{"id":2199946,"date":"2023-01-24T09:09:59","date_gmt":"2023-01-24T09:09:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/koreapro\/?p=2199946"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:10:18","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:10:18","slug":"south-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy-neglects-the-indo-part-to-its-detriment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/01\/south-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy-neglects-the-indo-part-to-its-detriment\/","title":{"rendered":"South Korea\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy neglects the \u2018Indo\u2019 part to its detriment"},"content":{"rendered":"
South Korea <\/span>released<\/span><\/a> its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) on Dec. 28, 2022, adding its name to a long list of countries expressing their interests in the Indo-Pacific region.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n To its credit, the IPS <\/span>recognize<\/span><\/a>s<\/span> the region’s challenges, such as rising uncertainties in the security environment, geopolitical competition and the arms race. However, the ROK\u2019s\u00a0 Indo-Pacific Strategy is arguably a misnomer, as it largely neglects the \u201cIndo\u201d part relating to the strategic role of the Indian Ocean and India in favor of focusing on the Pacific Ocean.<\/span><\/p>\n This oversight is not mere semantics: By neglecting India in its strategy, Seoul risks losing its opportunity to meaningfully improve relations with New Delhi.<\/span><\/p>\n THE STRATEGY\u2019S FLAWS<\/b><\/p>\n Even if the U.S. welcomed South Korea\u2019s IPS, the ROK\u2019s strategy still lacks any concrete aspect that marks a meaningful change in its approach toward the Indo region of the Indo-Pacific.<\/span><\/p>\n Like its predecessor, former President Moon Jae-in\u2019s <\/span>New Southern Policy<\/span><\/a> (NSP), the IPS states the region\u2019s issues, addresses the regional sub-system and focuses on the role of allies, neighbors and partners in the region and beyond. However, it limits the region\u2019s importance by avoiding the contextual challenges the region faces, such as China\u2019s rising <\/span>influence<\/span><\/a> within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) states.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The IPS strategy looks at South Asia and the Indian Ocean in isolation, diagonally different from how it <\/span>looks<\/span><\/a> at Southeast Asia and its security links with the South China Sea. For instance, whereas the IPS mentions the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 26 times, it mentions India only three times, showing how much it neglects India and the IOR.<\/span><\/p>\n Since the ROK and India established diplomatic ties in 1973, trade between the two nations has significantly increased. <\/span>According to Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (<\/span>KOTRA<\/span><\/a>), bilateral trade between South Korea and India grew 40% in 2021 compared to the previous year, recording about $23.7 billion. And in 2018, then-President Moon and Indian Prime minister Narendra Modi jointly inaugurated <\/span>Samsung Electronics’ smartphone assembly factory<\/span><\/a> in Noida.<\/span><\/p>\n While this may have benefited both countries, the IPS limits the ROK\u2019s ability to expand that relationship into something more significant.<\/span><\/p>\n For instance, by constraining India to the IPS\u2019 <\/span>South Asia section<\/span><\/a>, the ROK splits India from its sphere of influence, the Indian Ocean. By doing so, the ROK restricts the possibility of cooperation on issues of maritime security, joint patrols and cooperation in East Africa.<\/span><\/p>\n