{"id":2199847,"date":"2023-01-06T08:52:10","date_gmt":"2023-01-06T08:52:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/koreapro\/?p=2199847"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:10:25","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:10:25","slug":"rok-2023-what-to-expect-for-south-koreas-economy-and-society-in-the-year-ahead","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2023\/01\/rok-2023-what-to-expect-for-south-koreas-economy-and-society-in-the-year-ahead\/","title":{"rendered":"ROK 2023: What to expect for South Korea\u2019s economy and society in the year ahead"},"content":{"rendered":"
Now that it\u2019s a new year, all eyes are turned to see what 2023 will bring for South Korea. While South Korea grapples with supply chain issues and global inflation, it is surrounded by potential economic pitfalls and political challenges on the domestic front.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, the Yoon administration and the ruling People Power Party remain in partisan gridlock against a deeply entrenched opposition Democratic Party.<\/span><\/p>\n For the second of our two-part prediction series, we offer predictions for South Korea\u2019s domestic policy, with insights from:<\/span><\/p>\n POLITICS: YOON TO POSITION ADMINISTRATION FOR 2024 ELECTIONS<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span><\/i>Karl Friedhoff<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In 2022, President Yoon Seok-yeol faced a steep learning curve in his first year in office. He often <\/span>fell short<\/span><\/a>, with <\/span>missteps<\/span><\/a> littering his first months in office. But as the year closed, his administration began to gather momentum. According to Gallup Korea, he closed the year with a <\/span>36%<\/span><\/a> approval rate \u2014 the highest mark since mid-July.<\/span><\/p>\n He achieved this by adopting a <\/span>harder-edged image<\/span><\/a> when dealing with the media and the opposition party. That has seemingly proven a successful formula and is likely to continue.<\/span><\/p>\n The international media will continue to focus on North Korea and security challenges as the most significant issues facing the Yoon administration. Still, those will have little effect on the domestic perception of his presidency.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Instead, much of 2023 will be focused on positioning his administration and party for the April 2024 National Assembly elections \u2014 especially in the latter half of the year. As Yoon consolidates his support, his approval rates seem likely to recover, settling in the high-30s to low-40s.<\/span><\/p>\n For Yoon, the 2024 general election will define his presidency. If the opposition party retains its majority, Yoon will complete his 5-year term without hope of achieving anything of legislative significance. That will be a first for a sitting Korean president and will hasten his transformation <\/span>into lame duck president with nearly two years remaining in his term.<\/span><\/p>\n ECONOMY: HOUSING MARKET, INFLATION AND FISCAL POLICY<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span><\/i>Peter Ward<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The <\/span>housing market<\/span><\/a> is perhaps the most worrisome issue facing South Korea in 2023. There has already been a significant contraction due to interest rate rises and the government\u2019s talk of <\/span>relaxing regulations<\/span><\/a> on speculation may do less than hoped for in preventing a hard landing.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n A hard landing would be awful for many households that would become poorer and see their consumer spending freefall. A hard landing would also constrain the Bank of Korea\u2019s (BOK) capacity to raise interest rates further and thus probably have a negative impact on the <\/span>value of the Korean won<\/span><\/a> as well.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Inflation has proved thus far less worryingly high than in many parts of the OECD. Planned <\/span>energy<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>public transport<\/span><\/a> price rises in the coming year will hit consumers, but the main drivers of inflation thus far have been <\/span>food, fuel and housing costs<\/span><\/a>. Base effects may kick in before too long with food and fuel and house costs are liable to fall further with a falling market.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n However, imported inflation is still likely to hit consumers and force the BOK to keep rates higher than the housing market would warrant.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The risk of a hard landing in the housing market is what it will do to consumption and output rather than its effects on the financial system. That said, Bank of International Settlement (BIS) early warning indicators <\/span>indicate<\/span><\/a> that Korea faces a significant threat of a banking crisis of some description, given debt levels and rising debt servicing costs.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Fiscal policy may help to alleviate this risk somewhat and the fact that the country\u2019s banks have <\/span>high capital buffers<\/span><\/a> means that if a crisis is to come, it may take quite some time. The BOK is sanguine in the coming year and default rates are still low. So a financial crisis, if one is to happen, doesn\u2019t appear to be likely soon.<\/span><\/p>\n ROK MILITARY: SEOUL TO BRACE FOR POTENTIAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH NORTH KOREA\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span><\/i>Jeongmin Kim<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In 2023, South Korea will focus its military operations on countering North Korea and there is a high chance of armed, albeit limited conflict between the two Koreas. Knowing this, South Korea will focus on acquiring offensive and defensive weapons that match developing DPRK capabilities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Last year ended with a DPRK <\/span>drone incursion<\/span><\/a> in Seoul airspace and the first day of 2023 kicked off with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un directly <\/span>stipulating<\/span><\/a> South Korea as a target for the country\u2019s newly mass-produced nuclear-capable delivery system. Yoon severely <\/span>reprimanded<\/span><\/a> the defense minister for failing to shoot down the drones and not training enough, suggesting the contours of ROK defense priorities in the new year.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The DPRK\u2019s updated doctrine, which states the country will <\/span>preemptively use nuclear strikes<\/span><\/a> against non-nuclear threats, has prompted <\/span>renewed debates<\/span><\/a> about the redeployment or development of tactical nuclear weapons in Seoul. That debate will likely continue in the new year, evidenced by Yoon\u2019s desire to have more of a say in U.S. <\/span>nuclear forces\u2019 operations<\/span><\/a>\u00a0beyond traditional extended deterrence practices.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Both Koreas breached the armistice in 2022, and unless either side finds a way to de-escalate, there\u2019s a high chance this will happen again in one form or another.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n If North Korea breaches the terms of the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) again, such as firing artillery rounds into ROK waters, launching missiles that land off South Korean coasts, or sending aircraft across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), Seoul will suspend the military deal and likely return its troops and conduct military field exercises near the border regions.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n President Yoon Suk-yeol does not shy away from ordering officials to go <\/span>beyond \u201cproportional\u201d responses<\/span><\/a> to North Korean \u201cprovocations.\u201d This will influence the military\u2019s decision-making procedures at moments of potential clashes.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, South Korea\u2019s arms development will receive renewed interest and investment despite the <\/span>modest defense budget<\/span><\/a> raise in 2023. With the opposition holding a majority of seats in parliament, however, the administration could face challenges passing additional budget requests for certain weapons systems in late 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n ARMS SALES: WAR IS BUSINESS AND BUSINESS IS GOOD<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span><\/i>Yeji Chung<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n South Korea\u2019s arms industry had its best year in 2022 as it marked a record-high arms export worth about $17 billion (22.4 trillion KRW) \u2014 a remarkable jump from the <\/span>$3 billion or so<\/span><\/a> annual revenue in past decades.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Several factors, such as the Yoon Suk-yeol administration\u2019s aggressive export strategy and a <\/span>multi-billion deal with Poland<\/span><\/a>, were collectively well-timed boons that kicked off a new era in overseas ROK arms sales.<\/span><\/p>\n This trend will likely continue in 2023. ROK defense industry firm Hyundai Rotem is closing in on <\/span>a deal with Norway\u2019s Kongsberg<\/span><\/a> to sell K2 battle tanks at an estimated <\/span>$2.3 billion<\/span><\/a> (3 trillion KRW). Meanwhile, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is also in talks with <\/span>Malaysia<\/span><\/a> to export its FA-50 fighter jets.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The ROK arms industry has a brighter outlook than ever, with European countries neighboring Ukraine, such as <\/span>Slovakia<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Romania<\/span><\/a>, eyeing South Korean weapons in the face of Russia\u2019s ongoing war against Ukraine.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n But 2023 will not be without challenges. The South Korean military showed that it suffers from <\/span>vulnerabilities<\/span><\/a> ranging from a jet crash due to <\/span>poor maintenance<\/span><\/a> to the <\/span>misfiring<\/span><\/a> of a homegrown Hyunmoo-2C missile. Unless South Korea quickly addresses these issues, it will be difficult for Seoul to sustain foreign interest and sales.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n BUSINESS AND REGULATION: SMALL GOVERNMENT, NOT SO MUCH<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span><\/i>John Lee<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n After winning the presidential election last year, observers expected then-President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol to pursue <\/span>pro-small government policies<\/span><\/a> to help the economy recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. But external factors beyond his control, mainly Russia\u2019s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its spillover effects on the world economy, have forced Yoon to backpedal on much of his small government rhetoric.<\/span><\/p>\n Since assuming office, Yoon has been a chief proponent of state-led economic growth in two main industries \u2013 weapons and nuclear energy. Yoon <\/span>referred<\/span><\/a> to the defense industry as \u201ca new future growth engine\u201d and vowed to help South Korea become the world\u2019s fourth-largest weapons manufacturer.<\/span><\/p>\n He also vowed to accelerate nuclear energy and technology exports as <\/span>part of a goal<\/span><\/a> to dispatch 10 nuclear power plants by 2030. He will continue to pursue these aims in 2023.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In the coming year, Yoon will likely embrace his \u201cBig Government\u201d persona even more than he has in the first eight months of his presidency. As legislative elections will not take place until 2024, the National Assembly will remain firmly under the Democratic Party\u2019s (DP) control at least until then.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Regardless of what happens with the <\/span>investigations into Lee Jae-myung<\/span><\/a> \u2013 the scandal-plagued DP leader \u2013 the DP will continue to block much of Yoon\u2019s legislative agenda. Just as Yoon had to rely on an <\/span>executive order<\/span><\/a> to get unionized truckers to return to work, his reliance on executive orders will, therefore, likely increase this year.<\/span><\/p>\n SOCIAL ISSUES: GENDER DIVIDE AND LABOR RIGHTS<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span><\/i>Sea Young (Sarah) Kim<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Gender equality in South Korea faces an uncertain future in 2023. A key issue will be the <\/span>anticipated abolishment<\/span><\/a> of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) \u2013 which was first proposed as a controversial election pledge by Yoon Suk-yeol in early 2022 and formalized into a governmental plan as of October.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n With the plan currently waiting for approval by the National Assembly, there is growing concern that gender issues are being neglected by both the soon-to-be disintegrated MOGEF and successive governmental bodies. Even with parliamentary endorsement, it will take time for other ministries to assume, stabilize and prioritize MOGEF\u2019s responsibilities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n\n
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