{"id":2199760,"date":"2022-12-21T08:01:26","date_gmt":"2022-12-21T08:01:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/koreapro\/?p=2199760"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:10:30","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:10:30","slug":"what-rising-interest-rates-mean-for-the-south-korean-real-estate-market","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2022\/12\/what-rising-interest-rates-mean-for-the-south-korean-real-estate-market\/","title":{"rendered":"What rising interest rates mean for the South Korean real estate market"},"content":{"rendered":"
South Korean households have amassed a <\/span>significant amount<\/span><\/a> of household debt. The ROK government is adept at hiding its liabilities in off-balance sheets via public entities like KEPCO, which have quasi-government <\/span>guarantees<\/span><\/a> but whose liabilities government debt-to-GDP calculations don\u2019t include.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n However, households have nowhere to hide much of the money they borrow. Although household debt is a problem across the OECD, it is particularly acute in South Korea. A Korea Pro analysis indicates:<\/span><\/p>\n RISING DEBT<\/b><\/p>\n The ROK government has a healthy balance sheet when excluding public enterprise debt and is <\/span>still respectable<\/span><\/a> with it. The corporate sector is also <\/span>relatively healthy<\/span><\/a>, but the household sector is highly indebted.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n According to the <\/span>OECD<\/span><\/a>, South Korea\u2019s household debt is now at over 200% of disposable income, making it the sixth highest in the group. The speed of growth is also problematic, with the rate topping 5% of net disposable income in 2020 and 4.4% in 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n A popular interpretation of these figures is that they result from an underdeveloped welfare state, with households forced to borrow to compensate for income shortfalls. But the explosion in household debt is not a uniquely Korean phenomenon, with many OECD countries, including those with <\/span>expansive welfare<\/span><\/a> states, seeing a <\/span>marked rise<\/span><\/a> in household debt in the post-2008 period due to increasing real asset values and relatively stagnant real estate incomes.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n An apartment complex in central Seoul | Image: KoreaPro<\/p><\/div>\n WHO OWNS THE DEBT?<\/b><\/p>\n Two other related views explain increased household debt. The first view is that the desire and capacity to <\/span>purchase apartments<\/span><\/a> far exceeded the <\/span>rising<\/span><\/a> absolute supply of apartment units, driving prices upward. The second is that low interest rates incentivized a <\/span>housing bubble<\/span><\/a>, which pushed up indebtedness among people in OECD countries, albeit in some more than others.<\/span><\/p>\n Recent analysis from Bloomberg <\/span>indicates<\/span><\/a> that South Korea\u2019s real estate market is far less expensive compared to many other OECD countries, proving that the cost of housing is not the primary driver of household indebtedness for the average ROK household. In other words, the primary driver of growing indebtedness is not middle-class consumers being priced out of the housing market or borrowing beyond their means.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This finding is less surprising than it sounds. According to a 2016 study, households with high net disposable incomes tend to <\/span>hold<\/span><\/a> most household debt in OECD countries. These households have high credit ratings, can borrow significant amounts of money and have a relatively low credit risk.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Their low credit risk explains why banks are happy to lend and why rates of indebtedness continue to grow in many countries.<\/span><\/p>\n Further, these households generally have lower Debt Service Ratios (DSR; the ratio of debt service costs to annual income) and thus a larger cushion of excess disposable income to fall back on when interest rates rise.<\/span><\/p>\n So, household debt may not be a macroeconomic timebomb at the heart of the financial system that could spark a financial crisis as it sometimes may appear because asset-rich, high-income households primarily hold it. There have been exceptions to this, notably the <\/span>U.S. mortgage market<\/span><\/a> before the global financial crisis. Still, generally, this appears to be the case in OECD countries today, including <\/span>South Korea<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS<\/b><\/p>\n Hence, even if there is a substantial rise in interest rates, the households that primarily hold most of the country\u2019s debts can afford to make the repayments. And overall, the country\u2019s financial institutions <\/span>maintain<\/span><\/a> large capital buffers, meaning that a systemwide financial crisis appears relatively remote.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n However, two threats could still make South Korea\u2019s accumulated household debt a significant economic problem.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Rising debt defaults in smaller segments of the financial industry, such as <\/span>internet banking<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>savings banks<\/span><\/a>, illustrate the acute threat that household debt may hold for the country. Rising interest rates hit some households, primarily self-employed individuals, with <\/span>unsustainable<\/span><\/a> debt service costs and debt distress. The acute pain may fall on households whose overall significance for the financial system is minor, but their pain may still demand a societal response and require debt restructuring.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Existing research<\/span><\/a> on household debt also paints a gloomy picture of its <\/span>potential<\/span><\/a> chronic effects when interest rates rise. Households cut back on discretionary spending due to uncertainty and higher debt servicing costs. They also cut back on investment to pay down debt or to hold cash in case of an emergency. The net result is slower growth.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Thus, acute pain for some segments of the household sector, such as the self-employed, will likely spell significant social and political distress. However, a financial crisis appears highly unlikely, aside from those affecting relatively marginal parts of the financial system.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n But chronic pain could be felt for years or even longer if interest rates remain high and new growth engines do not emerge. Household debt overhang may speed up the secular stagnation anticipated due to structural economic decline.<\/span><\/p>\n Edited by John Lee<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n\n