{"id":2207563,"date":"2024-12-18T17:10:17","date_gmt":"2024-12-18T08:10:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2207563"},"modified":"2024-12-19T14:46:30","modified_gmt":"2024-12-19T05:46:30","slug":"turf-war-between-rival-agencies-threatens-yoon-impeachment-investigation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2024\/12\/turf-war-between-rival-agencies-threatens-yoon-impeachment-investigation\/","title":{"rendered":"Turf war between rival agencies threatens Yoon impeachment investigation"},"content":{"rendered":"
President Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s impeachment has inadvertently triggered an unprecedented clash between South Korea\u2019s investigative agencies. Both the prosecution service and a recently formed joint investigation team have issued competing summons for the president, highlighting a growing institutional rivalry that threatens to derail the case.<\/span><\/p>\n This jurisdictional conflict has evolved into a practical quagmire, with evidence and suspects divided among agencies and no clear central authority to coordinate efforts. The dysfunction risks not only compromising the investigation but also exposing systemic flaws in South Korea\u2019s reformed criminal justice system.<\/span><\/p>\n PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS SPUR CONFUSION<\/b><\/p>\n Two competing investigative tracks have emerged since Yoon\u2019s Dec. 3 martial law declaration. The first is led by the prosecution service\u2019s Special Investigation Headquarters, which has taken an early lead by securing key military suspects and temporarily integrating military prosecutors into its team.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The second is the Joint Investigation Headquarters (JIH) \u2014 a collaboration between the National Police Agency, the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) and the defense ministry\u2019s investigative bureau, explicitly excluding prosecutors.<\/span><\/p>\n This fragmented approach stems from prosecutorial reform measures enacted during the previous Moon Jae-in administration, which redistributed investigative authority across multiple agencies. While intended to reduce the prosecution service\u2019s dominance, these reforms have created overlapping jurisdictions and operational inefficiencies.<\/span><\/p>\n For example, the police stated that it had obtained crucial evidence including former defense minister Kim Yong-hyun\u2019s laptop and secure communication devices \u2014 but could not question him because he remains in the prosecution\u2019s custody.<\/span><\/p>\n Further complicating matters, prosecutors and police have clashed over arrest warrants for suspects such as Defense Intelligence Command chief Moon Sang-ho. Prosecutors rejected the police\u2019s request, arguing that the police lack jurisdiction over active military personnel, which the police disputed.<\/span><\/p>\n This conflict highlights a broader issue: different agencies pursuing the same suspects and evidence without effective coordination.<\/span><\/p>\n The structural limitations of these agencies compound the confusion. Police have broad authority to investigate insurrection cases but require prosecutorial approval for warrants, whereas prosecutors can issue warrants directly but lack investigative jurisdiction in some instances.<\/span><\/p>\n These constraints have resulted in a fragmented approach to evidence collection and suspect custody, creating inefficiencies in the investigation.<\/span><\/p>\n