{"id":2202500,"date":"2023-10-16T17:04:29","date_gmt":"2023-10-16T08:04:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2202500"},"modified":"2023-10-17T19:37:44","modified_gmt":"2023-10-17T10:37:44","slug":"south-koreas-nuclear-crossroads-weighing-seouls-options-beyond-us-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/south-koreas-nuclear-crossroads-weighing-seouls-options-beyond-us-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"South Korea\u2019s nuclear crossroads: Weighing Seoul\u2019s options beyond US deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"
South Korea, a longstanding treaty ally of Washington, has long relied on the U.S. military\u2019s <\/span>extended nuclear deterrence<\/span><\/a> to thwart any potential North Korean attack or use of nuclear weapons against it.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n But there\u2019s burgeoning uncertainty among ROK political elites about the U.S. defense commitment to Seoul, with many continuing to harbor fears of potential abandonment. As a result, analysts across the ideological spectrum are increasingly endorsing the idea of developing or acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent.<\/span><\/p>\n Cheong Seong Chang, a noted expert on North Korean affairs and a prominent figure in centrist to center-left circles, recently <\/span>authored a book<\/span><\/a> arguing in favor of such a South Korean nuclear deterrent. A <\/span>group of scholars<\/span><\/a> sharing similar concerns has <\/span>established<\/span><\/a> a forum to promote this stance.<\/span><\/p>\n Despite this, there are numerous obstacles to South Korea actually developing a nuclear weapon, not the least being the need for Washington to sign off on it. And while alternative strategies for shoring up nuclear deterrence with other partners have emerged, each carries its own challenges and pitfalls.<\/span><\/p>\n DEPENDENCE ON U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENCE<\/b><\/p>\n South Korea\u2019s reliance on U.S. military support, particularly its nuclear umbrella, faces critical scrutiny due to two prevailing concerns.<\/span><\/p>\n First, the \u201cSeoul for San Francisco\u201d <\/span>dilemma<\/span><\/a> posits that the U.S. might hesitate to respond to a North Korean attack on South Korea if the DPRK possesses the capability to threaten major U.S. cities. This scenario casts doubt on Washington\u2019s willingness to risk its own security for Seoul\u2019s defense.<\/span><\/p>\n Second, what might be dubbed the \u201cTrump problem\u201d underscores a growing uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to its international alliances. This uncertainty is driven by the isolationist positions of some U.S. political figures, notably exemplified by <\/span>Donald Trump<\/span><\/a>, and is further compounded by <\/span>rising support<\/span><\/a> among the American electorate toward such perspectives, particularly in contexts like <\/span>Ukraine<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n The validity of these concerns is debatable. Advocates of U.S. extended deterrence argue that Washington must be willing to incur risks when countering nuclear threats to uphold its global diplomatic and military reputation. If the U.S. falters in its commitments, its credibility as a nuclear and conventional superpower could be questioned.<\/span><\/p>\n Further, the strategic importance of Asian alliances is a point of emphasis in U.S. policy circles, particularly in light of the need to counterbalance China\u2019s regional influence. This perspective suggests a continuing U.S. interest in maintaining these partnerships, irrespective of the administration in power.<\/span><\/p>\n However, global affairs are inherently unpredictable and complex. The U.S. president wields the sole authority to deploy nuclear weapons and, when confronted with direct threats to American soil or in negotiations with Pyongyang, might assess that defending Seoul is an expendable commitment.<\/span><\/p>\n