Despite the well-wishing from South Korea and China to mark the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations, Beijing’s intensifying rivalry with the U.S. looks set to fundamentally limit those ties going forward.

On Wednesday evening, leaders Yoon Suk-yeol and Xi Jinping marked the occasion by exchanging letters expressing their desires for “new directions of cooperation” and a “substantive friendship.”

This reflects the hope for a relationship that has evolved quite significantly over the past few decades: According to data from the Korea International Trade Association published just this week, South Korea’s exports to China are a mammoth 160 times greater than they were when the two countries established relations relations — far greater than the 5.2 and 2.4-fold increases during the same period for the U.S. and Japan, respectively.

Unfortunately for South Korea, it is increasingly forced to side with its security guarantor at the expense of its largest trading partner.

THAAD: RAD OR BAD?

The deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile interceptor demonstrates South Korea’s conundrum well.

Seoul initially deployed THAAD five years ago in response to North Korea’s ever-improving missile capabilities, but consequently endured retaliatory economic losses from China. Beijing protested that the system’s radar could be used to track its own missile forces, therefore weakening its nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Washington.

Although the previous Moon Jae-in government convinced China to end the pressure campaign by promising that it wouldn’t deploy any more THAAD batteries, the new Yoon Suk-yeol administration now says that it won’t promise anything that compromises its ability to defend itself. This could risk another round of Chinese retaliatory measures.

South Korea and China are at loggerheads over the deployment of THAAD | Image: @USArmy (Sept. 10, 2013)

TIED UP ON TAIWAN

U.S.-China competition surrounding Taiwan also threatens to spill over to South Korea.

Although Seoul tiptoed around this thorny topic during U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to South Korea, the issue is getting closer to home.

China’s military exercises in response to Pelosi’s Taipei trip included drills near South Korean waters. In response to the exercises, Washington flew a U.S. Forces Korea reconnaissance plane from the peninsula to the Taiwan Strait.

If Taiwan continues to be a point of contention in U.S.-China relations, South Korea could come under pressure from its ally to further facilitate and cooperate in regional initiatives to protect the “rules-based international order” — or, in other words, keep China in check. This again risks Beijing’s reprisal, this time over a dispute that Seoul might otherwise prefer to sit out quietly in the background.

CHIPS AHOY

The U.S. is also trying to drag South Korea away from China through the Chip 4 semiconductor alliance. While Seoul maintains that the group isn’t about excluding a “certain country,” Beijing certainly doesn’t see things that way.

Chinese state media has published numerous articles suggesting South Korea would regret joining the chip alliance.

While China is aiming to achieve 70% self-sufficiency in chip production within the next few years, meaning fewer opportunities for South Korea, it currently makes up around 60% of South Korea’s semiconductor exports. According to a survey of 300 exporters in South Korea by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry last week, 53% of respondents said Seoul should join the group, 41% said it should wait for now and 5% opposed joining.

The Yoon administration is evidently treading lightly. It hasn’t committed to joining the group yet and says it will make a decision following an upcoming preliminary meeting based on what best serves its national interests. South Korea will likely try to convince Washington to save as many links with Beijing as possible.

South Korea is increasingly forced to side with the U.S. over China | Image: The White House (May 21, 2022)

THREE NOS AND FIVE REQUESTS

China has put forward five requests to help the two countries avoid issues in the future: reject external influence; address each other’s major concerns; maintain stable supply chains; not interfere in the other’s internal affairs; and abide by the principles of the U.N. charter.

Of course, Beijing almost certainly interprets these friendly sounding words in a one-sided way — ditch the U.S. for Team China. It probably doesn’t mean it will use its leverage to address Seoul’s major concern about North Korea’s missile program, or respect the spirit of the U.N. by properly implementing Security Council sanctions on the Kim regime.

These are on top of the “three nos” Moon promised in 2017 that Yoon now refuses to be bound by: no more THAAD batteries; no participation in a U.S.-led missile defense network; and no trilateral military alliance with the U.S. and Japan.

Seoul says it won’t compromise its national security by reaffirming this agreement. However, even though it’s strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan military ties and participating in multilateral missile tracking drills, it doesn’t seem to have crossed China’s red line yet.

The Yoon administration might simply be trying to look strong to its conservative political base and the U.S. without actually doing anything that could prompt a Chinese response.

However, it has for months now said that it will “normalize” existing THAAD operations and recently announced that it will do so by the end of this month.

China hasn’t retaliated yet, but it might be laying the groundwork. Following a recent ministerial meeting in Qingdao, the Chinese foreign ministry tacked on a “restriction” to the three nos, asserting that Seoul previously agreed not only to no more THAAD but to also restrict the use of the batteries that are already on the peninsula.

It’s not quite clear what Beijing will or will not do, but it’s unlikely that the Yoon administration will back down on normalizing current THAAD operations after making such a public commitment.

In the years ahead, South Korea will try to convince Beijing to keep thorny military issues and mutually beneficial economic cooperation separate. However, with China striving to realize its superpower destiny, it remains to be seen how well Seoul will be able to do this.

Edited by Arius Derr