{"id":2202457,"date":"2023-10-10T17:00:42","date_gmt":"2023-10-10T08:00:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2202457"},"modified":"2023-10-11T17:02:53","modified_gmt":"2023-10-11T08:02:53","slug":"renewed-diplomacy-summitry-amid-tensions-between-china-south-korea-and-japan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/renewed-diplomacy-summitry-amid-tensions-between-china-south-korea-and-japan\/","title":{"rendered":"Renewed diplomacy: Summitry amid tensions between China, South Korea and Japan"},"content":{"rendered":"
The diplomatic stage witnessed a crucial re-engagement on Sept. 26 as representatives from China, Japan and the ROK agreed to reconvene their trilateral summit for the first time since 2019. Amid China\u2019s <\/span>mounting criticisms<\/span><\/a> toward ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol and its decision to <\/span>ban Japanese seafood<\/span><\/a> in light of the Fukushima nuclear wastewater release, this renewed dialogue signals a marked change in Beijing\u2019s diplomatic stance.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the geopolitical landscape presents challenges, with rising regional tensions and shifting allegiances, making the outcomes of this trilateral engagement highly consequential for the balance of power in East Asia.<\/span><\/p>\n BEIJING\u2019S CHANGING CALCULUS<\/b><\/p>\n China has historically capitalized on Japan and South Korea\u2019s reliance on its markets and influence over North Korea. In return, China secured significant concessions in the past decade. Notably, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe <\/span>acknowledged<\/span><\/a> that China \u201chas a case\u201d to the disputed Senkaku Islands, and former South Korean President Moon Jae-in announced the \u201c<\/span>Three Nos<\/span><\/a>\u201d policy.<\/span><\/p>\n Yet as tensions with China and North Korea mounted, the ROK and Japan gravitated toward the U.S. While Japan increased its <\/span>military budget<\/span><\/a> considerably in late 2022, South Korea <\/span>consented<\/span><\/a> to deploying American submarines equipped with nuclear weapons around the Korean Peninsula in April.<\/span><\/p>\n In response to these strategic changes, China expressed stern disapproval. For instance, in June, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea <\/span>publicly warned<\/span><\/a> pro-U.S. South Korean officials not to \u201cbet against\u201d China. This admonition, perceived by many in South Korea as an implicit threat, underscores the escalating tensions.<\/span><\/p>\n However, China\u2019s confrontational tactics haven\u2019t yielded the desired outcomes. South Korea\u2019s Yoon remains skeptical of Beijing\u2019s intentions. He highlighted the <\/span>lukewarm reception<\/span><\/a> his predecessor, Moon, received in China during his 2017 state visit despite Moon\u2019s concessions.<\/span><\/p>\n The strategic realignments of South Korea and Japan with the U.S. culminated in the <\/span>Camp David trilateral summit<\/span><\/a> in August. This event underscored the limitations of China\u2019s diplomatic strategies, prompting Beijing to reconsider its deteriorating ties with the ROK and Japan.<\/span><\/p>\n WANING INFLUENCE<\/b><\/p>\n China\u2019s principal negotiation tools, notably trade and its dominance over North Korea, are witnessing a decline in their efficacy.<\/span><\/p>\n Recent data from September indicates a drop in South Korean exports to China by <\/span>17.6%<\/span><\/a> compared to the previous year. In contrast, exports to the U.S. have seen an 8.5% growth. Further, despite its <\/span>exemption<\/span><\/a> from U.S. chip export restrictions to China, South Korea <\/span>hasn\u2019t aggressively capitalized<\/span><\/a> on Beijing\u2019s offers to seize market share from American chip producers. This trend underscores South Korea\u2019s emerging economic autonomy from China.<\/span><\/p>\n Additionally, China\u2019s economic prospects have taken a <\/span>downturn<\/span><\/a> in recent months, implying that South Korea could face fewer repercussions from distancing itself from Beijing.<\/span><\/p>\n On the geopolitical front, there\u2019s a noticeable tilt of North Korea toward Russia. This pivot, whether attributed to China\u2019s <\/span>diminished influence<\/span><\/a> or Russia\u2019s enhanced financial offerings, poses challenges for Beijing.<\/span><\/p>\n North Korea serves as a <\/span>key asset<\/span><\/a> in China\u2019s diplomatic interactions with the U.S., South Korea and Japan. A commanding influence over Pyongyang grants Beijing significant leverage, especially when pursuing strengthened ties with the U.S. Hence, a North Korean realignment away from China could diminish incentives for the U.S. and its allies to negotiate with Beijing.<\/span><\/p>\n Further, despite <\/span>visual displays<\/span><\/a> of camaraderie between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, underlying tensions in Sino-Russian relations persist. Notably, China\u2019s territorial claims on <\/span>Russian territories<\/span><\/a>, its <\/span>restrained response<\/span><\/a> to Moscow\u2019s political maneuvers and the <\/span>diplomatic fallout<\/span><\/a> stemming from its non-condemnation of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine highlight this strain. Speculations are also rife about Beijing\u2019s <\/span>dissatisfaction<\/span><\/a> with Moscow\u2019s protracted conflict in Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n Given this backdrop, Russia might propose collaboration on the North Korean front as a bargaining chip for favorable conditions in Western peace negotiations. Such a move could sideline China, potentially diminishing its regional influence.<\/span><\/p>\n