{"id":2207636,"date":"2024-12-24T14:40:57","date_gmt":"2024-12-24T05:40:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2207636"},"modified":"2024-12-25T17:28:15","modified_gmt":"2024-12-25T08:28:15","slug":"why-a-democratic-party-led-south-korea-will-reject-nuclear-weapons","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2024\/12\/why-a-democratic-party-led-south-korea-will-reject-nuclear-weapons\/","title":{"rendered":"Why a Democratic Party-led South Korea will reject nuclear weapons"},"content":{"rendered":"

Editor\u2019s note: This is the second in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. Part one on foreign and trade policies can be read <\/span><\/i>here<\/span><\/i><\/a>.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Talk in South Korea about the merits of going nuclear has ramped up in recent years, particularly among conservatives, amid concerns about the U.S. commitment to Seoul\u2019s defense.<\/span><\/p>\n

But with the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) primed to reclaim the presidency following President Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s <\/span>impeachment<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Korea Pro<\/span><\/i> analysis suggests that a DP-led government is unlikely to pursue nuclear weapons, even as Trump\u2019s imminent return threatens to test the U.S.-ROK alliance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead of endorsing nukes, the DP is likely to focus on increasing investment in advanced defense systems and nuclear-powered submarines \u2014 a longtime priority of progressives \u2014 while building on the Yoon-era platform for discussing extended deterrence with Washington to guard against new North Korean threats.<\/span><\/p>\n

REBUILDING CREDIBILITY OVER NUCLEAR AMBITIONS<\/b><\/p>\n

Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s <\/span>martial law declaration<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>alleged plans<\/span><\/a> to provoke North Korea into attacking the South have left South Korea\u2019s international credibility in tatters.<\/span><\/p>\n

If the claims about provoking Pyongyang are proven to be true, it will raise profound concerns about Seoul\u2019s stability and governance, painting a picture of a leadership willing to manipulate geopolitical tensions and risk international conflict for domestic political gain.<\/span><\/p>\n

While such plans have not yet been verified, they will certainly have alarmed the U.S., which relies on South Korea as a linchpin of regional security. The notion of intentionally instigating a North Korean attack to justify declaring martial law not only undermines trust within the U.S.-ROK alliance, but also damages South Korea\u2019s image as a responsible and mature global actor.<\/span><\/p>\n

This erosion of credibility will significantly weaken what little international support South Korea has had for the development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program.<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead, a DP-led government will likely focus on strengthening conventional military capabilities, exploring nuclear submarine technology and leveraging its alliance with the U.S. and partnerships with other countries to maintain regional stability.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Then-ROK defense minister Kim Yong-hyun meets with U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin at the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., Oct. 31, 2024 | Image: ROK Ministry of National Defense via Facebook<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

PUBLIC OPINION AND ELITE PERSPECTIVES<\/b><\/p>\n

News media reports<\/span><\/a> have frequently cited that the majority of the South Korean public \u2014 nearly 70% \u2014 supports nuclear armament. This figure likely explains why Yoon first floated the idea of Seoul developing its own nuclear weapons in <\/span>Jan. 2023<\/span><\/a> and why South Korean <\/span>conservatives<\/span><\/a> frequently argue for a domestic nuclear arsenal.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, a <\/span>Korea Institute for National Unification poll<\/span><\/a> found that public support for nuclear armament falls between 36 and 37% when pollsters explain the various risks and scenarios that would likely follow, such as global sanctions, if Seoul pursues nuclearization.<\/span><\/p>\n

The same poll also shows that nearly half of South Korean voters do not view nuclear weapons as a factor in their decision to vote for a political candidate and that nearly 70% of voters support the <\/span>Non-Proliferation Treaty<\/span><\/a> (NPT).<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, a study by the <\/span>Center for Strategic and International Studies<\/span><\/a> found that only 34% of South Korean elites support nuclear weapons. These elites, including policymakers, business leaders and academics, are far more attuned to the potential economic, diplomatic and security ramifications of nuclearization.<\/span><\/p>\n

Their cautious stance reflects a pragmatic understanding of South Korea\u2019s position as an export-driven economy heavily reliant on global trade. Thus, the DP will likely adopt a similarly restrained approach.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in speaks during the unveiling of the KF-21 fighter jet, April 9, 2021 | Image: Blue House Archives<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

STRENGTH WITHOUT NUKES<\/b><\/p>\n

Contrary to perceptions that progressives are weak on defense, the DP has a track record of advancing South Korea\u2019s military capabilities. The Moon Jae-in administration successfully negotiated the <\/span>lifting of U.S.-imposed missile caps<\/span><\/a>, enabling South Korea to develop longer-range and more powerful ballistic missiles, such as the <\/span>Hyunmoo 5<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>KF-21 fighter jet program<\/span><\/a>, which aims to bolster South Korea\u2019s indigenous defense capabilities, also gained momentum during Moon\u2019s tenure.<\/span><\/p>\n

A DP-led government is likely to continue prioritizing advanced conventional deterrence. Nuclear submarines, long desired by South Korean defense strategists, could emerge as a centerpiece of this strategy.<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea’s interest in nuclear-powered submarines dates back to the <\/span>Roh Moo-hyun administration<\/span><\/a>, which first explored the feasibility of acquiring such vessels to counter North Korean threats. Moon also <\/span>pledged<\/span><\/a> to develop nuclear submarines during his presidential campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although both Roh and Moon ultimately failed to develop that technology, the ambition reflects a longstanding recognition of the strategic advantages nuclear submarines provide, including extended underwater operations and enhanced maritime deterrence capabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

A DP-led government may revisit this initiative, negotiating with the Trump administration for enriched uranium or technical assistance while framing the move as a necessary counterbalance to <\/span>North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

While there are <\/span>arguments<\/span><\/a> against South Korea\u2019s acquisition of nuclear submarines, they do not invoke immediate condemnation as nuclear weapons. By pursuing nuclear submarines equipped with conventional or extended-range missiles, the ROK could enhance its deterrence posture without the political and economic risks associated with nuclear armament.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

A ceremony takes place to unveil the ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarine, Sept. 14, 2018 | Image: Moon Jae-in via Twitter<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

TRUMP, COLBY AND CHANGING U.S. DYNAMICS<\/b><\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s impending return to the White House and the <\/span>appointment of Eldridge Colby<\/span><\/a> as undersecretary of defense for policy will undoubtedly impact South Korea\u2019s security calculus.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Colby\u2019s emphasis on <\/span>prioritizing China over North Korea<\/span><\/a> suggests a reduced U.S. commitment to the Korean Peninsula, potentially including troop reductions under the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). He has described the USFK\u2019s mission of addressing North Korea\u2019s threats as holding the 28,500 U.S. troops as \u201c<\/span>hostages<\/span><\/a>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

While these developments might amplify calls for greater defense autonomy in South Korea, a DP-led government is unlikely to interpret them as a green light for nuclearization. The primary reason lies in the overwhelming international opposition to such a move.<\/span><\/p>\n

The EU, the U.K. and Australia would likely condemn South Korean nuclearization, framing it as a violation of nonproliferation norms and a destabilizing factor in global security. Japan, which is wary of the DP\u2019s more hostile approach to historical issues, would likely argue strongly against nuclear proliferation and consider <\/span>reinstating trade restrictions<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Southeast Asian nations, heavily invested in maintaining regional stability, would likely oppose any actions that risk igniting an arms race.<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, China, which would view a nuclear-armed South Korea as a direct challenge to its regional influence, could respond with economic sanctions or increased military provocations. Further, North Korea could exploit South Korea\u2019s nuclearization as a pretext to further expand its own arsenal and engage in closer cooperation with Russia, complicating any future diplomatic efforts.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, if South Korea were to withdraw from the NPT in order to develop and acquire nuclear weapons, it would lose access to imported uranium under the <\/span>Nuclear Suppliers Group<\/span><\/a> (NSG) guidelines.<\/span><\/p>\n

The NSG, an international coalition that regulates the export of nuclear materials to prevent proliferation, would likely prohibit uranium sales to South Korea. This would effectively shut down the country\u2019s nuclear reactors, which are a critical source of energy, and severely disrupt industries reliant on nuclear power, such as manufacturing and technology, with far-reaching economic repercussions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead, a DP-led government would likely seek to strengthen existing frameworks like the <\/span>Nuclear Consultative Group<\/span><\/a>, expand its <\/span>missile defense capabilities<\/span><\/a> and negotiate for increased U.S. support in other areas, such as intelligence sharing and joint military exercises. By focusing on these avenues, a DP-led government can bolster South Korea\u2019s security posture without alienating its global partners or undermining its economic and diplomatic standing.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Saeul Nuclear Power Plant\u2019s units 1 and 2, July 6, 2022 | Image: Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

A NON-NUCLEAR PATH FORWARD<\/b><\/p>\n

A DP-led government will prioritize rebuilding South Korea\u2019s international credibility over pursuing nuclear weapons. Yoon\u2019s martial law declaration and its fallout have left South Korea with a trust deficit that the DP must address to restore its standing as a responsible global actor.<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead of nuclearization, the DP will likely focus on strengthening conventional deterrence through advanced defense systems, pursuing nuclear submarines and leveraging platforms like the NCG. This balanced approach will allow South Korea to navigate a volatile regional security environment while maintaining its commitment to international norms and economic stability.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, a DP-led government will likely pursue a pragmatic path forward, prioritizing stability and credibility as priorities shift.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by Alannah Hill<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Defense & Security<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Editor\u2019s note: This is the second in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. Part one on foreign and trade policies can be read here. Talk in South Korea about the merits of going nuclear has ramped up in recent years, particularly among conservatives, amid concerns […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10407,"featured_media":2207637,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[26,28],"class_list":["post-2207636","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-defense-security","tag-inter-korean-foreign-relations"],"yoast_head":"\nWhy a Democratic Party-led South Korea will reject nuclear weapons - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2024\/12\/why-a-democratic-party-led-south-korea-will-reject-nuclear-weapons\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why a Democratic Party-led South Korea will reject nuclear weapons - KOREA PRO\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Editor\u2019s note: This is the second in a multi-part series exploring South Korean policy changes that could emerge under a Democratic Party president. 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