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The U.S. tests a THAAD missile interceptor on Aug. 30, 2019 | Image: U.S. Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency<\/p><\/div>\n
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE<\/b><\/p>\n
The big question then is whether it actually matters that Yoon has altered Seoul\u2019s public messaging on the three nos. And in all likelihood, the answer is yes.<\/span><\/p>\n
States don\u2019t just respond to material reality, but also how they perceive others\u2019 intentions. Generally, reassuring messages can de-escalate tensions, whereas ominous threats aggravate them, and the effect of ambiguous signals is situation-dependent and, well, ambiguous.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
Countries face a dilemma when sending a reassuring signal to one state means alarming another. In this vein, taking a public stance for or against the three nos, even while keeping actual policy the same, brings different advantages.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
By publicly opposing the Moon-era agreement, Yoon can appeal to his conservative base and the U.S. But he could still face a backlash from supporters if he doesn\u2019t actually pursue a change in policy that would violate the deal.<\/span><\/p>\n
On the other hand, Moon was able to improve China-South Korea relations by agreeing to stick to the three nos, even if only behind closed doors. This included securing the lifting of retaliatory measures that Beijing implemented in response to the initial decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea.<\/span><\/p>\n
Moon\u2019s approach is likely off the table for Yoon given how much emphasis he has put on improving ties with the U.S. and in light of his low approval ratings, which make him more reliant on his conservative base.<\/span><\/p>\n
But one option could allow Yoon to avoid the dilemma entirely: He could publicly oppose the three nos while privately reassuring China that it will stick to them. Beijing would be able to breathe a sigh of relief, while Yoon would not have to lose face and go back on his past promises.<\/span><\/p>\n
The risk of this approach is that China could publicly reveal that Yoon made such reassurances behind closed doors, not unlike it did when the Moon administration reportedly said it would stick to the three nos. Yoon would further lose the trust of his supporters as a result, as well as of the U.S.<\/span><\/p>\n
While Yoon could ask China to keep any promises about the three nos secret, it would be difficult to do this without revealing his cards. It would also be difficult for Yoon to keep information about Seoul offering reassurances to Beijing from leaking from within his own administration.<\/span><\/p>\n
Publicly opposing the three nos while privately offering China reassurances thus seems like a suboptimal option for South Korea as well.<\/span><\/p>\n
A BETTER APPROACH?<\/b><\/p>\n
If Seoul does make some promise to Beijing behind closed doors, a better option would be to do so in a way that is ambiguous enough to give the Yoon administration plausible deniability, while still getting the message across.<\/span><\/p>\n
A tell-tale sign that Yoon is pursuing such a strategy would be China softening its rhetoric on the three nos, which could occur if Beijing feels confident Seoul won\u2019t violate them and thus sees less reason to reiterate its understanding of the agreement.<\/span><\/p>\n
However, all of this assumes that security concerns are actually the cause of China\u2019s focus on THAAD and the three nos, rather than serving as a pretext for other motives. For instance, some have accused China of making use of the situation to assert power over its neighboring countries or to bully South Korea.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
More likely is that these issues tie into China\u2019s worry that South Korea will close ranks with the U.S. and balance against it.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
South Korea has an important question before it. Is it willing to risk Beijing\u2019s wrath by openly balancing against it? If the past is any indication, the answer is no.<\/span><\/p>\n
Edited by Bryan Betts<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n