{"id":2202427,"date":"2023-10-05T19:54:24","date_gmt":"2023-10-05T10:54:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2202427"},"modified":"2023-10-06T17:18:33","modified_gmt":"2023-10-06T08:18:33","slug":"why-south-koreas-new-indigenous-missile-interceptor-cant-replace-thaad","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/why-south-koreas-new-indigenous-missile-interceptor-cant-replace-thaad\/","title":{"rendered":"Why South Korea\u2019s new indigenous missile interceptor can\u2019t replace THAAD"},"content":{"rendered":"

South Korea <\/span>showed off<\/span><\/a> its long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) for the first time at a military parade in Seoul last month, a system that is central to the country\u2019s evolving missile defense strategy, in particular for defending against threats from North Korea.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Currently in its <\/span>final<\/span><\/a> development phase, the L-SAM system is anticipated to enter <\/span>mass production<\/span><\/a> in two years. It is <\/span>designed<\/span><\/a> to provide mid-altitude interception coverage, complementing other missile defense systems tailored for different altitude ranges.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, experts told <\/span>Korea Pro<\/span><\/i> that the present configuration of the L-SAM system cannot serve as a comprehensive substitute for the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (<\/span>THAAD<\/span><\/a>) system, which has been a <\/span>point of contention<\/span><\/a> with China in the past.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGY<\/b><\/p>\n

L-SAM is vital for South Korea\u2019s drive to bolster the Korea Air and Missile Defense system \u2014 one of the integral components of the so-called three-axis system, along with <\/span>Kill Chain<\/span><\/a> and the <\/span>Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The THAAD system specializes in medium-to-high altitude interception, ranging from 25 to 90 miles (40 to 150 km). Meanwhile, upon deployment, the L-SAM will target medium altitudes of 25 to 44 miles (40 to 70 km). M-SAM-II and the U.S. Patriot system (PAC-3) ensure protection within the nine to 25-mile (15 to 40 km) altitude range at the lower spectrum.<\/span><\/p>\n

L-SAM underwent successful tests between <\/span>Nov. 2022<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>June<\/span><\/a> of this year. It is slated for final evaluations by the end of 2023, with mass production planned for <\/span>2025<\/span><\/a> to 2026 and full-scale deployment anticipated <\/span>between<\/span><\/a> 2027 and 2028.<\/span><\/p>\n

L-SAM can engage targets up to 124 miles (<\/span>200 km<\/span><\/a>) away using active radar guidance. Notably, its S-band frequencies contrast with THAAD\u2019s X-band: The S-band can detect ballistic missiles and aircraft further away but offers <\/span>lower precision<\/span>.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Despite the drawback in resolution, S-band radars are cheaper to produce than the X-band alternatives.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, public data that can confirm the L-SAM\u2019s effectiveness remains elusive.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe initial L-SAM, in theory, should be an indigenous analog to the lower engagement altitudes covered by the THAAD system, but we don\u2019t have good data on its performance across as many tests as we do for THAAD,\u201d Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told <\/span>Korea Pro.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s like having insurance,\u201d explained Choi Gi-il, a professor of national security division at Sangji University. \u201cIt would be ideal if the ROK could quickly intercept missiles at higher altitudes. However, if interception at 150 km fails, we would try again at 100 km, and if that fails, attempt again at lower altitudes like 80 km and 70 km and so on.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In its current iteration, the L-SAM would primarily \u201csupplement\u201d the THAAD system, particularly if high-altitude interceptions don\u2019t succeed, Choi emphasized. The remaining task for South Korea is to increase the L-SAM\u2019s interception success rate at its designated altitude without necessarily encroaching on THAAD\u2019s entire range of coverage, he said.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

South Korea unveils its domestically produced Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM) at Seoul Air Base, Sept. 26, 2023 | Image: Korea Pro<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

MISSILE DEFENSE EVOLUTION<\/b><\/p>\n

Even though it has yet to deploy L-SAM, South Korea is already looking ahead to the next iteration of the system while also looking to update its M-SAM system for lower altitudes.<\/span><\/p>\n

M-SAM Block-II, or Cheongung-2, is a mid-range surface-to-air missile. It specializes in low-altitude interception within the 9 to 25-mile (15 to 40 km) range and functions with the Patriot missile system at similar altitudes.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since 2012, the missile\u2019s domestic development has been spearheaded by the Agency for Defense Development. The missile was deemed combat-ready in June 2017 and entered mass production the following year.<\/span><\/p>\n

Several industrial partners contributed to the Cheongung-2 project. Firms including LIG Nex1, Hanwha Systems, Hanwha Aerospace and Kia have each played critical roles in creating various components.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea boasted of a 100% success rate in flight and interception tests with Cheongung-2, which contributed to international demand. In January last year, for example, LIG Nex1, Hanwha Systems and Hanwha Defense signed a significant export contract with the UAE\u2019s Tawazun Technology and Innovation during a state visit by then-President Moon Jae-in.<\/span><\/p>\n

This contract, estimated at around $3.5 billion (about 4.1 trillion won), marked a historic high for South Korean defense exports at the time.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Now, South Korea aims to upgrade the system further.<\/span><\/p>\n

This <\/span>April<\/span><\/a>, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration publicized its approval of funds for developing an advanced L-SAM \u2014 L-SAM II \u2014 by 2035. The allocated budgets stood at 2.71 trillion won for L-SAM II and 2.83 trillion for the M-SAM Block-III. The aspirations for L-SAM II include amplifying its interception altitude and <\/span>tripling<\/span><\/a> its defense range, allowing it to rival the capabilities of high-altitude interceptors.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moreover, the upgrade aims to incorporate a guided missile capable of long-range mid-flight interceptions, taking into account North Korea\u2019s advanced cruise and alleged hypersonic missile technologies.<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the primary focus of the M-SAM Block-III upgrade will be to elevate its interception abilities and bolster its combat capabilities, ensuring a fortified and reliable defense system.<\/span><\/p>\n

THE LONG GAME<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While the L-SAM that made its public debut last month can\u2019t supplant THAAD, its successor, L-SAM II, might be able to do so.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe current L-SAM is still not at the level of THAAD in terms of altitude and technology. But the objective of the L-SAM II upgrade is to advance it to that level,\u201d Shin Seung-ki, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), told <\/span>Korea Pro.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u201cBut it wouldn\u2019t be for a complete replacement, but complementing the existing THAAD while bolstering South Korea\u2019s own defense capacities.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Experts told <\/span>Korea Pro<\/span><\/i> that China\u2019s concerns regarding L-SAM would likely differ from its reservations about THAAD. A primary reason behind this distinction lies in the different radar systems the two missiles employ and that L-SAM would be an ROK asset, not one dispatched by the U.S. military.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cChina was never primarily concerned about the THAAD interceptors, but the possibility that the U.S.-operated AN\/TPY-2 X-band radar could be used to cue U.S. homeland missile defenses,\u201d Panda told <\/span>Korea Pro<\/span><\/i>. \u201cThat concern won\u2019t exist with the L-SAM.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

KIDA\u2019s Shin agreed.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe L-SAM was not created to counter China. While it can intercept Chinese ballistic missiles, it was not designed for this purpose. Although the radar beam can be adjusted during crises, it\u2019s not meant to target China. It was developed to counter threats from North Korea,\u201d Shin emphasized.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Sangji University\u2019s Choi described South Korea\u2019s recent announcement about the 2035 upgrade to the L-SAM II as laying out a vision for air and missile defense systems spearheaded by domestic technology.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cSolving the technical challenges to completely replace existing systems with indigenous technology will be gradual,\u201d Choi said. \u201cEven if we replace the air defense system with our own technology, there is no reason to discard or cease the operation of THAAD and the Patriot system. South Korea plans to utilize them concurrently.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

A US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense interceptor,\u00a0Sept. 19, 2013 | Image: 2013_THAAD_FTO-01_1 via Flickr<\/a> (CC BY 2.0 DEED<\/a>)<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

INDEPENDENT DEFENSE<\/b><\/p>\n

M-SAM, colloquially nicknamed the Korean version of the Patriot interceptor systems, also faces a similar issue.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe current M-SAM has a shorter range and operates at a slightly lower altitude than PAC-3. Therefore, rather than being a replacement, it is developed to defend against North Korea\u2019s long and medium-range ballistic missiles independently,” Shin of KIDA told <\/span>Korea Pro.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u201cTechnically, comparing it to the Patriot is still challenging.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWe are also attempting interceptions at high altitudes but cannot guarantee 100% success with the first attempt. Therefore, we use a multi-layered defense system, incorporating mid and low-altitude systems,\u201d Choi of Sangji University explained.<\/span><\/p>\n

Choi also signaled the ambition behind M-SAM III and L-SAM II: a vision of reducing reliance on the Patriot system and moving toward a wholly Korean air defense architecture.<\/span><\/p>\n

Yet he was quick to temper expectations. \u201cEven if the M-SAM exhibits superior accuracy and range, there is no reason to discard the Patriot system completely \u2014 like with L-SAM,\u201d Choi said.<\/span><\/p>\n

Panda stated that cost-effectiveness and interception capabilities will be important for the future development of L-SAM and M-SAM systems.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cIf South Korea can cost-effectively scale these missile defenses and they prove to be effective, then Seoul will have a potent capability on its hands,\u201d Panda said.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThis, however, has <\/span>scarcely<\/span><\/a> been the case across many other cases of advanced states pursuing missile defenses to cope with missile threats. Israel is a notable exception, but it faces a very different and relatively unsophisticated set of rocket and missile threats compared to what North Korea can pose to South Korea.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Joon Ha Park contributed to this analysis. Edited by John Lee<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Defense & Security<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

South Korea showed off its long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) for the first time at a military parade in Seoul last month, a system that is central to the country\u2019s evolving missile defense strategy, in particular for defending against threats from North Korea.\u00a0 Currently in its final development phase, the L-SAM system is anticipated to enter […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10407,"featured_media":2202428,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[26,28],"class_list":["post-2202427","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-defense-security","tag-inter-korean-foreign-relations"],"yoast_head":"\nWhy South Korea\u2019s new indigenous missile interceptor can\u2019t replace THAAD - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/why-south-koreas-new-indigenous-missile-interceptor-cant-replace-thaad\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why South Korea\u2019s new indigenous missile interceptor can\u2019t replace THAAD - 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