{"id":2200455,"date":"2023-03-21T20:52:50","date_gmt":"2023-03-21T11:52:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/?p=2200455"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:07:53","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:07:53","slug":"why-aukus-could-have-knock-on-effects-on-south-korea-australia-defense-ties","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/03\/why-aukus-could-have-knock-on-effects-on-south-korea-australia-defense-ties\/","title":{"rendered":"Why AUKUS could have knock-on effects on South Korea-Australia defense ties"},"content":{"rendered":"

When Seoul and Canberra <\/span>concluded<\/span><\/a> a $1 billion contract with defense giant Hanwha a little over a year ago, it marked a historical point in Australia\u2019s defense strategy as the first major deal with an Asian country.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In a following contract, the South Korean firm far exceeded that deal by reportedly winning the bid to supply the Australian Defense Force with 450 <\/span>Infantry Fighting Vehicles<\/span><\/a> (IFV), which are worth about $27 billion.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is the Australian army\u2019s <\/span>largest acquisition program<\/span><\/a>. If successfully concluded, the deal would supersede the previous Hanwha contract to mark the most significant development in South Korea-Australia defense ties.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But the outcome of the agreement is far from certain because of Australia\u2019s other growing defense commitments. If the two countries are not careful, diplomatic relations will suffer.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

CHANGING COMMITMENTS<\/b><\/p>\n

The Australian government decided late last year to <\/span>delay<\/span><\/a> the official announcement of the bid\u2019s winner until its Defense Strategic Review (DSR), an independently led examination of Australia’s defense force posture, released its findings. The DSR will inform Canberra\u2019s defense allocation in the federal budget in May.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Due to China\u2019s growing naval capabilities, the DSR will likely shift priorities to long-range missile systems and capabilities. On the other hand, as some analysts <\/span>call into question<\/span><\/a> the relevance of IFVs in the Indo-Pacific security environment, there are <\/span>growing concerns<\/span><\/a> that the Hanwha contract could be significantly shrunk or outright canceled.<\/span><\/p>\n

Critically, Australian defense minister Richard Marles has <\/span>hinted<\/span><\/a> that his government is prepared to scale back some defense projects as priorities shift.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While the release of the DSR is anticipated in April, the AUKUS announcement just earlier this month is likely a harbinger of the fate of the IFV project. U.S. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met on <\/span>March 13<\/span><\/a> for the announcement of the optimal pathway for Australia to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS.<\/span><\/p>\n

The outcomes of this announcement <\/span>estimate a total project cost of up to $368 billion <\/span><\/a>through the 2050s, all but confirming that AUKUS-related expenditures will make up the lion\u2019s share of the Australian defense budget for decades to come.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

U.S. Virginia-class nuclear submarine, July 2004 via Wikimedia Commons<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

BIG NAVAL BUDGET<\/b><\/p>\n

While AUKUS-related <\/span>spending<\/span><\/a> will vary from year to year, if Australia\u2019s norm of spending 2% of its GDP on defense continues while assuming 2% annual GDP growth, AUKUS-related expenditures would account for nearly 28% of the country\u2019s defense spending over the next 27 years.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Australian government will face hard budgetary choices as it modernizes the Australian Defense Force to meet the current strategic environment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is deemed a \u201c<\/span>game-changer<\/span><\/a>\u201d capability for Australia. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that AUKUS-related expenditures will likely take high priority in Canberra\u2019s defense budget.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Yet as the diplomatic fall-out of the French submarine cancellation demonstrates, all choices have consequences. In the aftermath of Canberra\u2019s withdrawal from the French contract, President Emmanuel Macron <\/span>struck<\/span><\/a> Australia from his country\u2019s list of key Indo-Pacific partners.<\/span><\/p>\n

While the deal’s status for Australia\u2019s next-generation IFV remains undetermined, consideration should be given to how a scenario in which the contract does not proceed ahead as planned might impact Seoul-Canberra defense ties. Despite tendencies to view arms sales as a minor part of strategic relationships, defense contracts are an essential foundation for security cooperation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Because the South Korea-Australia defense relationship is relatively underdeveloped, these initial contracts are essential to solidifying trust and establishing patterns of cooperation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One poorly handled deal early on has the potential to sour relations moving forward. Because defense-industrial cooperation can often be a precursor to deeper security cooperation overall, the outcome of the IFV contract will bear out more widely on the relationship’s future.<\/span><\/p>\n

It should be noted that during the Dec. 2021 announcement of the $1 billion Hanwha contract, former ROK President Moon Jae-in and former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison simultaneously declared the upgrade of the bilateral relationship to a \u201c<\/span>comprehensive strategic partnership<\/span><\/a>.\u201d Arms sales can carry broader implications for the overall strategic tone of bilateral relations.<\/span><\/p>\n

FUTURE OF ROK-AUSTRALIA DEFENSE TIES\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Since Seoul and Canberra upgraded their diplomatic ties in late 2021, the two countries have taken steps to strengthen bilateral security ties. Only four months ago, the South Korean and Australian defense ministers <\/span>agreed<\/span><\/a> to enhance interoperability between their militaries through expanded arms cooperation and strengthened bilateral military exercises.<\/span><\/p>\n

This agreement represents a shift toward <\/span>greater alignment<\/span><\/a> in South Korean and Australian strategies as both countries seek to broaden and deepen their security relationships with multiple partners.<\/span><\/p>\n

The most critical factor in weighing defense contracts is ensuring militaries are equipped with the capabilities best suited to meet mission requirements. And prudent governments generally allocate defense spending accordingly. But spending decisions and defense contract choices do not exist in a vacuum.<\/span><\/p>\n

When Australia scrapped plans to buy Korean-made Howitzers in 2013, it <\/span>sparked outrage in Seoul<\/span><\/a>, despite Canberra\u2019s attempt to justify the decision as motivated by changes to the strategic environment. The 2021 Hanwha deal was a successful attempt to revive the contract \u2014 nearly a decade later.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

If the IFV deal falls through, it could set back South Korea\u2019s diplomatic relationship with Australia for years.<\/span><\/p>\n

Shoring up the South Korea-Australia bilateral security relationship does not oblige Canberra to cough up the cash for defense deals. However, realizing the comprehensive strategic partnership will require sustained investment.<\/span><\/p>\n

Due to rapidly changing security requirements in the Indo-Pacific, the Australian government is preparing for a whirlwind of significant defense developments that will set the country\u2019s strategic path for the next several decades. And those rapid changes threaten to make some South Korean weapons platforms unsuitable for Australia\u2019s needs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Seoul and Canberra must ensure the path they set forward doesn\u2019t set back defense relations. To realize their shared vision of an Indo-Pacific region that is free, peaceful, and prosperous, South Korea and Australia cannot afford any regression in their hardwon diplomatic ties.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by John Lee<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Defense & Security<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

When Seoul and Canberra concluded a $1 billion contract with defense giant Hanwha a little over a year ago, it marked a historical point in Australia\u2019s defense strategy as the first major deal with an Asian country.\u00a0 In a following contract, the South Korean firm far exceeded that deal by reportedly winning the bid to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7824,"featured_media":2200457,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[26,28],"class_list":["post-2200455","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-defense-security","tag-inter-korean-foreign-relations"],"yoast_head":"\nWhy AUKUS could have knock-on effects on South Korea-Australia defense ties - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/03\/why-aukus-could-have-knock-on-effects-on-south-korea-australia-defense-ties\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why AUKUS could have knock-on effects on South Korea-Australia defense ties - 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