{"id":2200749,"date":"2023-04-18T20:05:53","date_gmt":"2023-04-18T11:05:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2200749"},"modified":"2023-04-20T10:24:19","modified_gmt":"2023-04-20T01:24:19","slug":"despite-improved-rok-japan-ties-an-intel-alliance-remains-a-step-too-far","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/04\/despite-improved-rok-japan-ties-an-intel-alliance-remains-a-step-too-far\/","title":{"rendered":"Despite improved ROK-Japan ties, an intel alliance remains a step too far"},"content":{"rendered":"
ROK principal deputy national security adviser Kim Tae-hyo recently <\/span>floated the idea<\/span><\/a> that Seoul and Washington expand their \u201cintelligence alliance\u201d to include Japan. This marks the first time a South Korean official has used the term \u201calliance\u201d in the context of the country’s partnership with Tokyo.<\/span><\/p>\n The rationale for potentially including Japan in the ROK\u2019s intelligence-sharing pact with the U.S. is clear: North Korea\u2019s <\/span>missiles and nuclear weapons<\/span><\/a> pose a threat to Seoul, Tokyo and the tens of thousands of U.S. forces stationed in both countries. China’s growing influence and <\/span>military assertiveness<\/span><\/a> in the Indo-Pacific region are also driving the two rivals closer together.<\/span><\/p>\n While South Korea and Japan have a military intelligence-sharing pact, the <\/span>General Security of Military Intelligence Act (GSOMIA)<\/span><\/a>, the deal is not comprehensive. It is a mostly symbolic mechanism that does not obligate either country to share any military intelligence. Instead, GSOMIA <\/span>requires<\/span><\/a> both countries to use their respective domestic laws to protect the military intelligence they provide each other.<\/span><\/p>\n Intelligence sharing between the two countries is typically done through the U.S. via their respective defense treaties with Washington. By formally including Japan in the U.S.-ROK intelligence-sharing pact, the three nations could improve their coordination and joint responses to North Korean missile and nuclear threats.<\/span><\/p>\n But the high probability of significant pushback from South Korea\u2019s main opposition Democratic Party (DP), which still maintains a parliamentary majority, and widespread suspicion about Japan among the general public, means that Yoon has his work cut out for him if he\u2019s going to realize such a deal.<\/span><\/p>\n NORMALIZING RELATIONS<\/b><\/p>\n Including Japan in this \u201calliance\u201d has the additional benefit of cementing ties between Seoul and Tokyo, which the Yoon administration hopes to normalize before his term ends. <\/span>Polls<\/span><\/a> indicate that many South Koreans oppose President Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s diplomatic outreach to Tokyo \u2014 primarily driven by perceptions that Seoul caved to Tokyo\u2019s demands without having much to show for it.<\/span><\/p>\n The lack of public support and Yoon\u2019s low approval ratings could lead to the next South Korean president to scrap his policy of compensating South Korean victims of Japanese forced labor programs, leading bilateral relations to deteriorate once again.<\/span><\/p>\n However, Yoon would make it harder for his successor to undo his initiatives if he can elevate Japan\u2019s status from a partner country to an ally through a strengthened intelligence pact \u2014 even if the DP retakes the presidency in 2027.<\/span><\/p>\n Already the DP has been leading opposition to Yoon\u2019s efforts to repair ties with Tokyo. DP leader Lee Jae-myung <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a>, for instance, that Yoon\u2019s plan to compensate South Korean victims of wartime forced labor might result in the deployment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces troops in South Korea. He has also repeatedly described Yoon\u2019s attitude toward Japan as \u201c<\/span>subservient<\/span><\/a>\u201d and \u201c<\/span>humiliating<\/span><\/a>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Kim Tae-hyo appeared to acknowledge such opposition and seek to mitigate criticism when he <\/span>added<\/span><\/a> that including Japan in a U.S.-ROK intelligence pact could be \u201cconsidered in a step-by-step manner or on a case-by-case basis.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n In addition to domestic opposition, North Korea and China will likely respond negatively to Japan\u2019s inclusion in the intelligence-sharing pact. Pyongyang and Beijing will interpret the move as the three allies improving their cooperation and ability to coordinate against them, leading to further deterioration in Seoul\u2019s relations with both countries and possible military provocations.<\/span><\/p>\n