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South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden at Osan Air Base on May 22, 2022 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/p><\/div>\n
Experts told Korea Pro<\/em> that Seoul\u2019s firm backing of U.S. leadership in the region, as well as South Korean firms\u2019 stateside investment commitments amid ongoing domestic economic difficulties ahead of the U.S. midterm election, were major \u201cwins\u201d for Biden.<\/p>\n For Yoon, hosting the U.S. president less than two weeks after becoming president was a big boon for the political neophyte, experts said. Yoon was able to secure stronger extended deterrence commitments from Washington, a key goal for the conservative leader.<\/p>\n However, experts also told Korea Pro<\/em> that there were missed opportunities, including no explicit outline of Washington\u2019s support for Seoul should Beijing retaliate economically against Yoon\u2019s pro-U.S. policies.<\/p>\n Korea Pro<\/em> asked the following experts to analyze what the top achievements and missed opportunities were during the summit.<\/p>\n U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at the dinner on the second day of Biden’s Seoul visit, May 21, 2022 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/p><\/div>\n QUESTION 1:<\/b><\/span> What were the key wins for Biden and Yoon from this summit, and what were some of the missed opportunities?<\/strong><\/p>\n Andrei Lankov: <\/strong>I think that Biden has secured the ROK support for major American initiatives, and also Seoul\u2019s backing in the U.S.-China rivalry.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Christopher Green: <\/strong>What Yoon needed to get from the summit was reassurance that the United States is back to being South Korea\u2019s implacable defender. He got that. Sunday\u2019s visit to the Korean Air and Space Operations Center at Osan Air Base exemplified the tenor of the visit \u2014 symbolically restoring the alliance.<\/p>\n On the subject of missed opportunities, it is easy to say that President Biden should have been more vocal in offering North Korea support in its fight against COVID-19, but how realistic would that have been? Pyongyang would probably not accept aid offered in the context of a summit designed around signaling containment and deterrence.<\/p>\n Kuyoun Chung: <\/strong>The Biden administration, which is currently battling domestic inflation due to supply chain problems, was able to provide various solutions through the ROK-U.S. alliance cooperation. For instance, Samsung’s new semiconductor production facilities in Texas and Hyundai’s new one in Georgia will provide Americans with thousands of new jobs and lead the provision of those goods in the world market, reordering the supply chain. I believe that significant leverage has been achieved as the Biden administration heads toward the midterms in November.<\/p>\n The Yoon administration successfully debuted on the international stage, sending its signal that it is more willing to take a greater role in the Indo-Pacific, with more converging strategic interests with the U.S. and regional partners. Also, the Yoon administration was able to secure deterrence measures with the U.S. against North Korea, including extended deterrence, joint military exercise and strategic asset deployment around the Korean Peninsula, which was the most pressing issue for it.<\/p>\n Myong-hyun Go: <\/strong>This was a summit without drama. The two administrations were closely aligned in many policy areas to start with, so it’s not a surprise that there was no point of contention in the joint statement.<\/p>\n So there were no negotiations beforehand. Yoon wanted U.S. reaffirmation of extended deterrence, a combined force posture against not only North Korea’s conventional threat but also its nuclear capability.<\/p>\n Biden focused on economic security, which was fleshed out in last year’s joint statement between him and Moon Jae-in. The main win for Biden was South Korea’s eager participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which was being criticized for being vague and lacking a trade agenda. With South Korea firmly anchoring the agreement, IPEF has become more real.<\/p>\n Having said that, there is a missed opportunity for Seoul in that there is no explicit commitment from Washington to support Korea in case of economic retaliation from China. This was a point of tension between Barack Obama and Park Geun-hye when Beijing retaliated against the South Korean economy following the announcement of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment in 2016.<\/p>\n As for Biden, some will argue that he could have gotten an explicit mention of China in the joint statement. Personally, I didn’t believe that this was in the cards. But I can see how some will see this as a missed opportunity for the U.S.<\/p>\n South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden on the second day of their summit meeting on May 21, 2022 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/p><\/div>\n QUESTION 2:<\/b><\/span> One of the main themes of this summit was a new “economic security” alliance between Seoul and Washington. Were there any tangible achievements?<\/strong><\/p>\n Andrei Lankov: <\/strong>Frankly, it\u2019s too early to say \u2014 such things take time. But I believe that President Yoon to a very large extent is ready to embrace the U.S. plan of \u201ctechnology securitization.\u201d<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Christopher Green: <\/strong>It would be easy to write this off as more a matter of style than substance. History is littered with examples of investment announcements made to coincide with U.S.-ROK bilateral meetings. Ever since South Korea ceased being dependent on American aid and emerged as an Asian economic powerhouse, the two sides have wanted to capitalize on their relationship. To oversimplify, South Korea wants access to the American market, and America wants South Korean firms to create jobs there.<\/p>\n But today\u2019s geopolitical risks are bringing additional opportunities as the world economic system adjusts. The United States is striving to deepen relations between democracies, with itself at the center of the network. This is not just about military power, it is about shared prosperity. Practically speaking, there is no question that Seoul is keen to take a slice of the American business \u2014 investments and contracts \u2014 that will either no longer go to China or be withdrawn from China over time if the current direction of travel is maintained.<\/p>\n Kuyoun Chung: <\/strong>Economic security, or more specifically, supply chain issues, were raised during the Trump administration as it emphasized the importance of \u201ctrusted partners.\u201d This issue has become more salient during the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. No longer are sustainable supplies of critical resources and technology guaranteed during this crisis. The U.S. also believes it cannot fully rely on authoritarian China. In that sense, securing and reordering the supply chain and broader economic security was vital. Achievements will be more concrete as countries join IPEF and agree on deliverables shortly.<\/p>\n For South Korea, as it will confront more economic coercion from China or Russia, it is also imperative to secure its supply chain and new market. South Korea\u2019s decision to join the IPEF will be another opportunity for Seoul to set the standard of economic activities in the region.<\/p>\n Myong-hyun Go:<\/strong> The agreements in semiconductor and network and data protection were expected, but it was interesting to see the level of detail. A great win for South Korea is in nuclear cooperation. Moon’s anti-nuclear energy policy had undermined the competitiveness of South Korea’s nuclear technology and power plants, but with U.S. backing and marketing, South Korea’s nuclear energy industry will be competitive again in the world market.<\/p>\n On the economic security alliance theme, I am struggling to see how this works beyond the point of rhetoric given how deeply invested many large South Korean firms are in China as both a manufacturing base and as a consumer of their products. This rhetoric around economic security clearly appears to be directed at China, but surely any serious moves to distance South Korea from China will hurt Seoul\u2019s economy more than the Yoon administration would be comfortable with.<\/p>\n The second one is the announcement by Hyundai that it will invest an extra $5 billion in the U.S., which gives immediate substance to the agreement by Seoul and Washington to cooperate in high-tech sectors and supply chain resilience. This is important in that both Korea and the U.S. feel threatened by China in this area.<\/p>\n The third one is a bit more clarity about the area of space cooperation. This is a new area of cooperation that only really started towards the tail end of the Moon administration, once Biden replaced Trump. South Korea lags behind the U.S. in this area, so it will benefit from this cooperation.<\/p>\n South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden at Osan Air Base, May 22, 2022 | Image: ROK Presidential Office<\/p><\/div>\n QUESTION 3:<\/b><\/span> How do you assess the promises related to “extended deterrence” that Yoon and Biden made during the summit? Are they any different from what was promised before?<\/strong><\/p>\n Andrei Lankov: <\/strong>The promises definitely sound more radical than what we have heard from Seoul and Washington recently. However, I am sort of skeptical on such issues: At the end of the day, the use of the nuclear deterrent will be decided by the U.S., not South Korea.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Christopher Green:<\/strong> Not substantively. The aim of the summit was to reaffirm the alliance and demonstrate how effectively the two sides are capable of collaborating. The leaders did that. There was nothing surprising in the joint statement, given that South Korea has a conservative government now and North Korea has turned away from dialogue. We shall see whether anything comes out of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group<\/a> (EDSCG) that changes this assessment, but there is no reason to think it will.<\/p>\n Kuyoun Chung: <\/strong>Extended deterrence has become one of the significant agenda items not only between the ROK-US alliance but also with the Japan-U.S. alliance as North Korea’s missile technology has become sophisticated and diversified, as exemplified in the recent test of a tactical guided weapon system that can include a small-yield nuclear warhead.<\/p>\n While strategic bombers, nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers have been deployed as a part of extended deterrence measures whenever North Korea provokes militarily, both Seoul and Washington need to come up with a more sustainable way of providing extended deterrence measures as the North’s provocations continue in the future.<\/p>\n Myong-hyun Go:<\/strong>\u00a0Extended deterrence is implicit in the alliance but again it requires periodic reaffirmation. South Korea and the U.S. did it in the last statement, but this time it was followed by specific actions that operationalized extended deterrence more tangibly, providing reassurance for South Korea. Strategic asset deployment was never requested by Moon and he also opposed increased military readiness.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Edited by Arius Derr<\/em><\/p>\n\n
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Peter Ward: <\/strong>A general win is that the two nations looked like they are moving in lockstep. Yoon basically offered commitments on the alliance front with respect to China and the Indo-Pacific that Moon had not been prepared to do. The rhetoric around liberal democracy was also, no doubt, pleasing to Washington. But let’s not forget that the deal on the IPEF may have been facilitated by last minute moves<\/a> to water down commitments required.<\/p>\n
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Ramon Pacheco Pardo: <\/strong>In my view, this has been a very successful summit for both Yoon and Biden. In the case of Yoon, he has Washington’s support for his North Korea approach, a commitment to extended deterrence that some in Korea doubted and an invitation to be part of Biden’s tech and economic initiatives. The latter is crucial for South Korean firms. As for Biden, he has obtained South Korea’s support for his security and economic initiatives, as well as a commitment to trilateralism together with Japan.<\/p>\n
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\nPeter Ward: <\/strong>I think the big investment plans unveiled by Samsung and Hyundai were smart PR by both countries, but I am sure there are some sound economic \u2014 as well as geostrategic \u2014 reasons for them to invest in such facilities. It seems super unlikely the investments would not have happened with or without the summit. But it was an excellent photo-op for everyone, so what’s not to like?<\/p>\n
\nRamon Pacheco Pardo: <\/strong>I think that there are three tangible achievements. The first one is South Korea’s commitment to participation in IPEF, even though there was already informal confirmation. I don’t think that this is meaningless. If South Korea had decided not to join, there would have been talk about this being a diplomatic victory for China. So Seoul joining has to be seen as a diplomatic victory for the U.S.<\/p>\n
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\nRamon Pacheco Pardo: <\/strong>I don’t think that the U.S. is promising anything new. But it is true that Korea and many other allies need all the reassurances they can get following the Trump years. So the Yoon government can rightly hail this as an achievement.<\/p>\n
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