{"id":2195873,"date":"2022-05-03T08:55:39","date_gmt":"2022-05-02T23:55:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/pro\/?p=2195873"},"modified":"2023-04-05T16:12:37","modified_gmt":"2023-04-05T07:12:37","slug":"how-politicization-of-south-koreas-covid-19-response-has-undercut-its-successes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2022\/05\/how-politicization-of-south-koreas-covid-19-response-has-undercut-its-successes\/","title":{"rendered":"How politicization of South Korea\u2019s COVID-19 response has undercut its successes"},"content":{"rendered":"

There\u2019s no denying that South Korea initially managed to keep a lid on the virus by responding stringently and flexibly when COVID-19 first broke out. Based on aggressive testing, tracing and treatment, the country quickly isolated infected patients and implemented social distancing policies to limit daily infection numbers.<\/span><\/p>\n

The strategy seemed to work, and as the world applauded the country\u2019s success in flattening the curve, the <\/span>Moon administration reveled in the attention, dubbing its response \u201cK-Quarantine.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, it was clear by autumn 2020 that the pandemic would stretch on and likely worsen over the colder months. It was also clear that COVID-19 vaccines would be readily available sooner than many expected after rapid development.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But South Korea did not move to seal deals with major vaccine developers, opting instead to spend millions promoting <\/span>K-Quarantine<\/span><\/a> as the global standard for <\/span>public health<\/span><\/a>.<\/span> The Moon administration <\/span>seemed to believe<\/span><\/a> South Korea\u2019s COVID-19 response was so successful that vaccine imports were not needed and that the country could develop its own indigenous vaccines, despite medical experts\u2019 skepticism.<\/span><\/p>\n

To keep this dream alive, the South Korean government chose to enforce ever-increasing social distancing restrictions and sow doubt about the efficacy and safety of foreign vaccines. There is \u201cno rush\u201d to procure mRNA vaccines from abroad, said Ki Mo-ran, a professor at the National Cancer Center and key <\/span>public health adviser<\/span><\/a> to the Moon administration, as recently as 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

The government did allow some groups to get vaccinated beginning in February that year \u2014 likely due to public pressure as the U.S. and other countries made vaccines widely available. But it was months before enough supplies were procured for the general population. Once the widescale rollout began, the K-Vaccine drive quietly ebbed away.\u00a0 Now in the third year of the pandemic, not a single K-vaccine has been approved and <\/span>prospects<\/span><\/a> for approval at any time in the future <\/span>appear dim<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The result of the administration\u2019s decision to ignore experts who disagreed with its overly optimistic narrative about vaccine development is that nearly <\/span>half of the country<\/span><\/a> does not trust the presidential office or elected offices to lead the pandemic response. Trust in public health authorities, such as the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA), has fallen by around 20 percentage points since 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

A vaccine passport system used in South Korea | Image: Lee Jeongsoo via Pixabay<\/p><\/div>\n

EVALUATING K-QUARANTINE<\/b><\/p>\n

As Moon Jae-in prepares to leave office on May 9, he and his administration are framing K-Quarantine as a legacy-defining success story. Despite the high daily infection figures published by its own ministries, the government has continued to blow its own trumpet, refusing to listen to criticism. Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum <\/span>said<\/span><\/a> the government’s quarantine efforts should not be undermined \u201cbased on the current numbers of infection cases.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Citing South Korea\u2019s relatively low death rate and economic figures, it was \u201cinsulting to the people\u201d to call K-Quarantine a failure. \u201cIt is unacceptable,\u201d he said.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The government\u2019s interpretation of the figures ignores reality, according to experts. The actual number of deaths is <\/span>likely to be much higher<\/span><\/a>, as those who died after their quarantine period or were indirectly affected by COVID-19 aren\u2019t represented in the bracket.<\/span> As hospitals were inundated with COVID-19 patients, hospital beds were <\/span>nearing maximum capacity<\/span><\/a>, critical surgeries were delayed and scores of elderly and severely ill patients <\/span>died waiting<\/span><\/a> for emergency care. In the first two months of 2022, ambulances took some 25 extra minutes to <\/span>bring patients<\/span><\/a> to the hospital.<\/span><\/p>\n

Further, the low fatality rate could be due to the country\u2019s high volume of testing. As the rate estimates the proportion of deaths among infected individuals, South Korea is likely to have a larger base of infected patients compared to other countries which would make the death rate smaller, according to Harold Lee, <\/span>director of the Center for Convergence Approaches in Drug Development at Seoul National University<\/span>. \u201cAs the denominator gets larger, then of course, the rate is going to go down correspondingly,\u201d Lee said.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Economic figures during the pandemic also shouldn\u2019t be taken at face value. <\/span>While South Korea\u2019s <\/span>overall GDP<\/span><\/a> fell by just 0.9 percent in 2020 and grew 4% in 2021, n<\/span>early <\/span>20,000 small firms<\/span><\/a> went bust every month in 2021, according to a state-funded Small Enterprise and Market Service report, <\/span>unable to survive indefinite periods of shutdowns and restrictions on business operations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Top-line growth rates have been mostly concentrated in the IT industry and driven by external demand for semiconductors and electronics from Samsung, LG and other conglomerates. Most South Koreans do not work for such companies: Over <\/span>nine in ten firms<\/span><\/a> in the country are small- and mid-size enterprises (SMEs) that have been hit hard by K-quarantine.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cOnce it was clear the situation would stretch beyond just a few weeks, they should have started discussing greater compensation or assistance to help people keep their jobs,\u201d said Yang Jun-sok, professor of economics at The Catholic University of Korea. <\/span>\u201cThe measures came too late and it could have been put to more structured and targeted use, particularly during the first year of the pandemic,\u201d Yang said.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As small businesses struggled, they were forced to lay off employees. The second year of K-Quarantine saw the fewest number of Koreans employed at SMEs as a <\/span>proportion of the workforce<\/span><\/a> in nearly two decades. Similar trends appear on the horizon as well, with central bank <\/span>projections<\/span><\/a> pessimistic for 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"

King Sejong the Great in Seoul’s Gwanghwamun Plaza, Feb. 2018 | Image: JH Seo via Pixabay<\/p><\/div>\n

THE FUTURE OF COVID-19 IN SOUTH KOREA<\/b><\/p>\n

The incoming Yoon government\u2019s goal should stick to the basics of public health: protecting people\u2019s lives and the health care system.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Its first job should be to elevate and follow the advice of the South Korean scientific community. The outgoing Moon administration was all too willing to subsume empirical evidence in favor of top-down, politically convenient policies.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWhat the government did was preselect a handful of mediocre experts politically aligned with the administration, which led to a very biased policy process,\u201d said Howard Lee of SNU. \u201cNo matter how many times we opposed and appealed to the government through channels like the media, we were shut out.\u201d\u3000<\/span><\/p>\n

South Korea needs a clear, non-partisan pandemic response system, with greater autonomy and capacity for public health authorities to coordinate an effective response, former KCDA chief Jung Ki-seok wrote in a <\/span>scathing review<\/span><\/a> of K-Quarantine policies. This means increasing transparency and accountability in order to prevent arbitrary or politically motivated intervention and decisions by government offices.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Public health strategists also need to look beyond short-sighted goalposts and devise strategies that allocate resources more prudently to prevent severe illnesses and deaths, Lee argued. \u201cTesting and tracing worked in the early days of the outbreak but sticking to this was short-sighted. As the daily number of confirmed cases fluctuates widely, basing virus prevention measures on the number of infection cases was basically chasing a moving target,\u201d he said.<\/span><\/p>\n

The majority of <\/span>last year\u2019s allocated budget<\/span><\/a> for the government\u2019s response to COVID-19 went toward financial subsidies to encourage spending, purchasing vaccines and strengthening quarantine measures. But South Korea can more effectively \u201clive\u201d with COVID-19 if the medical infrastructure is better positioned to help health care workers deal with a sudden influx of inpatients and if long-term projects to build capacity and develop vaccines for future pandemics are better funded.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The South Korean people did everything right, putting on masks before they were made compulsory by law, following social distancing rules religiously \u2014 even down to the tempo of the music playing at gyms \u2014 and jumping at the opportunity to get vaccinated. As of May 2022, <\/span>86.8 percent<\/span><\/a> of the population is vaccinated, <\/span>far higher<\/span><\/a> than comparable rates in the U.S., Germany and Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n

It was this high level of compliance that kept transmissions and deaths relatively low. But without discerning leadership, there seemed little payoff for the tremendous sacrifices that society was asked to bear. <\/span>As a new administration takes office in May, what South Koreans need at this juncture is not <\/span>a\u00a0 shining story of success, but practical ways forward and, above all else, honesty.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Edited by Arius Derr<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Business & Economy<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

There\u2019s no denying that South Korea initially managed to keep a lid on the virus by responding stringently and flexibly when COVID-19 first broke out. Based on aggressive testing, tracing and treatment, the country quickly isolated infected patients and implemented social distancing policies to limit daily infection numbers. The strategy seemed to work, and as […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3665,"featured_media":2195876,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[24],"yoast_head":"\nHow politicization of South Korea\u2019s COVID-19 response has undercut its successes - KOREA PRO<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/koreapro.org\/2022\/05\/how-politicization-of-south-koreas-covid-19-response-has-undercut-its-successes\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"How politicization of South Korea\u2019s COVID-19 response has undercut its successes - KOREA PRO\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"There\u2019s no denying that South Korea initially managed to keep a lid on the virus by responding stringently and flexibly when COVID-19 first broke out. 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