The prospects of improved relations with Tokyo remain tenuous and fragile, despite the Yoon administration\u2019<\/span>s focus throughout 2022 to warm bilateral ties.<\/p>\n To better understand the kinds of things South Korea might have to deal with in the coming year, KOREA PRO<\/em> spoke to a group of contributing writers and experts on topics that affect the ROK\u2019s diplomatic relations and foreign policies.<\/span><\/p>\n In the first of this two-part series, we offer predictions for South Korea\u2019s foreign policy front with insights from:<\/span><\/p>\n US-ROK RELATIONS: AN IRONCLAD ALLIANCE WITH A BIT OF RUST\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span>Sooyoung Oh<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Still, Pyongyang\u2019s growing missile threats and a possible seventh nuclear test will likely lead to renewed discussions on the effectiveness of the allies\u2019 <\/span>extended deterrence<\/span><\/a>. For example, ROK President Yoon stated this week that Seoul and Washington were discussing joint nuclear exercises, which Joe Biden and his office <\/span>denied<\/span><\/a>, indicating the two sides are something less than in lockstep with one another.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Confidence in the rotational deployment of U.S. nuclear assets <\/span>has been fragile<\/span><\/a> in Seoul and Tokyo, where there has been growing domestic support to attain or develop their own tactical nuclear weapons in the former.<\/span><\/p>\n While the North Korea agenda remains the focal point of the \u201cironclad\u201d alliance, it will not define the relationship in 2023 as Seoul and Washington jointly contend with broader issues of growing importance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Seoul\u2019s value as a strategic partner has notably increased for Washington amid its aim to counter Beijing\u2019s influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In the interest of regional stability and economic security, Seoul has agreed to develop bilateral ties into a \u201c<\/span>global comprehensive strategic alliance<\/span><\/a>,\u201d joining most U.S.-led initiatives, including minilateral forums on supply chains, semiconductors, space, climate change and cybersecurity.<\/span><\/p>\n Even as they upgrade their relations, tensions over trade will continue in the new year. Seoul and <\/span>Brussels<\/span><\/a> have cried foul over Washington\u2019s <\/span>protectionist industrial policies<\/span><\/a>, namely the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). U.S. allies have been mindful of their trade reliance on Beijing and would like to see more convincing economic benefits for America\u2019s partners.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Given the current lack of political impetus for multilateral trade agreements in the U.S. and the upcoming 2024 Presidential Election, it\u2019s uncertain whether the 118th Congress will revise the IRA, remove Trump-era tariffs on foreign steel, or take more actions to develop the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) <\/span>beyond the inception stage<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n ROK-CHINA RELATIONS: THE SHRIMP AND THE WHALE<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span>James Fretwell<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n Yoon Suk-yeol came into office promising a firmer approach toward China than his predecessor, Moon Jae-in. Still, the Yoon administration looks set to strengthen relations with the U.S. \u2014 whom it relies on for protection against North Korea \u2014 while not aggravating China \u2014 its largest trading partner \u2014 as much as possible.<\/span><\/p>\n South Korea\u2019s new <\/span>Indo-Pacific strategy<\/span><\/a> reflects this rebalancing act. Released on the cusp of 2023, it shares many similarities with the U.S. version, but it doesn\u2019t mention China nearly as often or as critically. The Yoon administration <\/span>stressed<\/span><\/a> at a press briefing for the document that, while the U.S. regards China as a potential competitor, its strategy does not exclude the Middle Kingdom.<\/span><\/p>\n Seoul\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy laments the \u201cspread of exclusive protectionism and supply chain disruptions.\u201d Instead, it pledges to \u201cwork with others to prevent the overwhelming dominance of security concerns over economic issues.\u201d This statement suggests South Korea will fight to maintain its lucrative ties with China as the U.S. pushes initiatives like the <\/span>Inflation Reduction Act<\/span><\/a> (IRA) and the <\/span>Chip 4<\/span><\/a> semiconductor alliance.<\/span><\/p>\n With North Korea\u2019s rapidly advancing weapons capabilities and tensions over Taiwan, the Yoon administration will continue to try and allay Beijing\u2019s concerns about efforts to bolster security relations with Washington.<\/span><\/p>\n More North Korean weapons testing means more U.S. <\/span>strategic assets<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>missile defense systems<\/span><\/a> in the region, right on China\u2019s doorstep. Meanwhile, the U.S. seems to be pushing South Korea to play a <\/span>bigger role<\/span><\/a> in a Taiwan contingency, prompting the Yoon administration to <\/span>distance itself<\/span><\/a> from committing to anything.<\/span><\/p>\n South Korea wants to be on cordial terms with China. But since the perennial shrimp among whales can only operate in the space dictated to by U.S.-China competition, South Korea will be hoping for a detente in 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS: A FRAGILE HOPE FOR DETENTE<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span>Justin Yeo<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n With some luck, ROK-Japan relations might begin to recover for the first time in nearly a decade. The biggest obstacle to this in 2023 is the issue of <\/span>forced wartime labor<\/span><\/a>. However, the South Korean foreign ministry plans to co-host a <\/span>public debate<\/span><\/a> next week with the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians\u2019 Union on the topic of compensation for victims of Japan\u2019s wartime forced labor.<\/span><\/p>\n As both Seoul and Tokyo have agreed to \u201c<\/span>seek a prompt settlement of the issue<\/span><\/a>,\u201d both sides will likely announce a compromise deal by the end of January.<\/span><\/p>\n After the two governments announce their compromise, Yoon will likely follow it up with a visit to Tokyo. As Seoul\u2019s relations with Japan improve, the next step will be strengthening the <\/span>U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship<\/span><\/a>. Keeping in mind that the ROK general elections are slated for April 2024, the Yoon administration will seek to forge a compromise with Japan as soon as possible.<\/span><\/p>\n However, any improvement in ROK-Japan relations would be fragile. The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) will likely attack the Yoon administration for being \u201ctoo soft\u201d on Korea\u2019s former colonizer.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The recent rise in President Yoon\u2019s approval rating is a good sign, but anti-Japan sentiment is a perennial force in Korean politics. Suppose the Yoon administration is not careful in convincing the public of the need to improve relations with Japan. In that case, any compromise agreement on the issue of wartime forced labor may collapse.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n ROK-RUSSIA RELATIONS: STANDING UP FOR WHAT IS RIGHT ONLY WHEN ONE MUST<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span>Chad O\u2019Carroll<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n In 2023, South Korea\u2019s Russia relations will likely follow much of what passed in 2022.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n From a birdseye level, Seoul will continue to politically distance itself from Moscow, play a part in international condemnation of Russian atrocities towards Ukraine and grow its portfolio of <\/span>defense industry clients<\/span><\/a> based in NATO countries and near Europe.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n But it is likely that unless Russia crosses the threshold of using WMD in Ukraine or assassinating high-value targets like Ukraine\u2019s president and his colleagues, South Korea will continue to allow or even facilitate a range of lower-level activities that may be in Moscow\u2019s interest.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n These will include support for <\/span>rapidly growing bilateral trade<\/span><\/a>, ongoing visa support for the tens of thousands of Russian nationals living and working in the ROK (one of the <\/span>largest ex-pat groups<\/span><\/a> in the country) and <\/span>repatriating Russian refugees<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In other words, South Korea will continue wanting to have its cake and eat it, too. It will join in with global condemnation of Russia but do its best to protect ROK companies with business interests linked to Russia and the diplomatic corps from any real consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n But if Russia does cross a major military threshold deemed unacceptable by world powers, the Yoon administration might likely consider taking firmer action. For example, it could supply arms to countries that directly provide them to Ukraine. It\u2019s also possible that Seoul might even provide weapons directly to Kyiv if the global isolation of Russia reaches a truly mainstream level among a clear and vast majority of the international community.<\/span><\/p>\n A very high threshold would be required as South Korea prefers to hedge where possible and only takes strident action if and after it has become expected and mainstream among a vast majority of key partners and allies.<\/span><\/p>\n ROK-EUROPE RELATIONS: BUILDING ON STRENGTHENING TIES<\/b><\/p>\n By <\/span>Ramon Pacheco Pardo<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n South Korea-Europe relations have never been as robust as they are at the start of 2023. <\/span>Political and economic ties<\/span><\/a> have been strengthening for many years, especially since South Korea and the EU signed their <\/span>strategic partnership and free trade agreements<\/span><\/a> in 2010.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Last year, security relations reached new heights. The main reason is Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and Seoul decisively siding with European countries providing political, economic and military support to Kyiv. Yoon Suk-yeol\u2019s participation in the <\/span>June Madrid NATO summit<\/span><\/a> symbolized these closer security ties.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n We can expect relations between South Korea and Europe to continue to be solid in 2023, particularly as Seoul and the EU celebrate the 60th anniversary of bilateral ties. In particular, European governments and firms are seeking <\/span>access to South Korean technology<\/span><\/a> (e.g., semiconductors, electric batteries and green ships) as well as investment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, South Korea is becoming an ever more attractive investment destination due to its stable domestic environment and high-tech economy. In this sense, South Korea should benefit from Europe\u2019s push to reduce supply chain dependence on China, navigate Sino-American competition and boost its technological base.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, security links between Seoul and Europe should continue to strengthen due to Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine and what many see as growing China-North Korea-Russia cooperation. Seoul\u2019s new <\/span>Indo-Pacific strategy<\/span><\/a> will also boost security ties with Europe in that region.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n If there is any threat to better South Korea-Europe ties in 2023, it is the perception that some European policy-makers have that the Yoon government is too focused on strengthening links with the U.S., such as the <\/span>Chip 4 alliance<\/span><\/a>. This perception has had no significant impact on South Korean-Europe relations until now, but this could change if it becomes politicized.<\/span><\/p>\n Edited by John Lee<\/em><\/p>\n\n
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As South Korea and the U.S. mark 70 years of their mutual defense treaty this October, they will continue to <\/span>bolster their joint capabilities<\/span><\/a> to deter North Korea\u2019s growing threat to regional security. Seoul and Washington plan to deepen cooperation via new working groups, three-way talks with Japan and intel-sharing, and resume large-scale joint exercises such as <\/span>Foal Eagle<\/span><\/a> in April.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
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