{"id":2200855,"date":"2023-04-28T17:56:34","date_gmt":"2023-04-28T08:56:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2200855"},"modified":"2023-05-01T19:32:23","modified_gmt":"2023-05-01T10:32:23","slug":"why-south-korea-is-looking-to-ai-and-emerging-tech-to-bolster-its-defenses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/04\/why-south-korea-is-looking-to-ai-and-emerging-tech-to-bolster-its-defenses\/","title":{"rendered":"Why South Korea is looking to AI and emerging tech to bolster its defenses"},"content":{"rendered":"
The persistent nuclear and missile threat from North Korea continues to drive South Korea to modernize its military, and while the Yoon administration has largely stuck to Seoul\u2019s long-standing approach, it has shown an increased willingness to explore new technologies to offset the DPRK\u2019s rapid weapons advances.<\/span><\/p>\n Seoul\u2019s comprehensive strategy for addressing the North Korean threat currently encompasses a four-pronged approach. Three of these prongs are well known as part of the three-axis system: the preemptive Kill Chain, the retaliatory Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan and Korea Air and Missile Defense.<\/span><\/p>\n The fourth prong \u2014 enhancing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities \u2014 is not formally included alongside the three-axis system. But Seoul has implicitly acknowledged that ISR is an area <\/span>in need of improvement<\/span><\/a> by making it a primary short-term focus, including by looking for ways to implement emerging technologies like artificial intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n There remain significant limitations to the military application of such new technologies, however, that will make it difficult for South Korea to avoid relying on conventional capabilities like missiles for now.<\/span><\/p>\n HIDE AND SEEK<\/b><\/p>\n The strategic dynamic between the two Koreas can be conceptualized as a classic \u201chider-finder\u201d problem: In its quest for a survivable nuclear force, North Korea has sought to communicate that it is developing a vast and diverse array of strike capabilities, including dual-capable systems.<\/span><\/p>\n During wartime, these systems will be concealed and hidden, placing the onus on Seoul and Washington to find and destroy as many systems as possible to diminish Pyongyang\u2019s warfighting ability and limit damage to South Korean territory.<\/span><\/p>\n This effectively amounts to a \u201cconventional counterforce\u201d strategy, in which a non-nuclear, technologically advanced South Korea will strive to employ all available means to disrupt, destroy and degrade North Korea\u2019s nuclear force.<\/span><\/p>\n While the three-axis system remains central to the Yoon administration\u2019s updated <\/span>Mid-Term Defense Plan<\/span><\/a>, South Korean defense officials privately acknowledge that ISR will be crucial. Regardless of how precise and capable Seoul\u2019s Hyunmoo missiles become, they will have limited utility without accurate ISR inputs for targeting purposes.<\/span><\/p>\n Resolving this issue solely through technology is incredibly challenging, if not intractable, given the level of confidence that Seoul seeks. One of the fundamental lessons of recent decades is that even technologically unsophisticated adversaries can cheaply and effectively pursue force survivability.<\/span><\/p>\n U.S. efforts to find and destroy Saddam Hussein\u2019s mobile missiles during the first Gulf War serve as a prominent example: The U.S. Air Force did not destroy a single al-Hussein short-range ballistic missile launcher during that war, despite the availability of relatively high-fidelity ISR data in some instances.<\/span><\/p>\n In pursuit of this goal, Seoul has several ambitions. Among the most notable are its plans for space, a domain that is currently underexploited.<\/span><\/p>\n South Korea intends to launch <\/span>military reconnaissance satellites<\/span><\/a>, an initiative that dates back to the Moon administration and the 2020 <\/span>abrogation<\/span><\/a> of the U.S.-ROK Revised Missile Guidelines\u2019 restrictions on solid-propellant space launch vehicles. Space-based optical satellites will enable South Korea to reduce its reliance on the U.S. for strategic situational awareness capabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n