{"id":2200787,"date":"2023-04-21T18:30:51","date_gmt":"2023-04-21T09:30:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2200787"},"modified":"2023-11-20T18:17:34","modified_gmt":"2023-11-20T09:17:34","slug":"why-the-us-rok-summit-will-be-an-important-litmus-test-for-yoons-foreign-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/04\/why-the-us-rok-summit-will-be-an-important-litmus-test-for-yoons-foreign-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the US-ROK summit will be an important litmus test for Yoon\u2019s foreign policy"},"content":{"rendered":"
The upcoming April 26 summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol will be an important bellwether to gauge how and whether Seoul\u2019s diplomatic ventures have successfully bolstered the country\u2019s security and economic prospects.<\/span><\/p>\n As North Korea\u2019s threat continues to grow and geopolitical rifts and <\/span>financial instability<\/span><\/a> persist, South Korea\u2019s export-reliant economy faces <\/span>challenges<\/span><\/a>. In response, Yoon has prioritized the U.S. as Seoul\u2019s most important partner in overcoming these difficulties. Since taking office last year, Yoon has worked to prove Seoul\u2019s value as a high-tech, democratic ally to Washington.<\/span><\/p>\n In a <\/span>departure<\/span><\/a> from previous administrations, Yoon\u2019s government has supported and joined U.S.-led initiatives in the Indo-Pacific, such as the <\/span>Chip 4 semiconductor grouping<\/span><\/a> and the Summit for Democracy, even at the risk of upsetting China, South Korea\u2019s largest trading partner.<\/span><\/p>\n Seoul also announced its <\/span>Indo-Pacific strategy<\/span><\/a> last year, signaling its support for the rules-based, liberal world order, according to Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Yoon further aligned Seoul with the Western world by <\/span>establishing<\/span><\/a> a mission to NATO and hinting that he is considering providing <\/span>military assistance for Ukraine<\/span><\/a> \u2014 something the previous Moon administration was reluctant to do to avoid offending Moscow.<\/span><\/p>\n Seoul also presented a plan in March to resolve a historical dispute with Japan on forced labor, drawing criticism from <\/span>victims\u2019 groups<\/span><\/a> and accusations from <\/span>political opponents<\/span><\/a> that Yoon is appeasing the country\u2019s former colonizer. At the same time, Yoon incurred Beijing\u2019s anger by <\/span>saying<\/span><\/a> that regional stability around the Taiwan Strait is \u201ca global issue.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n However, the returns on Yoon\u2019s diplomatic efforts thus far have not been as evident as expected. The upcoming D.C. trip presents an opportunity to secure outcomes that he can show voters to justify his foreign policy choices.<\/span><\/p>\n Yoon must deliver concrete results. His approval rating dipped to <\/span>27%<\/span><\/a> last week before slightly rebounding to <\/span>31%<\/span><\/a>, and respondents pointed to his foreign policy initiatives as the most significant factor for their disapproval.<\/span><\/p>\n A NUCLEAR SHARING PLAN?<\/b><\/p>\n Among the topics that Yoon and Biden will address in their joint statement to further advance their 70-year-old alliance, Yoon\u2019s priority will be establishing specific details on deterring North Korea\u2019s nuclear capabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n As the DPRK regime improves its <\/span>asymmetrical capabilities<\/span><\/a> and develops weapons that can avoid detection, weakening the allies\u2019 defenses, the usual reiterations of the \u201cironclad\u201d alliance have become tedious and worryingly insufficient.<\/span><\/p>\n Following a <\/span>barrage of missile testing<\/span><\/a> by Pyongyang last year, Seoul and Washington agreed to strengthen extended deterrence \u2014 the U.S. policy of defending its allies from nuclear or conventional attack \u2014 and revive large-scale joint military drills and <\/span>nuclear planning tabletop exercises<\/span><\/a> (TTXs), which were downscaled or halted for around five years.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the measures agreed upon at last November\u2019s <\/span>Security Consultative Meeting<\/span><\/a> have not deterred North Korea from testing missiles or reassured the South Korean public. <\/span>Over 70%<\/span><\/a> of South Koreans now believe the country should acquire nuclear weapons.<\/span><\/p>\n With American voters <\/span>reluctant<\/span><\/a> to spend tax dollars on maintaining U.S. troop presence worldwide, South Koreans have grown skeptical about the level of protection the U.S. would provide in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack.<\/span><\/p>\n As a result, Seoul seeks to establish a tangible course of action for the execution and effectiveness of extended deterrence, according to a high-level government official on Friday. President Yoon Suk-yeol has pushed for a <\/span>nuclear planning arrangement<\/span><\/a> with the U.S., which would give South Korea more of a say in planning and operating responses to North Korean attacks.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The U.S. has reportedly <\/span>acknowledged<\/span><\/a> Seoul\u2019s desire to expand deterrence by increasing operability, such as nuclear planning and execution. This week, defense officials <\/span>committed to<\/span><\/a> accelerating the expansion of South Korea\u2019s role under the combined defense system.<\/span><\/p>\n The details are crucial, and some <\/span>observers<\/span><\/a> expect Biden and Yoon\u2019s joint statement might even include a plan modeled after <\/span>NATO\u2019s nuclear sharing arrangements<\/span><\/a>. If adopted, the U.S. might <\/span>redeploy tactical nuclear weapons<\/span><\/a> in South Korea and operate them in consultation with local leaders as in Germany and elsewhere.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n