{"id":2202500,"date":"2023-10-16T17:04:29","date_gmt":"2023-10-16T08:04:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2202500"},"modified":"2023-10-17T19:37:44","modified_gmt":"2023-10-17T10:37:44","slug":"south-koreas-nuclear-crossroads-weighing-seouls-options-beyond-us-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/south-koreas-nuclear-crossroads-weighing-seouls-options-beyond-us-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"South Korea\u2019s nuclear crossroads: Weighing Seoul\u2019s options beyond US deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"

South Korea, a longstanding treaty ally of Washington, has long relied on the U.S. military\u2019s <\/span>extended nuclear deterrence<\/span><\/a> to thwart any potential North Korean attack or use of nuclear weapons against it.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But there\u2019s burgeoning uncertainty among ROK political elites about the U.S. defense commitment to Seoul, with many continuing to harbor fears of potential abandonment. As a result, analysts across the ideological spectrum are increasingly endorsing the idea of developing or acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent.<\/span><\/p>\n

Cheong Seong Chang, a noted expert on North Korean affairs and a prominent figure in centrist to center-left circles, recently <\/span>authored a book<\/span><\/a> arguing in favor of such a South Korean nuclear deterrent. A <\/span>group of scholars<\/span><\/a> sharing similar concerns has <\/span>established<\/span><\/a> a forum to promote this stance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite this, there are numerous obstacles to South Korea actually developing a nuclear weapon, not the least being the need for Washington to sign off on it. And while alternative strategies for shoring up nuclear deterrence with other partners have emerged, each carries its own challenges and pitfalls.<\/span><\/p>\n

DEPENDENCE ON U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENCE<\/b><\/p>\n

South Korea\u2019s reliance on U.S. military support, particularly its nuclear umbrella, faces critical scrutiny due to two prevailing concerns.<\/span><\/p>\n

First, the \u201cSeoul for San Francisco\u201d <\/span>dilemma<\/span><\/a> posits that the U.S. might hesitate to respond to a North Korean attack on South Korea if the DPRK possesses the capability to threaten major U.S. cities. This scenario casts doubt on Washington\u2019s willingness to risk its own security for Seoul\u2019s defense.<\/span><\/p>\n

Second, what might be dubbed the \u201cTrump problem\u201d underscores a growing uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to its international alliances. This uncertainty is driven by the isolationist positions of some U.S. political figures, notably exemplified by <\/span>Donald Trump<\/span><\/a>, and is further compounded by <\/span>rising support<\/span><\/a> among the American electorate toward such perspectives, particularly in contexts like <\/span>Ukraine<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The validity of these concerns is debatable. Advocates of U.S. extended deterrence argue that Washington must be willing to incur risks when countering nuclear threats to uphold its global diplomatic and military reputation. If the U.S. falters in its commitments, its credibility as a nuclear and conventional superpower could be questioned.<\/span><\/p>\n

Further, the strategic importance of Asian alliances is a point of emphasis in U.S. policy circles, particularly in light of the need to counterbalance China\u2019s regional influence. This perspective suggests a continuing U.S. interest in maintaining these partnerships, irrespective of the administration in power.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, global affairs are inherently unpredictable and complex. The U.S. president wields the sole authority to deploy nuclear weapons and, when confronted with direct threats to American soil or in negotiations with Pyongyang, might assess that defending Seoul is an expendable commitment.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol delivers an address in front of the USS Kentucky, a United States Navy Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, July 19, 2023 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE<\/b><\/p>\n

Amid the perceived uncertainties of U.S. extended deterrence, voices across the political spectrum in South Korea are advocating for a reassessment of its defense posture, with growing calls for an indigenous nuclear deterrent.<\/span><\/p>\n

These <\/span>proponents<\/span><\/a> \u2014 from academia, think tanks and political offices \u2014 underscore the strategic autonomy a domestic nuclear program would grant Seoul. However, this proposition faces significant hurdles, notably the necessity of U.S. approval.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u200b\u200bAn alternative proposal involves South Korea adopting a <\/span>status of nuclear latency<\/span><\/a>, necessitating the establishment of uranium enrichment facilities. In Northeast Asia, China and North Korea share this capacity, while Japan, despite its non-nuclear stance, <\/span>maintains<\/span><\/a> the technical expertise to rapidly assemble nuclear weapons if deemed essential.<\/span><\/p>\n

A precedent for South Korea\u2019s nuclear ambitions exists. At some point in the late 1990s, certain officials initiated or oversaw a covert program <\/span>experimenting<\/span><\/a> with these capabilities, though the U.S. swiftly curtailed these efforts. Despite past setbacks and ongoing U.S. opposition, segments of the South Korean academic community continue to argue in favor of nuclear latency.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, Seoul\u2019s strategic contemplations extend beyond an indigenous nuclear weapons program.<\/span><\/p>\n

LESSONS FROM IRAN?<\/b><\/p>\n

Globally, a limited number of states possess nuclear weapons, including some signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) like the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia and China. Others, like India, Pakistan and Israel, developed nuclear arsenals outside the treaty\u2019s framework.<\/span><\/p>\n

Distinct from both groups, North Korea represents a nation that flouted the NPT to develop its nuclear capability before withdrawing from the treaty entirely, a category Iran might soon join given its advancing nuclear program.<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s strategic position and tense regional relationships heighten global apprehensions. While Israel vocally opposes a nuclear-armed Iran, Saudi Arabia\u2019s potential countermeasures intrigue South Korean strategists. Riyadh, purported to have <\/span>financed<\/span><\/a> Islamabad\u2019s nuclear initiatives, allegedly retains a \u201cPakistan Option\u201d to acquire nuclear arms from <\/span>Pakistan<\/span><\/a> if necessary.<\/span><\/p>\n

In late 2022, Saudi Arabia\u2019s foreign minister <\/span>hinted<\/span><\/a> at the possibility of the kingdom acquiring nuclear weapons if Iran develops them. This stance was more explicitly <\/span>confirmed<\/span><\/a> by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in an interview, where he stated unequivocally that Saudi Arabia would seek nuclear capabilities in response to Iranian nuclear armament.<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea, facing its own security quandaries, might ponder a similar arrangement. However, no established nuclear power, particularly those adherent to the NPT, openly markets nuclear warheads.<\/span><\/p>\n

While direct acquisition of nuclear weapons from NPT signatories remains off the table, South Korea isn\u2019t without recourse. Various non-proliferation strategies, potentially undertaken with U.S. collaboration and support from other regional democracies, could bolster South Korea\u2019s security posture without necessitating a rush to nuclear arms.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol meets with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, July 11, 2023 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

LESS RISKY OPTIONS?<\/b><\/p>\n

Under current geopolitical dynamics, Russia and China are unlikely to help South Korea if U.S. support wanes, nor are they likely to collaborate with Washington to mitigate the strain Pyongyang\u2019s <\/span>nuclear blackmail<\/span><\/a> would have on Seoul.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pakistan seems neither capable nor inclined to offer assistance. Although India possesses the requisite capabilities and a burgeoning interest in the region, any deeper security cooperation faces obstacles. India\u2019s nuclear program primarily counters perceived threats from China and Pakistan.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, India\u2019s status under the NPT and its adherence to a non-aligned stance would significantly hinder Seoul\u2019s efforts to strengthen ties with New Delhi. The tense dynamics between India and China could also render such a partnership challenging for South Korea.<\/span><\/p>\n

Israel has not officially confirmed that it has a nuclear arsenal but is widely acknowledged to possess one. Despite good relations with Seoul and a shared interest in thwarting North Korean nuclear coercion, Israel would need to formally admit to having nuclear weapons before it could extend nuclear-related security assurances to Seoul.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, the prevailing situation in the Middle East would add complexity to any deepening partnership between the two nations.<\/span><\/p>\n

A more plausible alternative might involve other NATO members aside from the U.S. The U.K. already contributes a form of limited extended deterrence to NATO through its nuclear arsenal. France, with a more substantial nuclear arsenal than the U.K. and a drive for an independent role in the Indo-Pacific, could be envisioned as a potential partner in more profound security collaborations with Seoul.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, neither France nor Britain is obligated to consent to such an arrangement. Despite France\u2019s <\/span>opposition<\/span><\/a> to the establishment of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo, its ambition to carve out a <\/span>unique Indo-Pacific strategy<\/span><\/a> and bolster <\/span>defense cooperation<\/span><\/a> in the region suggests the potential for strengthened ties with Seoul, though the extent and nature of these ties have yet to be defined.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the post-Brexit era, the U.K., under the Conservative government, is similarly looking to <\/span>expand trade<\/span><\/a> and defense relations in the Indo-Pacific, presenting Seoul with additional avenues for enhancing relations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such cooperation could enhance the international standing of both European nations. It could justify their deployment of nuclear weapons to the region and, in conjunction with AUKUS, might allow French weapons manufacturers to recover some <\/span>lost opportunities<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, in the absence of mutual defense agreements akin to the U.S.-ROK alliance, the credibility of any security assurances from France or Britain remains uncertain. This underscores the challenges inherent in devising alternatives to the U.S. nuclear umbrella.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by John Lee<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Defense & Security<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

South Korea, a longstanding treaty ally of Washington, has long relied on the U.S. military\u2019s extended nuclear deterrence to thwart any potential North Korean attack or use of nuclear weapons against it.\u00a0 But there\u2019s burgeoning uncertainty among ROK political elites about the U.S. defense commitment to Seoul, with many continuing to harbor fears of potential […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10407,"featured_media":2202501,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[26,28],"class_list":["post-2202500","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-defense-security","tag-inter-korean-foreign-relations"],"yoast_head":"\nSouth Korea\u2019s nuclear crossroads: Weighing Seoul\u2019s options beyond US deterrence - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/south-koreas-nuclear-crossroads-weighing-seouls-options-beyond-us-deterrence\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"South Korea\u2019s nuclear crossroads: Weighing Seoul\u2019s options beyond US deterrence - 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