{"id":2201700,"date":"2023-07-14T18:39:47","date_gmt":"2023-07-14T09:39:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2201700"},"modified":"2023-07-17T17:01:24","modified_gmt":"2023-07-17T08:01:24","slug":"how-south-koreas-transactional-diplomacy-threatens-indo-pacific-partnerships","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/07\/how-south-koreas-transactional-diplomacy-threatens-indo-pacific-partnerships\/","title":{"rendered":"How South Korea\u2019s transactional diplomacy threatens Indo-Pacific partnerships"},"content":{"rendered":"

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol <\/span>called<\/span><\/a> on NATO\u2019s three other Indo-Pacific partners \u2014 Japan, Australia and New Zealand \u2014 to establish a \u201cstrong collective security posture\u201d to counter North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile threats this week.<\/span><\/p>\n

Yoon\u2019s remarks came in a meeting with leaders of the AP4, the name used for the four NATO partners as a collective.<\/span><\/p>\n

The partnership offers South Korea access to arms sales and collective bargaining power, enabling participation in Ukraine\u2019s post-war reconstruction plans. However, this relationship appears to be primarily transactional, contingent upon the immediate benefits that Seoul can derive rather than shared values and interests with fellow democracies.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such a transactional approach could limit the longevity of Seoul\u2019s interest in AP4. If the current benefits dissipate, South Korea may stop actively engaging the group, which could negatively impact Seoul\u2019s long-term security and geopolitical interests.<\/span><\/p>\n

A ROBUST FOUNDATION?<\/b><\/p>\n

South Korea\u2019s primary security concern remains North Korea\u2019s burgeoning missile and nuclear weapons program. The DPRK\u2019s recent launch of the <\/span>Hwasong-18<\/span><\/a> intercontinental ballistic missile, launched east toward Japan, underscores the continuous security threats South Korea faces from its northern neighbor.<\/span><\/p>\n

International alliances and partnerships are critical to South Korea\u2019s strategic posture. Yoon\u2019s call for the AP4 to establish a \u201cstrong collective security posture\u201d reflects its security landscape. These Indo-Pacific nations represent a collective that shares mutual security concerns and economic interests, extending beyond the threats posed by North Korea\u2019s missiles and nuclear weapons to broader geopolitical tensions in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, outside of its relationship with Japan, South Korea\u2019s ties with the other AP4 nations \u2014 Australia and New Zealand \u2014 are underdeveloped.<\/span><\/p>\n

Seoul achieved some recent progress in trade relations with Australia, especially following Canberra\u2019s decision to purchase South Korea\u2019s <\/span>K9 self-propelled howitzers<\/span><\/a>. However, the relationship has cooled since Australia announced that it will <\/span>reduce its budget<\/span><\/a> for further land armored vehicles. This decision dashed Seoul\u2019s hopes of introducing its Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n

While South Korea and Australia maintain <\/span>trade<\/span><\/a> in various sectors \u2014 Seoul exports petroproducts and vehicles to Australia, and Canberra supplies coal, natural gas, minerals and agricultural and livestock products to the ROK \u2014 neither country seems highly incentivized to deepen these ties.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cA high degree of trade complementarity, a security focus on the U.S. and a shared perception of \u2018bilateral irrelevance\u2019 mean neither side has sought to build the relationship,\u201d Jeffrey Robertson, a professor at Yonsei University, told <\/span>Korea Pro<\/span><\/i>. \u201cThere\u2019s a strong strategic rationale to build the relationship, but without a greater domestic constituency, there\u2019s little hope of real change coming soon.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In the case of New Zealand, South Korea\u2019s ties are even less developed. Despite a <\/span>more than twofold<\/span><\/a> increase in bilateral trade following the enforcement of the Korea-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement in 2015, Wellington lacks the economic and military prowess necessary to support South Korea\u2019s long-term interests.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cAs a smaller middle power, New Zealand does not have the capacity to provide anything but a token contribution to the security or defense of South Korea within the context of wider U.S.-led efforts,\u201d Robertson added.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus South Korea\u2019s rationale for seeking closer cooperation with AP4 countries may lack a robust foundation.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

The AP4 meeting at NATO summit in Lithuania on July 12, 2023 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

EUROPEAN INTERESTS<\/b><\/p>\n

On the other hand, Yoon seems to have multiple compelling reasons to cultivate closer diplomatic and economic relationships with NATO member countries and its larger partners.<\/span><\/p>\n

During the NATO summit in Lithuania, Yoon seized the opportunity to participate in bilateral summit meetings with <\/span>Norway<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>the Netherlands<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>New Zealand<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Romania<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Lithuania<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Sweden<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Slovakia<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Estonia<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Finland<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Hungary<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Japan<\/span><\/a> and NATO Secretary-General <\/span>Jens Stoltenberg<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Throughout these dialogues, Yoon highlighted potential areas for increased cooperation, such as supply chains, semiconductors, electric batteries, nuclear energy and the defense industry. While the effectiveness of Yoon\u2019s sales diplomacy remains uncertain, he clearly used the NATO summit as an opportunity to reinforce South Korea\u2019s key export markets.<\/span><\/p>\n

If his attempts prove successful, Yoon will be able to assert to domestic constituents that he has bolstered South Korea\u2019s vital economic sectors, contributing to the ROK\u2019s economic growth and employment figures ahead of April\u2019s parliamentary elections.<\/span><\/p>\n

Furthering his diplomatic efforts, Yoon <\/span>visited<\/span><\/a> Poland, Seoul\u2019s most important Eastern European trading partner, following the NATO summit. Yoon and Polish President Andrzej Duda committed to strengthening their nations\u2019 security, business and trade relationships. Officials from both countries <\/span>signed<\/span><\/a> memorandums of understanding to foster cooperation in infrastructure, modern technologies and future reconstruction efforts in Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

Though South Korea has avoided providing lethal military aid directly to Ukraine, Yoon has pledged continued support by fostering cooperative ties with Poland. In an op-ed for the Polish daily newspaper <\/span>Rzeczpospolita<\/span><\/i>, Yoon <\/span>wrote<\/span><\/a>, \u201cKorea will continue to work closely with Poland, one of Europe\u2019s largest donors to Ukraine, and will cooperate in the process of bringing peace and rebuilding Ukraine after the end of the war.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea has committed $230 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, including <\/span>non-lethal military aid<\/span><\/a> such as portable mine detectors and protective suits. Yet it has provided less aid than countries with smaller economies like the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden, according to <\/span>data<\/span><\/a> by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a German think tank.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nonetheless, the ROK has provided weapons shipments to Poland, which has, in turn, freed up Warsaw to send a substantial portion of its Soviet-era weapons to assist Ukraine. Yoon <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a> that South Korea would continue to support Ukraine\u2019s reconstruction in partnership with Poland, which he called an \u201c<\/span>optimal partner<\/span><\/a>\u201d for the reconstruction process.<\/span><\/p>\n

Notably, Ukraine anticipates needing around <\/span>$1.1 trillion<\/span><\/a> in foreign assistance to repair the damage caused by Russia\u2019s invasion. Rostyslav Shurma, the deputy head of Ukraine\u2019s presidential office, <\/span>remarked<\/span><\/a> in March that Kyiv expects South Korean companies to partake in various reconstruction projects, such as erecting two new nuclear reactors and establishing infrastructure for hydrogen and electric power generation.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

A bilateral summit between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO summit on July 12, 2023 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

JUXTAPOSITION OF VALUES AND INTERESTS<\/b><\/p>\n

South Korea’s economic interests in Europe could potentially eclipse its commitments based on shared values with the AP4 nations. This juxtaposition between South Korea\u2019s regional cooperation values and its economic interests in NATO reflects a delicate balancing act. The ramifications of this shift could have notable consequences for both South Korea and the AP4 nations.<\/span><\/p>\n

For South Korea, diminishing attention to the AP4 alliance might undercut its regional influence. Meanwhile, for the AP4 nations, if South Korea primarily perceives them as gateways to European markets, their initiatives to advance regional security and cooperation might be jeopardized.<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea\u2019s pursuit of its self-interest, even when cloaked as values-based diplomacy, might paradoxically impede its long-term interests. The potential impact on the broader regional stability and Seoul\u2019s position within the international community merits close observation and analysis.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by Alannah Hill<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Defense & Security<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol called on NATO\u2019s three other Indo-Pacific partners \u2014 Japan, Australia and New Zealand \u2014 to establish a \u201cstrong collective security posture\u201d to counter North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile threats this week. Yoon\u2019s remarks came in a meeting with leaders of the AP4, the name used for the four NATO partners […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10207,"featured_media":2201701,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[26,28],"class_list":["post-2201700","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-defense-security","tag-inter-korean-foreign-relations"],"yoast_head":"\nHow South Korea\u2019s transactional diplomacy threatens Indo-Pacific partnerships - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/07\/how-south-koreas-transactional-diplomacy-threatens-indo-pacific-partnerships\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"How South Korea\u2019s transactional diplomacy threatens Indo-Pacific partnerships - KOREA PRO\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol called on NATO\u2019s three other Indo-Pacific partners \u2014 Japan, Australia and New Zealand \u2014 to establish a \u201cstrong collective security posture\u201d to counter North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile threats this week. 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