed to curb conservative influence in the courts.<\/span><\/p>\n His ability to govern will be unchallenged \u2014 at least on paper.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n But power does not equal trust. Even as he consolidates authority within the government, he will struggle to earn legitimacy in the eyes of a deeply divided electorate. His presidency will begin under the shadow of ongoing legal cases, allegations of corruption and the lingering belief that his election was not the result of a fair political process, but the final stage of a strategy to seize power through impeachment.<\/span><\/p>\n No amount of legislative victories will erase that perception for his opponents.<\/span><\/p>\n National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik attempts to calm ruling People Power Party lawmakers protesting Prime Minister Han Duck-soo’s impeachment, Dec. 27, 2024 | Image: Woo Won-shik via Facebook<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLT<\/b><\/p>\n Even if Lee wins fairly, his presidency will be permanently contested. Conservatives will reject his legitimacy from day one, and the People Power Party (PPP) will refuse to acknowledge him as anything more than a criminal who escaped justice by gaming the system.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n For a lot of conservatives, Yoon\u2019s impeachment has provided them with a powerful narrative to rally behind. To many of them, impeachment was not an act of democratic accountability, but a political coup designed to remove an elected leader and replace him with one who <\/span>lost<\/span><\/a> the previous election despite Yoon\u2019s novice political status.<\/span><\/p>\n They will likely continue to argue that Lee manipulated the system, that the courts shielded him from prosecution long enough to seize power and that his presidency represents the triumph of legal maneuvering over the will of the people.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This narrative has already fueled mass protests against Lee and is unlikely to dissipate. Meanwhile, conservative lawmakers will use every available legal and parliamentary tool to delay, investigate and delegitimize his presidency, ensuring that his time in office is marked by constant political combat.<\/span><\/p>\n Although the ROK Constitution will likely shield Lee from any of the crimes that he has been accused of committing during his time as mayor of Seongman City or governor of Gyeonggi Province, the moment his term ends and he is no longer protected by presidential immunity, conservatives will seek to put him back on trial.<\/span><\/p>\n PRESIDENTIAL LEGITIMACY CRISIS<\/b><\/p>\n The deeper issue here is not just Lee\u2019s likely rise to the presidency, but that South Korea is now experiencing a broader collapse in public trust in the presidency itself.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Former President Park Geun-hye was impeached and removed from office in 2017. Yoon Suk-yeol may suffer the same fate. If Lee wins, he will take power under the cloud of ongoing legal battles and conservative resistance. The presidency is no longer an institution that commands respect across political lines \u2014 it has become a temporary possession, vulnerable to legal and parliamentary attacks the moment an opposing party gains the upper hand.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n As presidents are increasingly viewed as either an illegitimate usurper or a soon-to-be-impeached figurehead, South Korea risks turning its highest office into little more than a pawn in the country\u2019s partisan warfare.<\/span><\/p>\n The erosion of presidential legitimacy will not just destabilize individual leaders \u2014 it will weaken the stability of the entire system, leaving South Korea in a perpetual cycle of contested elections, legal battles and political revenge.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n