{"id":2196464,"date":"2022-06-01T18:48:21","date_gmt":"2022-06-01T09:48:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/pro\/?p=2196464"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:12:19","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:12:19","slug":"why-supporting-taiwan-remains-a-bridge-too-far-for-south-korea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2022\/06\/why-supporting-taiwan-remains-a-bridge-too-far-for-south-korea\/","title":{"rendered":"Why supporting Taiwan remains a bridge too far for South Korea"},"content":{"rendered":"

From Beijing\u2019s point of view, U.S. President Joe Biden\u2019s recent<\/span> visit<\/span><\/a> to South Korea was concerning. For one, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol committed his country to<\/span> joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, despite China\u2019s<\/span> deep misgivings<\/span><\/a>. Seoul and Washington also agreed to beef up their combined defense capability via<\/span> expanded military exercises<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Significantly, Taiwan came up during the two leaders’ joint press conference as well: Biden<\/span> said<\/span><\/a> he and Yoon were committed to \u201cpromoting stability across the Taiwan Straits as well; and ensuring freedom of navigation, including in the South China Sea and beyond.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While this statement was nearly identical to <\/span>one<\/span><\/a> made in 2021 when Biden held a summit with then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in, it would be a mistake to view this in a vacuum. Yoon has made overtures toward taking a harder line on Beijing, and the war in Ukraine has also revealed ways in which South Korea could get more involved in the Taiwan issue.<\/span><\/p>\n

Recently, Canada <\/span>asked<\/span><\/a> South Korea for 100,000 rounds of 155mm artillery shells, noteworthy as Ottawa <\/span>plans to ship to Ukraine<\/span><\/a> M777 howitzers that fire the same ammunition. While Yoon has given <\/span>no indication<\/span><\/a> of changing Seoul\u2019s policy of providing chiefly <\/span>non-lethal, humanitarian assistance<\/span><\/a> to Ukraine, providing the ammunition to Canada could amount to indirect aid insofar as it frees up Ottawa to increase its own military support to Kyiv.<\/span><\/p>\n

The same goes for Poland\u2019s <\/span>request<\/span><\/a> to South Korea for<\/span> K2 Black Panther Main Battle Tanks<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>K21 Infantry Fighting Vehicles<\/span><\/a> (likely to<\/span> replace the T-72 tanks<\/span><\/a> donated to Ukraine) <\/span>and<\/span> K4 automatic grenade launchers<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Beijing will never compromise on Taiwan. But strengthening the ROK\u2019s alliance with the U.S. is also a matter of national sovereignty, identity and survival for Seoul. While the costs of crossing the Rubicon and supporting Taiwan appear to outweigh the benefits in the near future, the changing global order means Yoon may increasingly face calls to do so.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden attend an event at the conclusion of Biden’s three-day visit for a bilateral summit | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/a> (May 21, 2022)<\/p><\/div>\n

THE RISKS OF BACKING TAIWAN<\/b><\/p>\n

Any actions by South Korea to support Taiwan against China would put Seoul on a new and most likely irreversible trajectory. Moreover, it would incur significant risks as such a move would signal to Beijing that South Korea is ready for more direct confrontation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Seoul has already experienced China\u2019s weaponization of trade once before. When South Korea and the U.S. deployed a<\/span> Terminal High Altitude Area Defense<\/span><\/a> (THAAD) anti-missile battery in the South to defend against North Korean missiles, Beijing\u2019s <\/span>economic retaliation<\/span><\/a> cost South Korea <\/span>billions of dollars<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although Beijing eventually agreed to normalize<\/span> trade relations<\/span><\/a> with South Korea, it only did so after then-President Moon Jae-in<\/span> suspended the installation of additional launchers<\/span><\/a> for THAAD to reach full operational capability and after he made his<\/span> three-nos pledge<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The experience convinced many in Beijing\u2019s top echelons of power that South Korea is the<\/span> \u201cweak link\u201d in the U.S. strategy to encircle China<\/span><\/a>. After all, South Korea\u2019s economy is heavily dependent on exports to China. Furthermore, many in Seoul believe that Beijing is critical to the denuclearization of North Korea.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, if South Korea were to increase support for Taiwan, even indirectly, Beijing would likely ratchet up the punishment even more than it did from 2016 to 2017. Nothing underlined the depth of South Korea\u2019s dependence on China more than the impact last year\u2019s <\/span>urea shortage<\/span><\/a>\u00a0 had on the ROK\u2019s economy and society.<\/span><\/p>\n

Uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to South Korea\u2019s defense will also give Seoul pause about inviting China\u2019s fury unnecessarily. Although Washington has insisted it<\/span> remains focused on China<\/span><\/a>, Biden\u2019s <\/span>low approval ratings<\/span><\/a> mean <\/span>Trump could return to the White House<\/span><\/a> in 2024. If that happens, Trump would likely end the IPEF just as he pulled out of<\/span> the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP<\/span><\/a>) and put the ROK-U.S. alliance in<\/span> serious jeopardy<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

A plane pulls a banner that reads “Taiwan is not part of China!” as Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen arrives in the U.S. on Aug. 12, 2018 | Image: Taiwan Presidential Office’s Flickr<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n

THE BENEFITS OF DOING SO ANYWAY<\/b><\/p>\n

While the risks of South Korea supporting Taiwan are more obvious than any potential benefits, that does not mean they are nonexistent.<\/span><\/p>\n

Seoul knows how Beijing would react to it indirectly supplying arms and munitions to Taiwan or joining the U.S. and Japan in sailing through the Taiwan Strait. But such a move would allow South Korea to truly become what Yoon has called a \u201cglobal pivotal state.\u201d And firmly aligning with the liberal democracies of the world would open up opportunities that South Korea has not yet fully exploited.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, when former President Moon Jae-in<\/span> visited Australia last year<\/span><\/a>, many there hoped the trip would be about<\/span> addressing mutual security challenges<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> countering China<\/span><\/a> and elevating South Korea-Australia ties to the status of a<\/span> Comprehensive Strategic Partnership<\/span><\/a>. But South Korean news media and the government treated the visit as little more than another<\/span> presidential trip to expand exports<\/span><\/a>. Moon<\/span> insisted<\/span><\/a> that his trip to Australia had \u201cnothing to do with our position over China.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Neither Seoul nor Canberra have sufficiently invested in bilateral relations to truly enjoy a comprehensive strategic partnership. Unfortunately for South Korea, that applies to virtually every Western nation except the U.S. The good news for Seoul is that there is plenty of opportunity for improved relations and economic expansion.<\/span><\/p>\n

Fears of a second round of Chinese economic retaliation may also be overblown. Beijing realized that its economic retaliation pushed South Korea<\/span> closer<\/span><\/a> to the U.S. and led to<\/span> a<\/span> sharp decline in China\u2019s favorability<\/span><\/a> among South Koreans from which it has<\/span> yet to recover<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, when Beijing agreed to re-normalize trade relations with South Korea in 2017, one of the likely reasons for doing so was that further alienating Seoul could push it from a weak link to an aggrieved and rejuvenated partner in the U.S. hub-and-spokes system.<\/span><\/p>\n

Finally, due to<\/span> severe domestic troubles<\/span><\/a> resulting from the ongoing pandemic, the Chinese government might think twice before reverting to the same economic retaliatory measures it employed in the past.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen at a military event on July 6, 2020 | Image: Taiwan Presidential Office’s Flickr<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n

WHAT\u2019S NEXT<\/b><\/p>\n

Yoon is unlikely to pursue a more aggressive policy toward Beijing than his predecessor, at least for the first two years.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Anti-China sentiments among South Koreans<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> strategic encirclement<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> supply chain issues<\/span><\/a> provide plenty of incentives to side with the West. But global economic uncertainties, the possibility of Trump\u2019s return to the White House and<\/span> an opposition-controlled hostile National Assembly<\/span><\/a> will force Yoon to be cautious.<\/span><\/p>\n

The potential repercussions of pursuing an aggressive foreign policy are too severe for Yoon. His willingness to stand against Russia is likely because South Korea can afford to do so: Moscow\u2019s invasion of Ukraine is not going as planned, and Russia is becoming<\/span> one of the most isolated countries in the world<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Seoul will seek to reduce its economic overdependence on China. But until this situation changes, don\u2019t expect South Korea\u2019s support for Taiwan to go beyond a passing mention in joint addresses with the U.S.<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by Bryan Betts<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Business & Economy<\/span><\/a>Inter-Korean & Foreign Relations<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

From Beijing\u2019s point of view, U.S. President Joe Biden\u2019s recent visit to South Korea was concerning. For one, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol committed his country to joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, despite China\u2019s deep misgivings. Seoul and Washington also agreed to beef up their combined defense capability via expanded military exercises. Significantly, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3665,"featured_media":2196469,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[24,28],"class_list":["post-2196464","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-business-economy","tag-inter-korean-foreign-relations"],"yoast_head":"\nWhy supporting Taiwan remains a bridge too far for South Korea - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2022\/06\/why-supporting-taiwan-remains-a-bridge-too-far-for-south-korea\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why supporting Taiwan remains a bridge too far for South Korea - KOREA PRO\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"From Beijing\u2019s point of view, U.S. President Joe Biden\u2019s recent visit to South Korea was concerning. 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