{"id":2202423,"date":"2023-10-06T08:00:50","date_gmt":"2023-10-05T23:00:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2202423"},"modified":"2023-10-05T15:37:36","modified_gmt":"2023-10-05T06:37:36","slug":"declining-us-voters-support-for-south-korea-will-likely-reignite-nuclear-debate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/10\/declining-us-voters-support-for-south-korea-will-likely-reignite-nuclear-debate\/","title":{"rendered":"Declining US voters\u2019 support for South Korea will likely reignite nuclear debate"},"content":{"rendered":"
Research from the <\/span>Chicago Council on Global Affairs<\/span><\/a> has indicated a drop in American public support for U.S. military bases in South Korea. While a majority, 64%, still backs the presence of these bases, this marks a six percentage point decrease from the previous year. This decrease is consistent with reduced American support for overseas military bases in other regions.<\/span><\/p>\n Additionally, the report highlights a division in the U.S. public\u2019s willingness to intervene militarily in South Korea. When asked about defending South Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion, the respondents were almost evenly split: 50% in favor and 49% against. These figures present a significant shift from 2021, especially among Republican respondents. While Democratic support remains consistent, a segment of Republican respondents, who have traditionally supported such commitments, now show reluctance.<\/span><\/p>\n Why It Matters<\/b><\/p>\n The decline in U.S. public support for military intervention in South Korea could be linked to shifts within U.S. domestic politics. Specifically, U.S. President Joe Biden\u2019s ongoing <\/span>military support for Ukraine<\/span><\/a> in the face of Russia\u2019s invasion might influence the broader sentiment among Republican voters, leading to a more restrained outlook on U.S. defense commitments elsewhere, including South Korea.<\/span><\/p>\n Earlier in April, Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol jointly announced the <\/span>Washington Declaration<\/span><\/a>. The document, while establishing the <\/span>Nuclear Consultative Group<\/span><\/a>, emphasized joint planning concerning U.S. nuclear assets against potential North Korean threats. While South Korean officials presented this as a stride towards a more inclusive decision-making process on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, U.S. counterparts clarified it is <\/span>not a nuclear-sharing agreement<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n One of the underlying objectives of the Washington Declaration for Seoul was to address and mitigate domestic calls for an <\/span>indigenous nuclear weapons program<\/span><\/a>. However, the American public\u2019s apparent waning support for committing U.S. troops to defend South Korea in the event of a North Korean might renew debates in Seoul about the feasibility and necessity of independent nuclear capabilities, even after the assurances provided by the Washington Declaration.<\/span><\/p>\n