{"id":2200537,"date":"2023-03-27T18:11:34","date_gmt":"2023-03-27T09:11:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2200537"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:07:50","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:07:50","slug":"how-south-korea-can-counter-chinas-tactic-of-low-key-confrontation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/03\/how-south-korea-can-counter-chinas-tactic-of-low-key-confrontation\/","title":{"rendered":"How South Korea can counter China\u2019s tactic of low-key confrontation"},"content":{"rendered":"
A survey by the <\/span>Sinophone Borderlands<\/span><\/a> project last year showed that 81% of South Korean respondents expressed negative sentiments about China. This is a sharp increase from just a few years ago: A Pew Research poll from 2015 revealed that 61% of South Koreans had a <\/span>favorable view<\/span><\/a> of China.<\/span><\/p>\n Experts typically explain this sudden change due to tensions in bilateral relations, such as the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. But another reason for South Koreans\u2019 worsening attitude toward China is its use of foreign policy actions that experts often label \u201cgray zone tactics.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Examples of such tactics include but are not limited to <\/span>unofficial economic sanctions<\/span><\/a> on Korea following the THAAD deployment, barring K-pop groups like BTS from China, Beijing\u2019s apparent coordination of <\/span>fishing boat intrusions<\/span><\/a> into Korea\u2019s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and breaching <\/span>the ROK\u2019s air defense identification zone<\/span><\/a>, sometimes in conjunction with Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n But while China\u2019s gray zone tactics are troublesome, taking advantage of South Korea\u2019s deterrence strategy to irk the ROK into doing what it wants, Seoul still has options for countering a geopolitical approach that is ultimately harmful to Beijing\u2019s ambitions.<\/span><\/p>\n DEFINING GRAY ZONE TACTICS<\/b><\/p>\n Not all unpleasant actions that a state carries out are necessarily a gray zone tactic. Xi Jinping\u2019s <\/span>indefinite postponement of visiting<\/span><\/a> South Korea or the National Museum of China <\/span>not including<\/span><\/a> the ancient kingdoms of Goguryeo and Balhae in its chronology of Korean history seems a poor fit for that category.<\/span><\/p>\n The way many people \u2014 experts included \u2014 often <\/span>use<\/span><\/a> the term gray zone tactic as little more than a buzzword doesn\u2019t help. For instance, a <\/span>major CSIS report<\/span><\/a> defined it as \u201csomewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare,\u201d but such a definition leaves a lot of gray areas in the gray zone.<\/span><\/p>\n For instance, China\u2019s involvement in the Korean War was undeclared, with Beijing <\/span>still emphasizing<\/span><\/a> that it was not the People\u2019s Liberation Army but the Chinese People\u2019s Volunteers who aided Pyongyang. At the other end of the spectrum, there is nothing routine about Xi Jinping not visiting the ROK for nearly nine years. But somehow, calling it a gray zone tactic seems a stretch.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n