{"id":2199347,"date":"2022-11-07T10:13:08","date_gmt":"2022-11-07T10:13:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/koreapro\/?p=2199347"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:11:02","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:11:02","slug":"legoland-default-a-bleak-signal-for-south-koreas-corporate-bond-market","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2022\/11\/legoland-default-a-bleak-signal-for-south-koreas-corporate-bond-market\/","title":{"rendered":"Legoland default a bleak signal for South Korea\u2019s corporate bond market"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Bank of Korea began raising rates long before the U.S. Federal Reserve, and Korean borrowers have had to start living with rising rates. Now, the apparent default of the developer whose borrowing financed the construction of Legoland Korea, and problems with short-term borrowing in the corporate debt market more generally as rates rise, have heightened worries about the state of the market.<\/span><\/p>\n

There are <\/span>concerns <\/span><\/a>in South Korea that otherwise reliable borrowers (investment-grade issuers) have had more trouble rolling over existing debt, or issuing new debt to meet their obligations (see this BOK <\/span>report <\/span><\/a>on liquidity risk). The size of new debt issuance in the corporate bond market also hit record <\/span>lows<\/span><\/a> in October, registering a net negative with corporations actually paying down debt.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This is a <\/span>global problem<\/span><\/a> for corporate borrowers, but currently it appears to be causing more immediate concern within the Korean market than elsewhere.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korean non-financial firms are more <\/span>heavily indebted<\/span><\/a> than firms in many other countries worldwide. Relative to profitability, however, firms in the ROK are still <\/span>among the better performers<\/span><\/a> in the OECD.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But earnings are heading down, and combined with higher borrowing costs, South Korean firms are struggling with declining demand for their debts.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some of this is driven by rising interest rates that make it more expensive for households, firms and governments to borrow, so it\u2019s not all that surprising that corporate bond yields would rise along with interest rates. But rates are not all rising evenly or at the same time.<\/span><\/p>\n

The spreads, or difference in price, on Korean government debt to corporate debt across a range of maturities \u2014 the borrowing period \u2014 and credit ratings have <\/span>broadened substantially<\/span><\/a> in the last year. What this means is that it is getting far more expensive for companies to borrow now than it was a year ago, in absolute and relative terms.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Further, Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine hit South Korea\u2019s energy market hard. This is not unique to South Korea, but the way Seoul has chosen to respond to this crisis breaks from what other countries are doing. Across the OECD, many <\/span>governments<\/span><\/a> have moved in to provide subsidies for people\u2019s energy bills. But in the ROK, subsidies are primarily provided via the country\u2019s state-owned energy utility, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

KEPCO is not allowed to freely raise its prices in line with prevailing market conditions, and thus is making <\/span>large losses<\/span><\/a> that could total as much as 40 trillion won this year, or over $28 billion). These losses are financed primarily through debt issuance, and KEPCO is regarded as a premier debtor (AAA) because they <\/span>have<\/span><\/a> implicit and explicit government guarantees behind them.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The company <\/span>issued<\/span><\/a> upward of 20 trillion won of debt in the first half of this year out of its total debt pile of over 50 trillion won as of late September. Its financials are <\/span>poor<\/span><\/a> to say the least.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In fact, under current energy price regulations and the company\u2019s debt limits, it is predicted to go <\/span>bankrupt<\/span><\/a> early next year. Hence there is a need to change the law to allow it to borrow more (kicking the can down the road), raise energy prices (which would impact <\/span>inflation<\/span><\/a>) or subsidize it (explicitly socialize the costs of energy subsidies).<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

South Korean Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho and financial authorities attend an emergency economic meeting on Nov. 3, 2022. | Image: The Ministry of Finance and Economy<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n

BEND NOT BREAK?<\/b><\/p>\n

The state of KEPCO has several implications for the corporate debt market. The corporation has issued debt at a substantial premium compared to earlier in the year, according to BOK <\/span>data<\/span><\/a>, even compared to the average in the corporate debt market.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Compared to normal, non-financial corporations, KEPCO comes with the significant advantage of an implicit government guarantee, which makes it very attractive compared to most other companies. Thus when it offers higher interest rates (which it has been doing as it faces a market increasingly <\/span>uninterested <\/span><\/a>in its bonds), it may <\/span>crowd out<\/span><\/a> other borrowers. The result is higher rates, and more trouble selling bonds.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is not the only supply-side cause in the market, however. Korean banks <\/span>have<\/span><\/a> also been issuing considerable amounts of debt. This is not because they are in financial trouble, but because of regulatory changes requiring them to hold more <\/span>cash<\/span><\/a>. Regulators have stepped in to <\/span>slow down<\/span><\/a> the implementation of these changes, but as prime borrowers, the sudden increase in bank bond issuance has <\/span>hit<\/span><\/a> other firms that are not quite as well-regarded by the market.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The less well-regarded <\/span>segments<\/span><\/a> of the financial sector, like savings banks, insurance, securities firms and other non-bank financial institutions are also heavily involved in project financing for the country\u2019s real estate market (both mortgages and the financing of new builds).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The sector appears to be stable and solvent as of now, but there are genuine concerns that as interest rates and defaults rise, the sector could face a serious liquidity shortfall that will require an emergency <\/span>intervention<\/span><\/a> by South Korea\u2019s central bank.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The real estate sector itself is also facing a serious squeeze as a result of rising rates, with significant amounts of short-term project financing debt instruments coming to <\/span>maturity<\/span><\/a> between now and March. Refinancing with new rates amid considerable market turmoil will be expensive, and it may be difficult for some of these firms to do so, with defaults thus becoming more likely.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

The Bank of Korea | Image: The Bank of Korea via Flickr<\/a> (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0<\/a>)<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

DIAGNOSIS<\/b><\/p>\n

How big of a problem all this is for South Korea\u2019s broader economy depends primarily on the response of the regulators and its central bank. Much of this problem stems from the need for the BOK to fight inflation. As observers have <\/span>noted<\/span><\/a>, much of the squeeze in interest rates and shortage of funds in the market could be resolved by BOK interventions in the markets.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The BOK and the government have signaled that they are prepared to intervene to avert a crisis, but some defaults and continued rate rises appear unavoidable.<\/span><\/p>\n

The BOK also has limited room to intervene given the state of the exchange rate and <\/span>inflation<\/span><\/a>. The country already has a serious problem with <\/span>zombie firms<\/span><\/a> and fast rising corporate indebtedness (which rose by 6.2% relative to GDP in the first six months of the year). Declining <\/span>profits<\/span><\/a>, high debt levels and rising interest rates are likely to hit South Korean firms in the coming few years \u2014 depending on just how high interest rates go.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Right now, out of OECD countries, Korea\u2019s corporate bond market is getting the most attention. This may be a timing issue to some extent, with other markets also looking <\/span>shaky<\/span><\/a> but with fewer firms needing to refinance right now. There are also similar fears that there will be a <\/span>wave<\/span><\/a> of defaults in U.S. corporate bonds as well, just not right now.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The talk within the U.S. market is of restructuring debt loads, which might imply lower interest rates for borrowers or even write-downs on the face value of bonds (partial debt forgiveness). Such talk may start to emerge in Seoul as well.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Fighting inflation may push the U.S. and European monetary authorities to induce a recession. In so doing, they will push down the profitability of firms, push up their financing costs, and by extension ensure defaults rise.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by Arius Derr<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Business & Economy<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Bank of Korea began raising rates long before the U.S. Federal Reserve, and Korean borrowers have had to start living with rising rates. 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