{"id":2200537,"date":"2023-03-27T18:11:34","date_gmt":"2023-03-27T09:11:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2200537"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:07:50","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:07:50","slug":"how-south-korea-can-counter-chinas-tactic-of-low-key-confrontation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/03\/how-south-korea-can-counter-chinas-tactic-of-low-key-confrontation\/","title":{"rendered":"How South Korea can counter China\u2019s tactic of low-key confrontation"},"content":{"rendered":"

A survey by the <\/span>Sinophone Borderlands<\/span><\/a> project last year showed that 81% of South Korean respondents expressed negative sentiments about China. This is a sharp increase from just a few years ago: A Pew Research poll from 2015 revealed that 61% of South Koreans had a <\/span>favorable view<\/span><\/a> of China.<\/span><\/p>\n

Experts typically explain this sudden change due to tensions in bilateral relations, such as the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. But another reason for South Koreans\u2019 worsening attitude toward China is its use of foreign policy actions that experts often label \u201cgray zone tactics.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Examples of such tactics include but are not limited to <\/span>unofficial economic sanctions<\/span><\/a> on Korea following the THAAD deployment, barring K-pop groups like BTS from China, Beijing\u2019s apparent coordination of <\/span>fishing boat intrusions<\/span><\/a> into Korea\u2019s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and breaching <\/span>the ROK\u2019s air defense identification zone<\/span><\/a>, sometimes in conjunction with Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

But while China\u2019s gray zone tactics are troublesome, taking advantage of South Korea\u2019s deterrence strategy to irk the ROK into doing what it wants, Seoul still has options for countering a geopolitical approach that is ultimately harmful to Beijing\u2019s ambitions.<\/span><\/p>\n

DEFINING GRAY ZONE TACTICS<\/b><\/p>\n

Not all unpleasant actions that a state carries out are necessarily a gray zone tactic. Xi Jinping\u2019s <\/span>indefinite postponement of visiting<\/span><\/a> South Korea or the National Museum of China <\/span>not including<\/span><\/a> the ancient kingdoms of Goguryeo and Balhae in its chronology of Korean history seems a poor fit for that category.<\/span><\/p>\n

The way many people \u2014 experts included \u2014 often <\/span>use<\/span><\/a> the term gray zone tactic as little more than a buzzword doesn\u2019t help. For instance, a <\/span>major CSIS report<\/span><\/a> defined it as \u201csomewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare,\u201d but such a definition leaves a lot of gray areas in the gray zone.<\/span><\/p>\n

For instance, China\u2019s involvement in the Korean War was undeclared, with Beijing <\/span>still emphasizing<\/span><\/a> that it was not the People\u2019s Liberation Army but the Chinese People\u2019s Volunteers who aided Pyongyang. At the other end of the spectrum, there is nothing routine about Xi Jinping not visiting the ROK for nearly nine years. But somehow, calling it a gray zone tactic seems a stretch.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Spanish political scientist <\/span>Javier Jordan<\/span><\/a> explains that gray zone tactics can be a valuable tool because it allows China to flip the logic of deterrence. Deterrence is when a country does not take a particular course of action \u2014 such as an invasion \u2014 because it fears the target\u2019s ability to impose unacceptable costs. However, gray zone tactics turn this power of deterrence around onto the defender.<\/span><\/p>\n

China might, for example, balk at putting its warships in ROK waters, fearing what Seoul and its superpower ally\u2019s response might be. There\u2019s also the potential damage to its global reputation to consider.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But China has much less compunction about placing fishing boats in South Korea\u2019s EEZ. If Seoul does nothing, then Seoul is implicitly saying that it is not in control of those waters. But if Seoul does too much, like starting to sink those fishing boats, China would be justified in sending in its navy.<\/span><\/p>\n

The ROK would also think twice about sinking Chinese fishing boats because its U.S. ally might get annoyed that Seoul let fishing boats and a minor EEZ dispute drag them to the brink of World War III. What\u2019s worse, Beijing knows that Seoul knows this.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It\u2019s now on Seoul to restore the previous status quo. By employing gray zone tactics, Beijing has slipped underneath South Korea’s deterrence strategy and turned it around on Seoul.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

President Yoon Suk-yeol meets with U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during a NATO side meeting, June 29, 2022 | Image: ROK Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

GEOPOLITICAL DILEMMA<\/b><\/p>\n

For countries on the receiving end of China\u2019s gray zone tactics, they are a wicked problem to deal with. Regaining deterrence means upping the ante, but Seoul can\u2019t be sure that Washington, or the Korean public, will follow it into a crisis. Even if they do, the rest of the world could judge that Seoul is in the wrong for overreacting. Meanwhile, Beijing can move on to the next pressure point.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, Beijing has formidable levers of deterrence, and South Korea could retaliate against de facto Chinese sanctions. But Beijing and Seoul know that would hurt the South Korean economy more than China\u2019s. As for China\u2019s rapidly <\/span>growing military capabilities<\/span><\/a>, even the U.S. would prefer to avoid a fight, even though it <\/span>expects to win<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

A potential way out for Seoul is to create leverage in other areas, cornering Beijing into dialing down its gray zone tactics. The ROK can do this by increasing <\/span>cooperation with the Quad<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>improving relations with Japan<\/span><\/a>. In part, Seoul is saying that it deserves \u201c<\/span>mutual respect<\/span><\/a>.\u201d Otherwise, it will keep sliding toward closer ties with Beijing\u2019s rivals.<\/span><\/p>\n

The problem with pursuing this strategy is Beijing\u2019s default foreign policy setting is now \u201c<\/span>dare to struggle<\/span><\/a>,\u201d a phrase used by Xi Jinping when he outlined the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s \u201cThree Imperatives\u201d <\/span>last year<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cIn the face of profound and complex changes in the international and domestic environment, we must remain calm, maintain concentration, strive for progress while maintaining stability, take action, be united and dare to struggle,\u201d Xi <\/span>said<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, rather than make concessions, Beijing will not rest until it has counteracted any leverage Seoul manages to create in one area until Seoul realizes the only way out is to <\/span>better align with Beijing\u2019s agenda<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

As China cannot overcome the U.S. or its allies\u2019 military superiority or the costs of engaging in overt hostilities, Beijing will leverage its power to gain concessions using the inverted deterrence logic of gray zone tactics. In internal speeches, this is called <\/span>\u201cstruggle but not smash\u201d<\/span><\/a> \u2014 exploit tension without losing control. Seoul has next to zero chance of shifting China\u2019s calculus.<\/span><\/p>\n

THE ONLY SOLUTION<\/b><\/p>\n

While there are possible solutions to China\u2019s gray zone tactics, they will require long-term commitment and patience.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea could complain about China\u2019s economic restrictions to all who will listen, <\/span>including at the WTO<\/span><\/a>. It could release videos of overworked South Korean coast guard officers professionally trying to <\/span>uphold the law<\/span><\/a> in the face of <\/span>hostile<\/span><\/a> resistance<\/span><\/a>. It could also publicize how the air force has improved its response to repeated approaches from Chinese aircraft and release <\/span>videos of such encounters<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

These solutions have a chance to work because China\u2019s gray zone tactics are counterproductive. Tactics should be a means to an end, but all too often, the tactics tail wags the strategic dog.<\/span><\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s goal is to maintain the global order while it replaces Washington at the top and center. While its gray zone tactics might have created the illusion of progressing toward that goal, that end goal is receding into the distance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Under Beijing\u2019s pressure, South Korea has increased its ability to resist and reached out to <\/span>other countries<\/span><\/a> under similar pressure, including Japan. China\u2019s tactics have already hardened regional and global resistance, and a powerful countervailing coalition puts a Beijing-led order out of reach.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, this doesn\u2019t mean being on the receiving end is good. China\u2019s gray zone tactics hurt South Korean interests, and leveraging deterrence can be dangerous. But only Beijing can decide to stop or continue. All Seoul can do is manage the risks while increasing China\u2019s costs of doing so.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by John Lee<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Defense & Security<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A survey by the Sinophone Borderlands project last year showed that 81% of South Korean respondents expressed negative sentiments about China. This is a sharp increase from just a few years ago: A Pew Research poll from 2015 revealed that 61% of South Koreans had a favorable view of China. Experts typically explain this sudden […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10407,"featured_media":2200538,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[26,28],"yoast_head":"\nHow South Korea can counter China\u2019s tactic of low-key confrontation - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/03\/how-south-korea-can-counter-chinas-tactic-of-low-key-confrontation\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"How South Korea can counter China\u2019s tactic of low-key confrontation - KOREA PRO\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"A survey by the Sinophone Borderlands project last year showed that 81% of South Korean respondents expressed negative sentiments about China. 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