{"id":2207722,"date":"2024-12-27T15:21:18","date_gmt":"2024-12-27T06:21:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2207722"},"modified":"2024-12-30T17:33:20","modified_gmt":"2024-12-30T08:33:20","slug":"what-a-democratic-party-presidency-means-for-south-koreas-trade-future","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2024\/12\/what-a-democratic-party-presidency-means-for-south-koreas-trade-future\/","title":{"rendered":"What a Democratic Party presidency means for South Korea\u2019s trade future"},"content":{"rendered":"

Editor\u2019s note: This is the fourth in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. Part one on foreign and trade policies can be read <\/span><\/i>here<\/span><\/i><\/a>, part two on nuclear weapons policy <\/span><\/i>here<\/span><\/i><\/a> and part three on domestic economic policy <\/span><\/i>here<\/span><\/i><\/a>.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n


\n

South Korea\u2019s main opposition Democratic Party (DP) appears increasingly likely to return to power if the Constitutional Court upholds President Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s impeachment, and that could bring major changes to arguably the most important part of the ROK economy \u2014 trade.<\/span><\/p>\n

The DP\u2019s <\/span>proposals<\/span><\/a> for digital platform regulations, enhanced labor protections, agricultural subsidies and green energy mandates already loom large. These reforms will likely have a profound impact on South Korea\u2019s export-driven economy and its increasingly fraught role within worsening U.S.-China relations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Policymakers in Seoul often walk a diplomatic tightrope between Washington and Beijing. However, a DP administration would likely introduce measures that risk tilting this delicate balance, whether by restricting the market power of <\/span>U.S. tech giants<\/span><\/a>, investing in technologies that rely on Chinese-controlled supply chains for <\/span>rare earths<\/span><\/a> or expanding government support for domestic rice farmers.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, it remains to be seen whether a DP-led government will be able to successfully implement its progressive agenda in a global environment shaped by Trump-era protectionism and China\u2019s willingness to leverage trade as political clout.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHY THE DP\u2019S AGENDA MATTERS<\/b><\/p>\n

South Korea\u2019s economy is among the most export-focused in the world, with exports accounting for around <\/span>44% of GDP in 2023<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

This heavy reliance underscores what\u2019s at stake if a DP-led government, with the aid of a <\/span>DP-controlled National Assembly<\/span><\/a>, enacts its economic platform in full.<\/span><\/p>\n

DP proposals would have a significant impact on the competitive structure of digital industries, place tighter emissions targets on manufacturing, require businesses to improve worker protections and expand agricultural support.<\/span><\/p>\n

Proponents may argue that these policies would align South Korea with international trends toward green growth and corporate social responsibility.<\/span><\/p>\n

But skeptics fear that imposing strict regulations on heavyweight industries could undermine competitiveness, and that intensifying scrutiny of foreign tech firms might incite retaliatory tariffs or legal battles.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

The logos of Twitch, YouTube and Netflix | Image: Twitch<\/a>, YouTube via Wikimedia Commons<\/a>, Netflix via Wikimedia Commons<\/a>, Pixabay<\/a>, edited by Korea Pro<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND RISK OF U.S. RETALIATION<\/b><\/p>\n

A signature component of the DP\u2019s program is amending the <\/span>Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act<\/span><\/a> to crack down on practices like self-preferencing and bundling.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Google, Meta and Netflix collectively account for <\/span>more than a third of internet traffic<\/span><\/a> and consumer spending in the country, giving them market dominance in South Korea\u2019s digital sphere. A DP-led crackdown would likely challenge these platforms\u2019 favorable treatment of their own services and could mandate financial contributions for network usage.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, U.S. firms could perceive such a move as discriminatory, and Donald Trump could respond by using the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) as a springboard for tariffs. South Korea\u2019s trade surplus with the U.S. hit a record <\/span>$44.4 billion in 2023<\/span><\/a>, which Trump may cite to target ROK automakers and consumer electronics producers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Even the hint of tariffs or punitive measures could lead to capital flight and force Seoul to negotiate carve-outs for American tech companies, which would undermine the very purpose of the reforms.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, there is an upside for local players like Naver and Coupang. If the reforms are successful in curtailing U.S. companies\u2019 monopolistic behaviors, domestic firms might be able to recapture market share.<\/span><\/p>\n

Over the long term, an expanded home base would allow them to refine innovative platforms, such as Naver\u2019s <\/span>HyperCLOVA X<\/span><\/a> \u2014 the company\u2019s response to OpenAI\u2019s ChatGPT \u2014 to later export them to emerging markets in Southeast Asia.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, it remains uncertain whether such domestic gains could offset the potential damage of U.S. tariffs.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Wind turbines off the South Korean coast, Feb. 2, 2021 | Image: alice1981y<\/a> via Pixabay<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

GREEN ENERGY GOALS<\/b><\/p>\n

The DP\u2019s push toward <\/span>strict emissions targets<\/span><\/a> and generous renewable-energy subsidies aims to align South Korea with global sustainability trends. The ROK has historically depended on fossil fuels to power its industries, and the DP\u2019s proposed regulations would accelerate a shift to cleaner energy sources.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, South Korea\u2019s existing energy grid structure will make it challenging for energy-intensive sectors, such as steel, semiconductors and petrochemicals, to avoid significant financial and logistical hurdles. Slashing emissions too aggressively will drive up production costs, reducing those sectors\u2019 global competitiveness.<\/span><\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s <\/span>Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism<\/span><\/a> (CBAM) complicates matters further by imposing tariffs on imports from high-emission producers. Failing to adapt could price South Korean exporters out of valuable European markets. South Korean exports to Europe reached <\/span>more than $68 billion<\/span><\/a> in 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, companies that can adapt quickly will be able to reap significant benefits from new subsidies and rising global demand for green tech.<\/span><\/p>\n

For instance, Hyundai Motors, which is exploring <\/span>hydrogen-fuel-cell vehicles<\/span><\/a>, could leverage government-led infrastructure projects to solidify its leadership in zero-emission mobility. These early movers might eventually become global suppliers of advanced environmental solutions, thus creating a whole new export category.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Construction helmets, March 18, 2019 | Image: Pop & Zebra<\/a> via Unsplash<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

LABOR REFORMS<\/b><\/p>\n

The DP\u2019s stance on labor protections goes hand-in-hand with its broader progressive vision. South Korea\u2019s labor market, especially in the logistics and e-commerce segments, relies heavily on subcontracted or gig workers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Coupang drivers, for instance, have <\/span>protested<\/span><\/a> against tight delivery deadlines and minimal benefits. By demanding stable contracts and expanded benefits, as well as leveraging workplace safety laws such as the <\/span>Serious Accident Punishment Act<\/span><\/a>, the DP will likely seek to incentivize large companies to prioritize hiring regular employees.<\/span><\/p>\n

Businesses, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises, will likely resist these reforms, arguing that they would cut into profit margins. However, a growing number of foreign investors and global consumers have been emphasizing ethical supply chains.<\/span><\/p>\n

In Europe, the \u201cS\u201d in ESG (environmental, social and governance) frameworks is gaining prominence, and brands perceived as exploiting gig workers risk reputational blowback. If South Korean firms align with rigorous labor standards, they may find favor among corporate procurement departments and retail consumers in markets that reward ethical practices.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Rice field in North Gyeongsang Province, July 25, 2009 | Image: Wikimedia Commons<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

AGRICULTURE SUBSIDIES<\/b><\/p>\n

Agriculture is another pillar of the DP\u2019s domestic agenda that carries potentially significant trade ramifications.<\/span><\/p>\n

Acting President Han Duck-soo <\/span>vetoed<\/span><\/a> six bills passed by the opposition-controlled National Assembly on Dec. 19, four of which aimed to support farmers via mandatory government purchases of surplus rice, price stabilization measures and expanded disaster coverage. Han\u2019s stance against expanded agricultural subsidies dates back to 2023, when Yoon <\/span>rejected<\/span><\/a> similar revisions to the Grain Management Act.<\/span><\/p>\n

A DP administration, bolstered by its majority in the National Assembly, will almost certainly pass these agriculture bills into law. By promising guaranteed minimum prices and broader safety nets, the DP has earned strong support from farmers who have long complained of volatile markets and <\/span>declining rice consumption<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, history shows that agricultural subsidies often trigger backlash from other countries, and ensuing trade disputes can sometimes <\/span>last for decades<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

If Yoon had not vetoed the 2023 revision to the Grain Management Act, it would have obliged Seoul to purchase surplus rice whenever production exceeds demand by 3 to 5%, or if prices drop by more than 5% compared to the previous year.<\/span><\/p>\n

The U.S., which secured from South Korea a rice import quota worth roughly $110 million annually under World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations in 2019, may have viewed these mandates as undermining the spirit \u2014 or even the letter \u2014 of existing agreements.<\/span><\/p>\n

If a DP administration passes into law rice-purchase mandates or price stabilization programs, it could invite retaliation from major rice-exporting countries, such as the U.S., Australia, China, Thailand and Vietnam.<\/span><\/p>\n

Further, it could also impact South Korea\u2019s broader trade priorities. KORUS benefits and ongoing negotiations with other importers might hang in the balance should foreign partners perceive these agricultural programs as unfairly distorting the market.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Then-U.S. President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump visit the Forbidden City in Beijing with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and first lady Peng Liyuan, Nov. 8, 2017 | Image: Trump White House Archives<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

THE U.S.-CHINA DILEMMA<\/b><\/p>\n

A second Trump administration will likely drag the KORUS into the spotlight <\/span>again<\/span><\/a>. Given Trump\u2019s penchant for <\/span>retaliatory trade measures<\/span><\/a>, digital regulations perceived as targeting American tech could invite immediate blowback. This would imperil not just auto and electronics exports but also Seoul\u2019s green-energy ambitions if the U.S. uses regulatory pressure to hamper technology transfers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Beijing continues to absorb nearly a quarter of South Korea\u2019s exports and exert sway over critical supply chains. South Korea <\/span>relies on China<\/span><\/a> for 82% of 30 essential types of raw materials and even surpasses 90% for the top 10 items. This dependency adds significant vulnerabilities for advanced battery and solar technologies.<\/span><\/p>\n

A DP-led government that aligns too closely with American digital or environmental standards could prompt Beijing to informally curtail trade, as happened during the 2017 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense row. Companies like <\/span>Samsung and SK Hynix<\/span><\/a>, which rely on China for both manufacturing and end markets, would be in the crossfire.<\/span><\/p>\n

To reduce reliance on both major powers, South Korea has been intensifying ties with Southeast Asia. The Moon Jae-in administration championed its <\/span>New Southern Policy<\/span><\/a>, which the Yoon administration followed up with its <\/span>Indo-Pacific Strategy<\/span><\/a>. A DP administration will likely expand those efforts.<\/span><\/p>\n

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, such as <\/span>Vietnam<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Indonesia<\/span><\/a>, offer not only consumer markets for South Korean products but also alternative supply chains for intermediate goods, from electronics components to raw materials.<\/span><\/p>\n

By collaborating on infrastructure and renewable energy projects \u2014 areas in which ASEAN governments frequently solicit foreign expertise \u2014 South Korea could find long-term growth avenues that help it sidestep U.S.-China tensions.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

An industrial excavator loads material into a heavy-duty dump truck | Image: Canva<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

RARE EARTHS AND ESG<\/b><\/p>\n

A DP-led government could use South Korea\u2019s year-long position as <\/span>chair of the Minerals Security Partnership<\/span><\/a> to advocate for sustainable and ethical mineral supply chains \u2014 a crucial component of emerging ESG standards in the global green energy transition.<\/span><\/p>\n

While Japan has been active in drafting <\/span>digital trade rules<\/span><\/a> under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the EU is at the forefront of environmental regulations, Seoul has tended to <\/span>follow rather than lead<\/span><\/a> in such areas.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the alignment of a DP administration\u2019s domestic labor reforms, digital platform oversight and green technology incentives offers an opening. If orchestrated well, South Korea could become a reference point for mid-sized economies looking to balance growth with inclusive and sustainable development.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Achilles\u2019 heel remains the country\u2019s rare earth dependency. Reducing that to a manageable level would close cooperation with commodity-rich countries like Australia and Vietnam, as well as ramping up recycling capabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Yoon administration <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a> in 2023 that it aims to reduce the country\u2019s dependency on rare earth imports from 80% to 50% by 2030, as well as to expand recycling of critical minerals from 2% to 20%. But Seoul has yet to make significant progress in reaching those goals.<\/span><\/p>\n

Whether a DP administration could orchestrate this transition fast enough to keep pace with demand \u2014 especially if China imposes export restrictions \u2014 remains uncertain.<\/span><\/p>\n

If the DP were to invest in building a robust domestic rare-earth recycling infrastructure, supplemented by trade deals with non-Chinese suppliers, it could offset Beijing\u2019s hold over critical materials.<\/span><\/p>\n

Combined with an advanced regulatory framework that prioritizes sustainable business and worker protections, that could enable South Korea to position itself as a standard-bearer for progressive trade policies in East Asia.<\/span><\/p>\n

WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE SOUTH KOREA?<\/b><\/p>\n

South Korea will need to chart a course that mitigates the inherent contradictions in a progressive domestic agenda while maintaining market access in the U.S., China, the EU and ASEAN economies.<\/span><\/p>\n

A too-aggressive stance on regulating U.S. tech could antagonize Washington, but a conciliatory approach might dilute the DP\u2019s aims of fostering a level digital playing field. Emissions mandates can propel South Korea toward its green transition goals, but they could hamper businesses. Tougher labor standards may reap ethical dividends and ESG investment, at the cost of short-term profits. And agricultural subsidies, though welcomed by local farmers, risk sparking international trade disputes.<\/span><\/p>\n

With Yoon likely on his way out due to <\/span>crippling unforced errors<\/span><\/a>, a DP administration will look to prove that it has the strategic foresight to pursue meaningful global partnerships via shrewd diplomacy. But for now, it remains to be seen whether a DP-led government will be able to deliver on its progressive vision without triggering punishing tariffs or jeopardizing critical supply chains.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by Bryan Betts<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Business & Economy<\/span><\/a>Domestic Politics<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Editor\u2019s note: This is the fourth in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. Part one on foreign and trade policies can be read here, part two on nuclear weapons policy here and part three on domestic economic policy here. South Korea\u2019s main opposition Democratic Party […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10407,"featured_media":2207723,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[24,27],"class_list":["post-2207722","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-business-economy","tag-domestic-politics"],"yoast_head":"\nWhat a Democratic Party presidency means for South Korea\u2019s trade future - Korea Pro<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2024\/12\/what-a-democratic-party-presidency-means-for-south-koreas-trade-future\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"What a Democratic Party presidency means for South Korea\u2019s trade future - Korea Pro\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Editor\u2019s note: This is the fourth in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. 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